University of Massachusetts Amherst

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Open Access Dissertations
9-2009

Essays on Financial Behavior and its Macroeconomic Causes and
Implications
Soon Ryoo
University of Massachusetts Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/open_access_dissertations
Part of the Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Ryoo, Soon, "Essays on Financial Behavior and its Macroeconomic Causes and Implications" (2009).
Open Access Dissertations. 114.
https://doi.org/10.7275/j7tp-wb49 https://scholarworks.umass.edu/open_access_dissertations/114

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Open Access Dissertations by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

ESSAYS ON FINANCIAL BEHAVIOR AND ITS
MACROECONOMIC CAUSES AND IMPLICATIONS

A Dissertation Presented
by
SOON RYOO

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulﬁllment
of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
September 2009
Economics

c Copyright by SOON RYOO 2009
⃝
All Rights Reserved

ESSAYS ON FINANCIAL BEHAVIOR AND ITS
MACROECONOMIC CAUSES AND IMPLICATIONS

A Dissertation Presented
by
SOON RYOO

Approved as to style and content by:

Peter Skott, Chair

James Crotty, Member

James Heintz, Member

Diane Flaherty, Department Chair
Economics

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In the years during my graduate program at University of Masschusetts Amherst,
I beneﬁted enormously from Peter Skott. He provided generous support for my research, valuable suggestions and constructive comments on every aspect of this dissertation. I was very fortunate to have him as my disseration advisor. I am also grateful
to James Crotty and James Heintz who read this dissertation and provided several
constructive criticisms and helpful suggestions. Financial support from Political Economic Research Institute at University of Massachusetts at Amherst is gratefully
acknowleged.
I would also like to thank my mother, two brothers and four sisters in Korea for
their support and encouragement. Finally, I wish to extend my special thanks to my
wife, Bong A, for her support, patience and, most importantly, taking good care of
our adorable baby, Ian. This disseratation could not be completed without them.

iv

ABSTRACT

ESSAYS ON FINANCIAL BEHAVIOR AND ITS
MACROECONOMIC CAUSES AND IMPLICATIONS
SEPTEMBER 2009
SOON RYOO
B.A., KOREA UNIVERSITY
M.A., KOREA UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Peter Skott

This dissertation consists of three independent essays. The ﬁrst essay, “Long
Waves and Short Cycles in a Model of Endogenous Financial Fragility,” presents a
stock ﬂow consistent macroeconomic model in which ﬁnancial fragility in ﬁrm and
household sectors evolves endogenously through the interaction between real and
ﬁnancial sectors. Changes in ﬁrms’ and households’ ﬁnancial practices produce long
waves. The Hopf bifurcation theorem is applied to clarify the conditions for the
existence of limit cycles, and simulations illustrate stable limit cycles. The long waves
are characterized by periodic economic crises following long expansions. Short cycles,
generated by the interaction between eﬀective demand and labor market dynamics,
ﬂuctuate around the long waves.
The second essay,“Macroeconomic Implications of Financialization,” examines
macroeconomic eﬀects of changes in ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial behavior (retention policy, eqv

uity ﬁnancing, debt ﬁnancing), and household saving and portfolio decisions using
models that pay explicit attention to ﬁnancial stock-ﬂow relations. Unlike the ﬁrst
essay, the second essay focuses on the eﬀects of ﬁnancial change on steady growth
path. The results are insensitive to the precise speciﬁcation of household saving behavior but depend critically on the labor market assumptions (labor-constrained vs
dual) and the speciﬁcation of the investment function (Harrodian vs stagnationist).
The last essay, “Finance, Sectoral Structure and the Big Push,” studies the role of
ﬁnance in the presence of investment complementarities using a big push model. Due
to complementarities between diﬀerent investment projects, simultaneous industrialization of many sectors (big push) may be needed for an underdeveloped economy to
escape from an underdevelopment trap. Such simultaneous industrialization requires
costly coordination by a third party, such as the government. Some recent papers
show that private banks with signiﬁcant market power may also solve the problem
of coordination failure. We show that private coordination may not work since even
large private banks may ﬁnd it more proﬁtable to ﬁnance ﬁrms in the traditional
sector than in the modern sector.
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INTRODUCTION

Chapters in this dissertation represent an attempt to understand changes in ﬁnancial behavior and their macroeconomic causes and implications from three different angles. Chapter 1 examines changes in ﬁnancial behavior from a perspective
of macroeconomic instability and cycles. Chapter 2 analyzes macroeconomic implications of ﬁnancialization from a perspective of long-run steady growth. Chapter 3
studies the role of ﬁnance in the presence of investment complementarities from a
viewpoint of development and industrialization.

According to Minsky’s ﬁnancial instability hypothesis, a capitalist economy cannot
lead to “a sustained, stable-price, full employment equilibrium” and serious business
cycles are unavoidable due to the unstable nature of the interaction between investment and capitalist ﬁnance (Minsky, 1986, 173). An initially robust ﬁnancial system
is endogenously transformed into a fragile system as cash-ﬂow relations change during
tranquil years. During expansions, an investment boom generates a proﬁt boom but
this induces investors and bankers to adopt more speculative ﬁnancial arrangements.
While Minsky’s hypothesis has received growing attention in light of the current ﬁnancial crisis, the logic behind it is intricate and not always easy to understand.1
1

For instance, Foley (2001) states “When Minsky’s followers try to formulate his vision into
mathematical models, they face a series of methodological riddles. It is not easy to formulate a
single, generic, range of assets to represent the multifarious vehicles for the ﬁnancial maneuvers that
lie behind ﬁnancial fragility. The model needs to be able to represent a shift in the average riskiness
of position... It is not clear exactly where to locate a parameter to represent the ﬁnancial boldness
of investors. In Minsky’s discourse, the shift toward more exposed ﬁnancial positions is not simply
a psychological phenomenon based in the increasing optimism or level of denial of investors (though
that is surely part of the process), but involves strong competitive pressures on individual investors
to conform to group norms that are themselves shifting...”

1

Chapter 1 incorporates Minskian ideas into a macroeconomic model in order to
clarify mechanisms of ﬁnancial instability and cycles. Many attempts have been
made to formalize Minsky’s ideas. Early contributions include Taylor and O’Connell
(1985), Foley (1986), Semmler (1987), Jarsulic (1989, 1996), Delli Gatti and Gallegati
(1990), Skott (1994), Dutt (1995), Keen (1995) and Flaschel, Franke and Semmler
(1998, Ch.12), and recent studies include Setterﬁeld (2004), Nasica and Raybaut
(2005), Lima and Meirelles (2007), Fazzari et al. (2008), and Charles (2008). My
own contributions to this literature are threefold:
First, the model in chapter 1 is stock-ﬂow consistent. Financial stocks are explicitly introduced and their implications for income and ﬁnancial ﬂows are carefully
modeled. In particular, unlike the previous studies listed above, capital gains from
holding stocks are not assumed away and enter the deﬁnition of the rate of return on
equity.2 The rate of return on equity deﬁned in this way provides a basis of households’ portfolio decision. Firms’ and households’ ﬁnancial decisions jointly determine
stock prices and the rate of return on equity in equilibrium. Thus, stock markets
receive a careful treatment in this model and play a central role in producing cycles.
Second, my model pays attention to both ﬁrms’ and households’ ﬁnancial decisions. Minsky’s own account of ﬁnancial instability tends to privilege the ﬁrm sector
as a source of fragility. Most previous studies follow this tradition and tend to neglect
the role of households’ ﬁnancial decisions in creating instability and cycles. Some of
the previous studies, including Taylor and O’Connell (1985), Delli Gatti and Gallegati (1990), and Flaschel, Franke and Semmler (1998, Ch.12), do not suﬀer from
this kind of limitation but analyze households’ portfolio decision as well. However,
their neglect of the role of capital gains in households’ portfolio decision makes it
diﬃcult to analyze the implication of households’ ﬁnancial decisions and stock mar2

Empirically, the movements of capital gains explain most of cyclical movements of the rate of
return on equity.
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ket behavior for instability and cycles. In contrast to these models, the model in
chapter 1 analyzes both households’ and ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial decisions. Capital gains and
stock markets are considered explicitly in a stock-ﬂow consistent framework and the
interactions between households and ﬁrms turn out to be critical to the behavior of
the system. Firms’ ﬁnancial decision is captured by changes in the debt-capital ratio
and households’ decision by changes in the equity-deposit ratio. Changes in those
two variables represent endogenous changes in ﬁnancial fragility, and interact with
each other through goods and ﬁnancial markets.
Lastly, existing Minskian models are not clear about the periodicity of cycles. My
model in chapter 1 is explicit in this matter. It produces two distinct cycles: long
waves and short cycles. Long waves are produced by the interaction between ﬁrms’
and households’ ﬁnancial decisions, while short cycles are generated by the interaction
between eﬀective demand and labor market dynamics. In this framework, Minsky’s
ﬁnancial instability hypothesis is seen as a basis of long waves.3 To the best of my
knowledge, my model is the ﬁrst to integrate an analysis of Minskian long waves with
that of short cycles.

Capitalist economies have been often characterized as increasing ﬁnancialization and it has been growing concern for some economists. For example, Lazonick
and O’Sullivan argue that the increasing dominance of shareholder value has forced
changes in management strategy from ‘retain and invest’ to ‘downsize and distribute’
and this change in strategy is reﬂected in increases in dividend rate and corporate
buybacks (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000, p.18). Crotty (2005) has suggested that
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Minsky’s two papers (Minsky, 1964, 1995) provide a strong support for this view. In these two
papers, Minsky argues that there exists a mechanism in a capitalist economy that generates a ‘long
swing’: the “mechanism which has generated the long swings centers around the cumulative changes
in ﬁnancial variables that take place over the long-swing expansions and contractions.” (Minsky,
1964). “The more severe depressions of history occur after a period of good economic performance,
with only minor cycles disturbing a generally expanding economy.”(Minsky, 1995, p.85) During this
long expansion, an initially robust ﬁnancial structure is transformed to a fragile structure.
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ﬁnancialization weakens non-ﬁnancial corporations and constrained the growth of aggregate demand and Dumenil and Levy (2001) has suggested that ﬁnancialization
tends to depress growth and employment while destabilizing economies.
Chapter 2 examines the macroeconomic eﬀects on steady growth path of changes
in ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial behavior (retention rate, net equity issues, debt ﬁnance), shifts in
the investment function, household saving/portfolio decisions, and interest rates. The
analysis is conducted in fully developed macroeconomic models to avoid the danger of
partial analysis.4 The chapter analyzes several models which are distinguished based
on the assumptions on accumulation behavior (Harrodian vs. Kaleckian) and labor
market (dual vs. mature).
Financial stocks are explicitly introduced in those models and households’ saving/portfolio behavior is characterized by desired stock-ﬂow ratios (equity/income
and deposit/income ratios in a two-asset context). In addition to these features, this
chapter adopts a novel approach to the analysis of the long-term eﬀects of ﬁnancial
change. The approach consists of two steps: the ﬁrst step investigates the eﬀects
of ﬁnancial change, assuming that the desired stock-ﬂow ratios are exogenous; the
second step examines the eﬀects of induced changes in the stock-ﬂow ratios.5
Chapter 2 is an outcome of a joint work with Peter Skott and published in Cambridge Journal of Economics (Skott and Ryoo, 2008).6 While some of the models
build on previous works by Skott, I carried most of the analysis in the paper. I would
like to list some elements I contribute to this joint work:
First, the main focus of chapter 2 is on the comparative statics regarding the
macroeconomic eﬀects of some ﬁnancial changes associated with ﬁnancialization. As4

Dangers of a partial analysis are discussed in 2.2.2 below.

5

For the advantage of this approach, see Ryoo and Skott (2008)

6

Ryoo and Skott (2008) complements this work by providing an analysis of Kaleckian economy
with labor constraint.
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suming the desired stock-ﬂow ratios are exogenous, the comparative statics are relatively simple and transparent. The question is whether the qualitative results carry
over to the case with endogenously determined stock-ﬂow ratios. I showed that using
two inﬂuential works, Lavoie and Godley (2001-02) and Godley and Lavoie (2007),
empirically plausible speciﬁcations yield small induced changes in the stock-ﬂow ratios that do not overturn the qualitative results from the simple model with exogenous
ratios. This approach turns out to be useful to evaluate the results of other models
regarding the eﬀects of ﬁnancialization. For instance, van Treeck (2008) presents simulation results as an example of contractionary eﬀects of increasing dividend or stock
buyback. Ryoo and Skott (2008) show that these contractionary eﬀects are based on
implausible adjustments of ﬁnancial stocks.
Second, the analysis of Lavoie and Godley (2001-02) and Godley and Lavoie (2007)
leads to a conclusion that the qualitative eﬀects of ﬁnancialization are insensitive to
the precise speciﬁcation of household saving behavior. Lavoie and Godley (2001-02)
assume that consumption depends on household income and capital gains. Godley
and Lavoie (2007) assume that consumption is determined by household income and
wealth. Our own speciﬁcation in Skott and Ryoo (2008) directly relates consumption
to stock-ﬂow ratios. All of these speciﬁcations produce the same qualitative results
regarding the eﬀects of ﬁnancialization. In addition, several sensitivity analyses were
conducted to show that the qualitative results are robust to wide ranges of parameter
values in each consumption function.
Third, the analysis in this chapter achieves a substantial degree of generality by
focusing on both Harrodian and Kaleckian speciﬁcations of investment behavior. In
particular, the chapter analyzes the Kaleckian framework in great depth (though our
own preference lies with a Harrodian framework). The analysis is performed based on
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a general form of Kaleckian accumulation function (see equation 2.4. below), which
include most of existing Kaleckian speciﬁcations as its subcases.7

Implications of ﬁnance for developing countries have been the subject of much
empirical research in the mainstream literature on development. One of the important topics is whether ﬁnancial development explains countries’ growth performance.
Many studies along this line accept the view that “the role of ﬁnancial markets and
institutions arises to mitigate the eﬀects of information and transaction costs that prevent direct pooling and investment of society’s savings” (Demirguc-Kunt, 2006, p.1)
From this perspective, good ﬁnancial markets, or more developed ﬁnancial markets,
are identiﬁed as “deep” markets which mean more liquid stock markets and larger
banking sectors. In spite of econometric and measurement issues, it is argued, there
exists a robust positive relationship between ﬁnancial development in this sense and
growth performance (Levine, 2003). However, a common feature of recent mainstream
studies on ﬁnance and development is characterized by its neglect of structural problems. This literature presumes that underdeveloped countries’ ﬁnancial structures
gradually evolve toward a more advanced one with deeper and thicker ﬁnancial markets. The implications of increasing returns such as multiple equilibria, poverty traps
and uneven sectoral development, which were main topics of traditional development
economics, receive a minor role or are simply ignored in recent trends.
Chapter 3 addresses the role of ﬁnance in the presence of investment complementarities. The key questions are whether a competitive or a monopolistic banking
structure is conducive to solving a coordination failure caused by investment complementarities and how the sectoral structure of an economy interacts with the banking
structure. Little is known about this in the existing literature, but Da Rin and Hell7

Skott and Ryoo (2008) considers only a dual economy version of Kaleckian model but Ryoo and
Skott (2008) extends the analysis to include a Kaleckian model with labor constraint.
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man (2002) recently provides, based on a big push model, a theoretical argument that
banks with market power may be able to solve this kind of coordination problem if
they have suﬃcient market power to make proﬁts from costly coordination.
The analysis in chapter 3 suggests that the conditions under which banks with
market power can solve the coordination problems are restrictive and depend critically
on the sectoral structure of an economy. Banks with market power, let alone small
competitive banks, may fail to provide a solution to coordination failures if they ﬁnd
it more proﬁtable to ﬁnance ﬁrms in the traditional sector than in the modern sector.
Thus, the analysis emphasizes the limitation of private coordination.

7

CHAPTER 1
LONG WAVES AND SHORT CYCLES IN A MODEL OF
ENDOGENEOUS FINANCIAL FRAGILITY

1.1

Introduction

Financial crisis hit the U.S and world economy in 2008. Giant ﬁnancial institutions
have collapsed. Stock markets have tumbled, and exchange rates are in turmoil.
Governments and central banks around the world have responded by implementing
bailout plans for troubled ﬁnancial institutions and cutting interest rates to contain
the ﬁnancial panic, and expansionary ﬁscal packages are being pushed through to
prop up aggregate demand. Hyman Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis oﬀers
an interesting perspective on these developments, which came after a long period of
ﬁnancial deregulation, rapid securitization and the development of a range of new
ﬁnancial instruments and markets.1
According to Minsky’s ﬁnancial instability hypothesis, a capitalist economy cannot lead to a sustained full employment equilibrium and serious business cycles are
unavoidable due to the unstable nature of the interaction between investment and
ﬁnance (Minsky, 1986, 173). An initially robust ﬁnancial system is endogenously
turned into a fragile system as a prolonged period of good years induces ﬁrms and
bankers to take riskier ﬁnancial practices. During expansions, an investment boom
generates a proﬁt boom but this induces investors and banks to adopt more speculative ﬁnancial arrangements. This is typically reﬂected in rising debt ﬁnance, which
1

Wray (2008), Kregel (2008), Cynamon and Fazzari (2008) and Crotty (2008), among others,
provide perspectives on how shaky are the foundations of these ‘sophisticated’ developments in
ﬁnancial markets.
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eventually turns out to be unsustainable because the rising debt changes cash ﬂow
relations (or income-payment commitment relations) and leads to various types of
ﬁnancial distress. Minsky suggests that this kind of endogenous change in ﬁnancial
fragility can generate debt-driven long expansions followed by deep depressions (Minsky 1964, 1995). In Minsky’s theory of long waves, short cycles ﬂuctuate around the
long waves produced by endogenous changes in ﬁnancial structure. Thus, the distinction between short cycles and long waves is an important characteristic of Minsky’s
cycle theory.
In spite of diﬃculties inherent in the formalization of Minsky’s theories, Minsky’s
ﬁnancial instability hypothesis has inspired a number of researchers to model the
dynamic interaction between real and ﬁnancial sectors. Taylor and O’Connell (1985),
Foley (1986), Semmler (1987), Jarsulic (1989, 1996), Delli Gatti and Gallegati (1990),
Skott (1994), Dutt (1995), Keen (1995) and Flaschel, Franke and Semmler (1998,
Ch.12) are early contributions. Recent studies include Setterﬁeld (2004), Nasica
and Raybaut (2005), Lima and Meirelles (2007), Fazzari et al. (2008), and Charles
(2008). While each of these studies captures a particular aspect of real-ﬁnancial
interactions, none of these tries to distinguish long waves from short cycles and the
average periodicity in most models is ambiguous.
This chapter presents a stock-ﬂow consistent model that produces long waves
around which short cycles ﬂuctuate. In the model, ﬁrms’ and households’ ﬁnancial
practices endogenously evolve through the interaction between real and ﬁnancial sectors. The interaction between changes in ﬁrms’ and households’ ﬁnancial practices,
which are captured by the debt-capital ratio and the equity-deposit ratio, respectively,
produce long waves. We prove the existence of limit cycles describing the long waves
by using the Hopf bifurcation theorem and conduct simulation exercises to illustrate
stable limit cycles. The resulting long waves are characterized by periodic economic
crises following long expansions. Short cycles, generated by the interaction between
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eﬀective demand and labor market dynamics, ﬂuctuate around the long waves. The
main contribution of this paper is to provide a mechanism which explains both long
waves and short business cycles in a unifying framework.
It is worth noting that long waves in this chapter emerge from the interaction
between ﬁrms’ and households’ ﬁnancial decisions. Minsky’s own accounts of cycles
and crises tend to privilege ﬁrm and banking sectors as a source of instability and cycles, while they tend to ignore the role of households’ ﬁnancial behavior in generating
cycles.2 Our model of long waves pays close attention to both ﬁrms’ and households’
ﬁnancial decisions. The model consists of two subsystems: ﬁrms’ debt dynamics and
households’ portfolio dynamics. One interesting result of our analysis is that two stable subsystems can be combined to produce instability and cycles in the whole system
(See section 1.4). Thus, the resulting instability and cycles are genuinely attributed
to the interaction between sectors rather than characteristics of one particular sector.
The stock-ﬂow consistent approach3 provides a useful framework that enables us to
keep track of the implications of one sector’s decisions for the other sector’s.
Short cycles as well as long waves in our model are the result of endogenous interactions among economic agents, not the result of exogenous shocks. Most of the
mainstream literature on business cycles follows the Frisch tradition in which the
source of cyclical behavior is exogenous shocks external to the models, and agents’
reactions to the shocks are important only as propagation mechanisms. Regarding
this broad aspect, there is little diﬀerence between New Classical and New Keyne2

Minsky’s neglect of the household sector is explained by his observation that “[H]ousehold debtﬁnancing of consumption is almost always hedge ﬁnancing.” (1982, p. 32) This position, however, has
been challenged by some Minskian explanations of the sub-prime mortgage crisis. (e.g. Wray(2008)
and Kregel (2008))
3

See Skott (1981, 1988, 1989A), Godley and Cripps (1983) and Taylor (1985) for early introductions of explicit stock-ﬂow relations in a post-Keynesian / structuralist context. Simulation exercises
based on the stock-ﬂow consistent framework have been ﬂourishing since Lavoie and Godley (2001-2).
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sian theories.4 In contrast to those recent theories, the older tradition rooted in
Harrod (1939, 1948), Kaldor (1940), Samuelson (1939) and Goodwin (1967) puts a
great emphasis on the endogenous nature of cycles. The interaction between Keynesian multiplier and investment accelerator plays a central role in Harrod, Kaldor
and Samuelson whereas the interaction between saving-constrained accumulation and
class conﬂict in the labor market provides a basic mechanism in the Goodwin cycle.
Skott (1989A) provides a synthesis of eﬀective demand and labor market dynamics two important elements in the older tradition - into a single framework. In the Skott
model, the rate of growth of employment and production depends on both labor
market conditions and eﬀective demand. A limit cycle results from the interaction
between destabilizing forces in the goods market and stabilizing forces in the labor
market. The same mechanism as that in the Skott model is used to generate short
cycles in this paper. However, unlike the Skott model, short cycles in this chapter
oscillate around the long waves for which ﬁnancial elements play a vital role.5
4

It is well known that exogenous stochastic productivity shocks are a main cause of New Classical
real business cycles. While New Keynesian theories emphasize the eﬀect of monetary shocks on
cyclical behavior, the nature of exogenous shocks does not matter in the New Keynesian theories
in the fundamental level, and New Keynesians accept the basic framework of real business cycle
theory. For instance, Bernanke and Gertler (1989) say: “We present a formal analysis of the role of
borrower’s balance sheets in the business cycle. Our vehicle is a modiﬁed real business cycle model,
in which a characteristic of the investment technology is an asymmetry of information between
the entrepreneurs who organize and manage physical investment and the savers from whom they
borrow.”(p.14).
5

The Skott model has some weaknesses from a Minskian perspective. Skott assumes that in the
context of two ﬁnancial assets (equity and deposit), the ratio of the value of equity to net proﬁt and
the ratio of deposit to nominal income are exogenously given. The constancy of the equity-proﬁt
ratio implies that the price-earnings ratio is always constant, not only on steady state path but
also during the course of cycles. More importantly, the assumption of constant deposit to nominal
income ratio suggests that ﬁrms’ stock of debt passively moves in proportion to nominal income so
that the debt-income ratio always remains constant on and oﬀ steady state path (In the Skott model,
as in this paper, all deposits in banks are lent to ﬁrms. Thus, the deposit/income ratio is always
equal to the debt/income ratio). Given this assumption, the debt-capital ratio (leverage ratio) will
follow cyclical change in the utilization rate but the inﬂuence of endogenous changes in ﬁrms’ and
bankers’ ﬁnancial practices on the trajectories of real and ﬁnancial variables are hardly conceivable
in this framework.
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The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 presents some of
the stylized facts about ﬁnancial changes in the ﬁrm and household sectors. Section
1.3 sets up our model. Section 1.4 analyzes how the interaction between ﬁrms’ and
households’ ﬁnancial practices produces long waves. Section 1.5 brieﬂy introduces a
model of short cycles into the current context. Section 1.6 combines our model of
long waves with the short-cycle model and provides simulation results. Section 1.7,
ﬁnally, oﬀers some concluding remarks.

1.2

Stylized facts

This section provides a brief description of some ﬁnancial changes in ﬁrm and
household sectors which happened in the U.S in the years since 1952.
In Figure 1.1(a), the ratio of debt to the replacement value of capital for nonfarm nonﬁnancial corporations is shown. This ratio has exhibited ﬂuctuations but an
apparent strong upward trend. In 1952, the debt ratio barely exceeded 30% but increased steadily in the 1950s and 1960s, reaching almost 50% in 1973 before dropping
back to 36% in 1981. The leverage ratio has since displayed a steep rise, with minor
downturns, up to now.
If the proﬁt rate had increased along with the debt ratio, the rising debt ratio
could have been validated by ﬁrms’ increasing cash generating capability. This was,
however, not the case. Figure 1.1(b) displays the ratio of debt to proﬁt before tax for
the same sector. The ratio had been below four until the mid 1960s and then began to
rise, reaching at six, the highest point since the World War II. It then fell, reﬂecting
a signiﬁcant fall in the debt ratio, and hit the bottom in 1978. The early 1980s was
characterized by a sharp rise in the debt/proﬁt ratio. It has shown ﬂuctuations since
then. The pattern was similar to that of the debt-capital ratio in Figure 1.1(a) but
exhibited much more volatility.
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(a) Ratio of Debt to Capital

(b) Ratio of Debt to Profit
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Figure 1.1. U.S. Nonfarm Nonﬁnancial Corporations (1952-2007)
Notes: Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States. Author’s
calculation. See Appendix A for details.

Figure 1.1(c) shows the ratio of real interest payment6 to proﬁt before tax. The
trend shows a sharp contrast before and after 1980. Throughout the 1950s and the
1960s, it remained at very low levels below 15%. In the 1970s, this ratio even further
decreased mainly due to the favorable eﬀects on interest payment obligations of high
inﬂation rates. Interest payments then dramatically increased above 60% of total
6

The measures of real interest payments are calculated using bank prime loan rates. Thus the
measures tend to hide the diﬀerence in interest rates associated with particular debt units depending
on various maturity and riskiness.
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proﬁt in the early 1980s, reaching the historical high, 80%, in 1986. Since then, it has
exhibited substantial ﬂuctuations and the high peaks hit in 1989 and again in 2000.
Both Figure 1.1 (b) and 1.1 (c) indicate that ﬁrms’ proﬁtability relative to their indebtedness and payment commitments was sound until the mid 1960s but the upward
trend in the debt-capital ratio since the mid 1960s changed the tendency afterwards.
In the meantime, the importance of equity ﬁnance has been greatly reduced.
Figure 1.1 (d) shows that in the 1950s-1970s a small positive fraction of investment
was ﬁnanced by new issues. Since 1980, however, the ratio has been negative in
most years and ﬂuctuated with much more volatility than in previous periods. The
amount of corporations’ stock buybacks sometimes reaches more than 50% of their
investment.
The household sector also has experienced signiﬁcant changes since 1952. The
ratio of consumption to disposable income had steadily fallen until the early 1980s
with cyclical movements. The ratio then exhibited an upward trend until recent
years (Figure 1.2(a)). Figure 1.2(b) shows, household indebtedness rose substantially
throughout the whole period. In 1952, household credit market debt was simply
39% of their disposable personal income but it reached 136%. A large part of the
upward movement is explained by the mortgage debt as shown in the ﬁgure. In Figure
1.2(c), the ratio of equity to deposit holding, indicating household portfolio, displays
large swings. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the equity-deposit ratio remained at
relatively high levels, on average, 1.45. This tendency was reversed in the 1970s and
1980s: the historical average of the equity-deposit ratio during the period marked
merely 0.67. The ratio, however, began to rise steeply since the early 1990s. The
ratio hit the historical high in 1999, followed by an astonishing collapse in 2000. Two
major collapses in this ratio, 1973 and 2000, match those in the rate of return on
equity shown in Figure 1.2(d).
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(a) Consumption to Disposable Income

(b) Ratio of Debt to Income
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Figure 1.2. U.S. Household and Nonproﬁt Organization (1952-2007)
Notes: Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States. Author’s
calculation. See Appendix A for details.

1.3

Model

This section presents a model. Firms make decisions concerning pricing/output,
accumulation and ﬁnancing; households make consumption and portfolio decisions;
banks accept deposits and make loans. It is assumed that there are only two types
of ﬁnancial assets - equity and bank deposits - and banks are the only ﬁnancial
institution. It is assumed that the available labor force grows at a constant rate7
7

We assume that there is no technical progress but the model can easily accommodate Harrod
neutral technical progress
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and long run growth is constrained by the availability of labor. Thus the economy is
‘mature’ in Kaldor’s (1966) terminology.

1.3.1
1.3.1.1

Firms
The ﬁnance constraint

Firms’ ﬂow of funds account consists of sources and uses of funds. Firms have
three sources of funds in our framework: proﬁts, new issue of equity and debt ﬁnance.
Using these funds, ﬁrms make investments in real capital, pay out dividends and make
interest payments. Algebraically,

pI + Div + iM = Π + v Ṅ + Ṁ

(1.1)

where I, Π, Div, M , and N are real gross investment, gross proﬁts, dividends, bank
loans and the number of shares, respectively. Bank loans carry the nominal interest
rate (i). p represents the price of investment goods as well as the general price of
output in this one-sector model. All shares are assumed to have the same price v. A
dot over a variable refers to a time derivative (ẏ = dy/dt).
I assume that ﬁrms’ dividend payout is determined as a constant fraction of net
proﬁts (= gross proﬁts − depreciation − real interest payments). The dividend payout
rate is denoted as 1 − sf and, consequently, sf represents ﬁrms’ retention rate. Thus,
we have

Div = (1 − sf )(Π − δpK − rM )

(1.2)

where K and δ are real capital stock and the rate of depreciation of real capital. r
represents the real interest rate, r = i − p̂ (A hat over a variable is used to denote
a growth rate of the variable, for instance, ŷ = (1/y)(dy/dt)). Lavoie and Godley
(2001-2002) and Dos Santos and Zezza (2007), among others, use the speciﬁcation
(1.2) regarding ﬁrms’ retention policy.
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New equity issue can be represented by the growth of the number of shares (N̂ )
or by the share of investment ﬁnanced by new issues denoted as x. Skott (1981, 1988,
1989A) and Foley and Taylor (2004) use the former and Lavoie and Godley (20012002) the latter. Two measures, however, are related to each other in the following
manner.8

vN N̂ = xpI

(1.3)

Substituting (1.2) into (1.1), we get

pI − δpK = sf (Π − δpK − rM ) + vN N̂ + M (M̂ − p̂)

(1.4)

Scaling by the value of capital stock (pK), we ﬁnally have

K̂ ≡ g = sf (πuσ − δ − rm) + x(g + δ) + ṁ + gm
where π, u, and m is the proﬁt share (π ≡

Π
pY

), the utilization rate (u ≡

full capacity output) and the leverage ratio (m ≡
ratio, σ (≡

YF
K

M
).
pK

(1.5)
Y
YF

, YF is

The technical output/capital

), is assumed to be ﬁxed. δ is the depreciation rate. Equation (1.5) has

a straightforward interpretation: ﬁrms’ investment (g) is ﬁnanced by three sources:
retained earnings, sf (πuσ − δ − rm), new equity issue, x(g + δ) and bank loans,
ṁ + gm. Given this ﬁnance constraint, ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial behavior is characterized by
sf , x (or N̂ ) and m in steady state. Most theories treat the rates of ﬁrms’ retention
and equity issue as parameters and debt ﬁnance as an accommodating variable (Skott
1988, 1989A, Lavoie and Godley 2001-2002 and Dos Santos and Zezza 2007). This
chapter assumes that the retention rate (sf ) is exogenous as in the above literature
but both the rate of equity issue (x or N̂ ) and the leverage ratio m are endogenous.
However, our way of treating equity ﬁnance and debt ﬁnance is not symmetric.
8

N̂ = Ṅ /N . Given this notation, v Ṅ = vN N̂ .
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Debt ﬁnance evolves through endogenous changes in ﬁrms’ and banks’ ﬁnancial
practices which are directly inﬂuenced by the relationship between ﬁrms’ proﬁtability
and leverage ratio (see section 1.3.1.2 below). With debt ﬁnance determined in this
way, equity ﬁnance (x) serves as a buﬀer in the sense that once the other sources
of ﬁnance − the retention and debt ﬁnance policies − and investment plans are
determined, equity issues ﬁll the gap between the funds needed for the investment
plans and the funds available from retained earnings and bank loans. In this regard,
equity ﬁnance is seen as a pure residual of ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing constraint. Formally, for
a given set of parameters sf , σ, δ and r, the trajectories of endogenous variables g,
π, u, m and ṁ determine the required ratio of equity ﬁnance to gross investment:

x=

g − sf (πuσ − δ − rm) − ṁ − gm
g+δ

(1.6)

The treatment of equity ﬁnance as a residual may not be entirely satisfactory,
especially from a point of view that emphasizes substantial diﬃculty involved in
raising capital in equity markets compared to the other methods of ﬁnance. However,
as Figure 1.1 (d) shows, the degree of ﬂexibility in issuing equities was historically
very large. This was even more prominent when the rate of net issue of equity was
negative (x < 0).

1.3.1.2

Endogenous changes in ﬁrms’ liability structure

Endogenous changes in ﬁrms’ liability structure, which are captured by changes
in ﬁrms’ debt-capital ratio (m), are central in this paper, and a Minskian perspective
suggests that the debt-capital ratio evolves according to sustained changes in ﬁrms’
proﬁtability relative to their payment obligations on debt. Changes in proﬁtability
that are perceived as highly temporary have only limited eﬀects on desired leverage.
I, therefore, distinguish cyclical movements in proﬁtability from the trend in average
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proﬁtability and assume that changes in liability structure are determined as the
trend of proﬁtability.9
The perception of strong proﬁtability relative to payment commitments during
good years, Minsky argues, induces bankers and businessmen to adopt riskier ﬁnancial
practices which typically results in increases in the leverage ratio. Following Minsky’s
idea (Minsky, 1982, 1986), I assume that changes in the ratio of proﬁt to debt service
commitments drive changes in the debt structure. Formally,

ṁ = τ

(ρ )
T

rm

; τ ′ (·) > 0

(1.7)

where ρT represents the trend rate of proﬁt10 and τ is an increasing function. The
equation suggests the ratio of proﬁt to debt service commitments drives changes
in the debt structure. More speciﬁcally, during the period of tranquility when the
level of proﬁt is suﬃciently high compared to interest payment obligations, ﬁrms’ and
bankers’ optimism reinforced by their success tends to make them adopt riskier ﬁnancial arrangements which involve higher leverage ratios. A high proﬁt level compared
to debt servicing is typically associated with a low probability of default which helps
bankers maintain their optimism. Recent history characterized by strong proﬁtability
may motivate ﬁrms to implement riskier projects that require a large amount of debt.
The opposite is true when the ratio of proﬁt to interest payments is low. Firms’
failure to repay debt obligations - defaults and bankruptcies in the ﬁrm sector - puts
ﬁnancial institutions linked to those ﬁrms in trouble as well. To the extent that
ﬁnancial institutions are intricately linked to each other through complex ﬁnancial
networks, a ﬁnancial failure in one unit can easily produce that in another unit. When
the proﬁtability of the ﬁrm sector turns out to be too weak, situations can lead to
9
10

See section 1.4.1 for more discussion.
A deﬁnition of the trend rate of proﬁt will be provided in section 1.4.
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systemic crises. A collapse in the ﬁnancial system may be unavoidable especially
when ﬁnancial networks are so complex that the level of systemic risk is high. A
ﬁnancial crisis forces ﬁrms and bankers to reduce their indebtedness and it is often
manifested in a system-wide credit crunch. Thus, this situation may be represented
by a sudden collapse of the debt-capital ratio.

1.3.1.3

Accumulation

In general, capital accumulation is aﬀected by several factors including proﬁtability, utilization, Tobin’s q, the level of internal cash ﬂows, the real interest rates and
the debt ratio, but there is no consensus among theorists concerning the sensitivity
of ﬁrms’ accumulation behavior to changes in the various arguments. In particular,
the long run sensitivity of the accumulation rate to changes in the utilization rate has
been in debate among the structuralist/post-Keynesian economists.11 This chapter
follows the Harrodian perspective in which capacity utilization has foremost importance in ﬁrms’ accumulation behavior (Harrod, 1939, 1948). A Harrodian perspective
is characterized by the assumption that ﬁrms have a desired rate of utilization. In the
short run, the actual rate of utilization may substantially deviate from the desired
rate since ﬁrms’ demand expectations are not always met and capital stocks slowly
adjust. If the actual rate exceeds the desired rate, ﬁrms will accelerate accumulation
to increase their productive capacity and if the actual rate is smaller than the desired rate, they will slow down accumulation to reduce the undesired reserve of excess
productive capacity. However, in the long run, it is not reasonable to assume that
the actual rate can persistently deviate from the desired rate because capital stocks
11

See Auerbach and Skott (1988), Dumenil and Levy (1993), Park (1997), Dutt (1997), Kurz
(1986), Lavoie (1995), Lavoie et al. (2004), Skott (2008A, 2008B) and Dallery and van Treeck
(2008).
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ﬂexibly adjust to maintain the desired rate. This perspective naturally distinguishes
the short-run accumulation function from the long-run accumulation function.12
A simple version of the long-run accumulation function can be written as

u = u∗

(1.8)

where u∗ is an exogenously given desired rate of utilization. (1.8) represents the idea
that in the long run, the utilization rate must be at what ﬁrms want it to be and
capital accumulation is perfectly elastic so as to maintain the desired rate. The strict
exogeneity of the desired rate in (1.8) may exaggerate reality but tries to capture
mild variations of the utilization rate in the long-run. Taking an example of the
U.S. economy from 1948 to 2008, Figure 1.3 (a) and 1.3 (b) plot the rate of capacity
utilization for the industrial sector and the manufacturing sector, respectively. The
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered series (dotted lines) are added to capture the long-run variations in the utilization rate. The ﬁgures show that the degree of capacity utilization
is subject to signiﬁcant short-run variations but exhibits only mild variations around
80% in the long-run.
In this chapter, I use the long run accumulation function (1.8) to analyze long
waves: as long as we are interested in cycles over a fairly long period of time, the
assumption that the actual utilization rate is on average at the desired rate is a
reasonable approximation.
For the analysis of short cycles, however, the accumulation function (1.8) cannot
be an appropriate speciﬁcation because the deviation of the actual from the desired
rate normally occurs in the short run. Thus, we will use the following speciﬁcation
(1.9) to describe accumulation behavior during a course of short cycles.

12

This Harrodian perspective is elaborated in Skott (1989, 2008A, 2008B) in greater detail.
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(a) Capacity Utilization: Total Index

(b) Capacity Utilization: Manufacturing (SIC)
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Figure 1.3. Capacity Utilization. U.S (1948-2008)
Sources: Federal Reserve Board, Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization

K̂ ≡ g = ϕ(u); ϕ′ (u) ≫ 0, ϕ(u∗ ) = n

(1.9)

The strong positive eﬀect of utilization on accumulation in (1.9) embodies the
Harrodian accelerator principle and the function ϕ is conﬁgured so that the desired
rate of utilization is consistent with steady growth at a natural rate. We will use
(1.9) in section 1.5 where short cycles are analyzed.13

1.3.2

Banks

In the model, banks’ active role in shaping ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial structure is represented
by equation (1.7) which reﬂects both ﬁrms’ and banks’ behavior. For a given proﬁtinterest ratio, equation (1.7) determines the trajectory of the debt-capital ratio m.
At any moment, the amount of loans supplied to ﬁrms will be M = mpK. I assume
13

The speciﬁcation (1.9) is clearly an oversimpliﬁcation since it leaves out other determinants of
investment. For instance, it does not capture the direct impact of ﬁnancial variables such as cash
ﬂow and asset prices which are highly emphasized by Minsky (1975, 1982, 1986) and Tobin (1969), as
well as current New Keynesian economics (Fazzari et al.(1988) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist
(1996), among others). However, equation (1.9) can be easily extended to accommodate the eﬀect
of those variables without aﬀecting major results of this study. In fact, the eﬀect of cash ﬂow
and Tobin’s q on accumulation, it can be shown, reinforces the utilization eﬀect on accumulation
embodied in (1.9). The merit of simple speciﬁcation in equation (1.9) is that it shows the underlying
mechanisms in a transparent way.
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that neither households nor ﬁrms hold cash, the loan and deposit rates are equal and
there are no costs involved in banking. With these assumptions, the amount of loans
to the ﬁrm sector must equal the total deposits of the household sector.

M = MH

(1.10)

where M H represents households’ deposit holdings.
Banks set the nominal interest rate i, which is typically aﬀected by inﬂation. To
simplify the analysis, I assume that banks eﬀectively control the real interest rate r.

1.3.3

Households

Households receive wage income, dividends in return for their stock holdings and
interest income. Thus, household real disposable income denoted as Y H is given as:

YH =

W + Div + rM H
p

(1.11)

Households hold stocks and deposits in our two ﬁnancial asset world and household
wealth is denoted as N W H . Thus, we have

NW H =

vN H + M H
p

(1.12)

Based on their income and wealth, they make consumption and portfolio decisions.
We adopt a conventional speciﬁcation of consumption function.

C = C(Y H , N W H ); CY H > 0 , CN W H > 0

(1.13)

The life cycle hypothesis (Ando and Modigliani, 1963), among others, may justify
this speciﬁcation. Similar speciﬁcations have been used by Boyer (2000), Godley and
Lavoie (2007) and Dos Santos and Zezza (2007).
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For simpliﬁcation, we assume that the function takes a linear form. We then have,
after normalizing by capital stock and simple manipulations,
C
= c1 [uσ − sf (πuσ − δ − rm)] + c2 q
K

(1.14)

where uσ − sf (πuσ − δ − rm) is disposable income scaled by capital stock and Tobin’s
q captures household wealth. c1 and c2 are household propensities to consume out of
disposable income and wealth.
In addition to consumption/saving decisions, households make portfolio decisions.
The long run evolution of household portfolio plays a pivotal role in generating long
waves in this model. We denote the equity-deposit ratio as α:
vN H
α≡
MH

(1.15)

We assume that the composition of households’ portfolio is aﬀected by their views
on stock market performance. Applying a Minskian hypothesis to household behavior,
it is assumed that during good years, households tend to hold a greater proportion
of ﬁnancial assets in the form of riskier assets. In our two-asset framework, equity
represents a risky asset and deposits a safe asset. Thus, a rise in fragility during
good years is captured by a rise in α. We introduce a new variable z to represent the
degree of households’ optimism about stock markets. We can normalize the variable
z so that z = 0 corresponds to the state where households’ perception of tranquility
is neutral and there is no change in α. Given this framework, the evolution of α is
determined by an increasing function of z.

α̇ = ζ(z); ζ(0) = 0, ζ ′ (z) > 0

(1.16)

The next question is what determines the degree of households’ optimism about
stock markets, z. It is natural to assume that household portfolio decisions, the
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division of their wealth into stocks and deposits, will be aﬀected by the diﬀerence
between the rates of return on stocks and deposits.
Our speciﬁcation of the process in which households form their views on stock
markets emphasizes historical elements in ﬁnancial markets. Thus, the past trajectories of rates of return on assets as well as those of α matter in the formation of z. As a
crude approximation of this perception formation process, the following exponential
decay speciﬁcation is introduced:
∫

t

z=
−∞

exp [−λ(t − ν)]κ (rνe − r, αν ) dν

where re is the real rate of return on equity, κre ≡

∂κ(r e −r,α)
∂re

> 0 and κα ≡

(1.17)
∂κ(re −r,α)
∂α

<

0. In expression (1.17), κ (rνe − r, αν ) represents the information regarding the state
of asset markets at time ν. The higher the rate of return on equity relative to
the deposit rate of interest, the more optimistic households’ view on stock markets
becomes (κre > 0). However, other things equal, a higher proportion of their ﬁnancial
wealth in the form of stock holdings (high α) tempers the desire of further increases
in equity holdings, i.e. κα < 0.
Information on asset markets at diﬀerent times enters in the formation of z with
diﬀerent weights. The term, exp [−λ(t − ν)], represents these weights, implying that a
more remote past receives a smaller weight in the formation of households’ perception
of tranquility. Thus, λ may be seen as the rate of loss of relevance or loss of memory
of past events. The higher λ, the more quickly eroded is the relevance of past events.
14

14

An alternative speciﬁcation to (1.16) and (1.17) is possible. Consider the following speciﬁcation.
α̇ = ζ(α∗ − α)
α∗ =

∫

(1.16a)

t
−∞

exp [−λ(t − ν)]κ̄ (rνe − r) dν

(1.17a)

where κ̄′ (·) > 0 and α∗ is the desired equity-deposit ratio. (1.17a) tells us that households’ desired
portfolio is determined by the trajectory of the diﬀerence between the rates of return on equity and
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Diﬀerentiation of (1.17) with respect to t yields the following diﬀerential equation:

ż = κ (re − r, α) − λz

(1.18)

Two dynamic equations (1.16) and (1.18), along with the equation describing the
evolution of ﬁrms’ liability structure, (1.7), are essential building blocks for our model
of long waves. To proceed, we need to see how the rate of return on equity, re , is
determined. re is deﬁned as follows:

re ≡

Div + Γ
(1 − sf )(Π − δpK − rM ) + (v̂ − p̂)vN H
=
vN H
vN H

(1.19)

where Γ is capital gains adjusted for inﬂation (Γ ≡ (v̂ − p̂)vN H ).
The rate of return on equity is determined by stock market equilibrium. Stock
market equilibrium requires that the number of shares supplied by ﬁrms equals that
of shares held by households, N = N H , which implies Ṅ = Ṅ H in terms of the change
in the number of shares. The issue of shares is determined by ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing needs.
Firms issue new shares whenever retained earnings and bank loans fall short of the
funds needed to carry their investment plans. Thus ﬁrms’ ﬁnance constraint (1.1)
implies that:

deposit. This desired ratio may not be instantaneously attained so that the adjustment of the actual
to the desired ratio takes time. (1.16a) represents this kind of lagged adjustment of the actual equitydeposit ratio toward the desired ratio. In spite of diﬀerent interpretations, the two speciﬁcations,
(1.16)-(1.17) and (1.16a)-(1.17a), are qualitatively similar. To see this, let z ≡ α∗ − α. Then
ż = α̇∗ − α̇. Diﬀerentiating (1.17a) with respect to t, we have α̇∗ = κ̄(re ) − λα∗ = κ̄(re ) − λ(α + z).
Therefore, we can rewrite (1.16a) and (1.17a) to:
α̇ = ζ(z)

(1.16b)

ż = κ̄(re ) − λα − ζ(z) − λz

(1.18a)

One may want to compare (1.16b) and (1.18a) with (1.16) and (1.18).
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1
Ṅ = [pI + Div + iM − Π − Ṁ ]
v

(1.20)

Simple algebra shows that capital gains can be expressed as follows:

Γ = (v̂ − p̂)vN H = (α̂ + m̂ + K̂)vN H − v Ṅ H

(1.21)

(α̂ + m̂ + K̂)vN H represents the total increase in the real value of stock market
wealth15 but some of the increase is attributed to the increase in the number of shares
(= v Ṅ H ). To get the measure of capital gains, the latter should be deducted from
the total increase.
Using N = N H , substituting (1.20) in (1.21) and plugging this result in (1.19),
we get the new expression for re :

re =

Π − iM + Ṁ + (α̂ + m̂ + K̂)vN H − pI
vN H

(1.22)

Normalizing by pK, we ﬁnally get the expression for re as a function of π, u, m,
ṁ, α and α̇:

re =

πuσ − δ − rm + (1 + α)[ṁ + mϕ(u)] + α̇m − ϕ(u)
αm

= re (π, u, m, α, ṁ, α̇)

(1.23)
(1.24)

Substituting this expression in the dynamic equation (1.19), we have:

ż = κ [re (π, u, m, α, ṁ, α̇) − r, α] − λz

(1.25)

(1.25) shows that households’ views of tranquility are aﬀected by a number of
variables and the relationship is complex. We consider several cases according to the
property of (1.25) in section 1.4.

15

Note that α̂ + m̂ + K̂ = v̂ + N̂ − p̂.
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1.3.4

Goods market equilibrium

The equilibrium condition for the goods market is:
C
I
Y
+
=
K K
K

(1.26)

The deﬁnition of q implies that q = (1+α)m. Using this, the equilibrium condition
for the goods market can be written as:

c1 [uσ − sf (πuσ − δ − rm)] + c2 (1 + α)m + ϕ(u) + δ = uσ

(1.27)

We take the proﬁt share (π) as endogenous and the equilibrium value of π can be
found for given u, m and α. Explicitly, we have:

π =

ϕ(u) + δ − (1 − c1 )uσ + c2 (1 + α)m + c1 sf (δ + rm)
c1 sf uσ

≡ π(u, m, α)

(1.28)
(1.29)

As u, m and α evolve over time, the proﬁt share changes as well. The Harrodian
investment function adopted in this paper emphasizes a high sensitivity of investment
to changes in the utilization. Speciﬁcally, it assumes that investment rises much faster
than saving as the utilization rate changes. Algebraically,

∂(I/K)
∂(S/K)
= ϕ′ (u) ≫ (1 − c1 )σ + c1 sf πσ =
∂u
∂u

(1.30)

This Harrodian assumption has an implication for the eﬀect of changes in utilization on proﬁtability: utilization has a positive eﬀect on the proﬁt share and the
magnitude will be quantitatively large. The partial derivative is given as
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∂π
ϕ′ (u) − (1 − c1 )σ − c1 sf πσ
=
≫0
∂u
c1 sf uσ

(1.31)

The large eﬀect of changes in utilization on the proﬁt share plays an important
role in generating short cycles. (See section 1.5)
It is also readily seen that changes in the debt ratio and the equity-deposit ratio
positively aﬀect the proﬁt share. Increases in the debt ratio or the equity-deposit
ratio raise consumption demand though increases in disposable income or wealth,
thereby increases the proﬁt share.

∂π
c1 sf r + c2 (1 + α)
=
>0
∂m
c1 sf uσ
∂π
c2 m
=
>0
∂α
c1 sf uσ

(1.32)
(1.33)

The eﬀects of changes in the state variables (u, m and α) on the current proﬁt
rate are straightforward. Since the current proﬁt rate equals πuσ, the positive eﬀects
of changes in u, m and α on the proﬁt share all carry over to those on the proﬁt rate.

1.4

Long waves

This section shows how endogenous changes in ﬁrms’ and households’ ﬁnancial
practices generate long waves. Our model of long waves consists of two subsystems:
one describes changes in ﬁrms’ liability structure and the other speciﬁes changes
in households’ portfolio composition. Section 1.4.1 analyzes the evolution of ﬁrms’
liability structure, assuming households’ portfolio composition is frozen. Section 1.4.2
examines households’ portfolio dynamics, given the assumption that ﬁrms’ liability
structure does not change. Section 1.4.3 combines two subsystems and shows how
long waves emerge from the interaction between two subsystems.
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1.4.1

Long-run debt dynamics

This section analyzes the long-run evolution of ﬁrms’ debt structure. For convenience, we reproduce equation (1.7).

ṁ = τ

(ρ )
T

rm

where τ ′ (·) > 0

(7)

Regarding the shape of τ in (1.7), Minsky’s discussion suggests that the prosperity
during tranquil years tends to induce ﬁrms and bankers to gradually raise the leverage
ratio; the rise in the leverage ratio, however, cannot sustain because it worsens the
proﬁt/interest relation. Minsky points out that the ﬁnancial system is prone to crises
as the ratio of proﬁt to interest traverses a critical level (Minsky, 1995). The resulting
systemic crisis may prompt a rapid de-leveraging process. To capture this idea, we
assume that τ ′ (·) takes relatively small positive values within a narrow bound when
ρT
rm

is above a threshold level (good years), whereas it takes relatively large negative

values when

ρT
rm

is below the threshold level (bad years). When falling proﬁt/interest

ratio passes through the threshold level, ṁ sharply falls reﬂecting a rapid del-everaging
process. Thus, τ ′ (·) is likely to be very large when

ρT
rm

= τ −1 (0). Figure 1.4 reﬂects

this assumption.
m
W()

W 1(0)

UT
rm

Figure 1.4. Debt-Capital Ratio and Proﬁt-Interest Ratio
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As brieﬂy discussed in section 1.3.1.2, we use the trend rate of proﬁt ρT as a basis
of the evolution of ﬁrms’ liability structure. Behind equation (1.7) is the idea that
ﬁrms’ liability structure evolves endogenously over time and that the key determinant
of the evolution is ﬁrms’ and banks’ perception of tranquility. The level of ﬁrms’ proﬁt
relative to payment commitments on liabilities is an indicator of ﬁrms’ performance
and solvency status. Movements of the proﬁt rate in general include both trend and
cyclical components. It seems reasonable to assume that the long-run evolution of
ﬁrms’ liability structure is primarily determined by the trend of the proﬁt rate rather
than the current proﬁt rate.16
The driving force of the short-run cyclical movements in the current proﬁt rate
is changes in capacity utilization while the desired rate, u∗ , provides a good approximation of the long-run average of actual rates of utilization. Thus setting the
utilization rate at the desired rate, the short-run cyclical component in the proﬁt rate
is eﬀectively eliminated, and we have

ρT = π(u∗ , m, α)u∗ σ
=

n + δ − (1 − c1 )u∗ σ + c2 (1 + α)m + c1 sf (δ + rm)
c1 sf

(1.34)

The trend rate of proﬁt deﬁned as (26) depends positively on the debt-capital
T
ratio m and the equity-deposit ratio α ( ∂ρ
> 0 and
∂m

∂ρT
∂α

> 0). The proﬁt-interest

ratio, the key determinant of the liability structure, is written as
ρT
n + δ − (1 − c1 )u∗ σ + c2 (1 + α)m + c1 sf (δ + rm)
=
rm
c1 sf rm
16

(1.35)

This perspective is in line with Minsky’s statement that “[T]he inherited debt reﬂects the history
of the economy, which includes a period in the not too distant past in which the economy did not do
well. Acceptable liability structures are based on some margin of safety so that expected cash ﬂows,
even in periods when the economy is not doing well, will cover contractual debt payments”(Minsky,
1982, 65).
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(1.35) implies that for a given value of α, the proﬁt-interest ratio is uniquely
determined by the debt-capital ratio m. Minsky’s implicit assumption that a rising
debt ratio deteriorates the proﬁt/commitment relation can be written as:

n + δ − (1 − c1 )u∗ σ + c1 sf δ > 0

(1.36)

The average gross saving rate is typically greater than household marginal propensity to save out of disposable income, and this condition ensures that (1.36) will be
met: if

S
Y

=

I
Y

=

n+δ
u∗ σ

> (1 − c1 ), then n + δ − (1 − c1 )u∗ σ + c1 sf δ > 0. Thus, we

assume that this condition is satisﬁed.17
Using (1.7) and (1.35), ṁ can be written as a function of m and α.

(
ṁ = τ

n + δ − (1 − c1 )u∗ σ + c2 (1 + α)m + c1 sf (δ + rm)
c1 sf rm

)
≡ F(m, α)
− +

(1.37)

(1.37), along with the condition (1.36), implies that for any value of α, (i) F is
decreasing in m, (ii) there exists a unique value of the debt ratio m∗ (α) such that if
m = m∗ (α), ṁ = 0, and (iii) m∗ (α) depends positively on α, i.e. m∗′ (α) > 0. By
setting ṁ to zero and solving for m, we obtain the algebraic expression for m∗ (α):
n + δ − (1 − c1 )u∗ σ + c1 sf δ
m (α) ≡ −1
[τ (0) − 1]c1 sf r − c2 (1 + α)
∗

(1.38)

Using these properties (i), (ii) and (iii), Figure 1.5 illustrates the motion of the
debt-capital ratio.
It is straightforward from Figure 1.5 that (assuming α is constant) our dynamic
speciﬁcation of Minksy’s ﬁnancial instability hypothesis implies that ﬁrms’ debt structure monotonically converges to a stable ﬁxed point m∗ (α). The intuition is simple.

17

Otherwise, an increase in the debt ratio will raise the proﬁt-interest ratio which leads to a
self-repelling process of debt ratio without any ceiling.
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m

m(Į)
0

m

Figure 1.5. Motion of Debt-Capital Ratio

When the actual debt ratio (m) is lower than m∗ (α), the corresponding proﬁt-interest
ratio is greater than the threshold level at which the debt ratio does not change. This
will induce ﬁrms to raise the debt ratio. The same kind of event will happen as long
as m < m∗ (α): m will eventually converge to m∗ (α). The opposite will happen when
the debt ratio is greater than the critical level (m > m∗ (α)).
It is worth noting that since the slope of the graph in Figure 1.5 is very steep
at m = m∗ (α), the derivative of F(m, α) with respect to m is strongly negative
at m = m∗ (α), i.e. |Fm | is very large. In a limiting case where the de-leveraging
process is instantaneous at m∗ (α), the graph in Figure 1.5 takes a step-like shape and
Fm → −∞.
Given assumption (1.36), a stable dynamics is inevitable in a one-dimensional
continuous time framework. Moving from continous to discrete time framework may
change the picture so that ﬁrms’ debt dynamics alone can produce long-run cyclical
movements. In this paper, however, I explore another avenue toward long waves by
integrating ﬁrms’ debt dynamics into households’ portfolio dynamics.
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1.4.2

Household portfolio dynamics

The other subsystem of our model of long waves, which describes households’
portfolio dynamics, consists of two dynamic equations:

α̇ = ζ(z)

(1.39)

ż = κ (re − r, α) − λz

(1.40)

Analogously to the analysis of ﬁrms’ debt dynamics, we are interested in the longrun evolution of household portfolio decisions and, to simplify the analysis abstracts
from the eﬀect of short-run variations in capacity utilization. The rate of return on
equity evaluated at u = u∗ equals

re |u=u∗ =

ρT (m, α) − δ − rm + (1 + α)[F(m, α) + mn] + ζ(z)m − n
αm

(1.41)

Given this expression for re , equation (40) becomes

ż = κ (re |u=u∗ − r, α) − λz ≡ G(m, α, z)

(1.42)

(1.37), (1.39), and (1.42) constitute a self-contained three-dimensional dynamical
system. To better understand the mechanics of the three dimensional system, let
us take a look at the subsystem (1.39) and (1.42), assuming that m is ﬁxed. By
diﬀerentiating (1.42) with respect to α and z, the eﬀects of α and z on ż are given
by:
∂re
+ κα S 0
∂α
∂re
ζ′
Gz = κre
− λ = κre − λ S 0
∂z
α
Gα = κre

(1.43)
(1.44)

The eﬀect of changes in α on z, Gα in (1.43), is decomposed into two parts. First,
changes in α aﬀect the rate of return on equity, which changes households’ views on
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e

. The eﬀect of an increase in α on re ,
stock markets, κre ∂r
∂α

∂re
,
∂α

can be negative or

positive in the steady state. Second, an increase in α mitigates the desire for further
increases in equity holdings (κα < 0). Thus, the overall eﬀect depends on the precise
magnitude of these two eﬀects.
The eﬀect of z on ż is also unclear. On the one hand, an increase in households’
optimism about stock markets accelerates stock holdings, which raises capital gains
e

and the rate of return on equity. The increase in re reinforces their optimism (κre ∂r
>
∂z
0). On the other hand, the degree of optimism will erode at a speed of λ, holding re
and α constant. Thus, the net eﬀect is ambiguous.
Let J H be the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the ﬁxed point of (1.39) and (1.42).
The ambiguity of the signs of Gα and Gz yields four cases. Table 1.1 summarizes it.
Table 1.1. Classifying ﬁxed points

Gz < 0

Gz > 0

Gα < 0

Case I Stable
Tr(JH ) < 0 and
Det(JH ) > 0

Case II Unstable
Tr(JH ) > 0 and
Det(JH ) > 0

Gα > 0

Case III Saddle
Tr(JH ) < 0 and
Det(JH ) < 0

Case IV Saddle
Tr(JH ) > 0 and
Det(JH ) < 0

A locally stable steady state in the subsystem is obtained when Gz and Gα are
e

e

both negative (Case I). In this case, λ is large relative to κre ∂r
, and κre ∂r
is negative
∂z
∂α
or, if positive, relatively small compared to the absolute value of κα . Thus, to get
a local stable steady state for households’ portfolio dynamics, the positive eﬀect of
changes in α and z on ż via the rate of return on equity needs to remain relatively
small in the neighborhood of the steady state.
e

Moving from Case I, as λ gets smaller than κre ∂r
(Gz > 0), keeping the condition
∂z
Gα < 0, the steady state becomes locally unstable, yielding Case II. In this case, a
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high optimism further boosts households’ optimistic views on stock markets, creating
destabilizing forces. The locally unstable steady state, along with nonlinearities of
(1.39) and (1.42), can produce limit cycles as long as λ is not too small (See Figure
1.6). Thus, in this case, households’ portfolio dynamics alone can generate persistent
long waves.
z
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Figure 1.6. A Limit Cycle Generated by Household Portfolio Dynamics Alone (Case
II)

If Gα > 0, i.e.

∂re
∂α

e

is positive and its magnitude is large so that κre ∂r
is greater
∂α

than |κα |, then the ﬁxed point of the households’ portfolio dynamics becomes saddle,
regardless of the sign of Gz (Case III and IV). In both Case III and IV, a high
level of equity holdings creates increasing optimism (Gα > 0), making the steady
state a saddle point. However, Case IV is distinguished from Case III because it
is an exceptional case: it turns out that the destabilizing force in Case IV is too
strong to produce a limit cycle for the three dimensional full system ((1.37), (1.39),
and (1.42)), whereas, in all other three cases I, II, and III, an appropriate choice
of parameter values can produce a limit cycle for the full system. The next section
analyzes the full system of long waves.
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1.4.3

Full dynamics: long waves

We now put together ﬁrms’ debt and households’ portfolio dynamics and obtain
the following three dimensional dynamical system:

ṁ = F(m, α)

(1.37)

α̇ = ζ(z)

(1.39)

ż = G(m, α, z)

(1.42)

Let us ﬁrst consider the Jacobian matrix of the system evaluated at the steady
state.





 Fm Fα

J=
0
 0

Gm Gα



0  − +
0 
 

0

=
ζ′ 
0
+
 

 

Gz
− +/− +/−

(1.45)

Gα and Gz are ambiguously signed but the partial derivative of G with respect to
m is likely to be negative:
Gm = κre
where
∂re
=
∂m

[ ∂ρT
∂m

∂re
∂m

]
m − ρT + (1 + α)mFm + n + δ
αm2

in the steady state. The sign of (1.47) may appear to be indeterminate: while

(1.46)

(1.47)
∂ρT
∂m

m−

ρT is negative due to assumption (1.36) and (1 + α)mFm is negative since Fm < 0,
n+δ is positive. The discussion on the shape of τ (·) in section 1.4.1, however, suggests
that Fm is large in magnitude at the steady growth path. Thus, at the steady state,
the negative terms in the numerator in (1.47) dominate, and the rate of return on
equity will decrease as ﬁrms’ indebtedness increases in the neighborhood of the steady
e

state. Thus, we have Gm = κre ∂r
< 0.
∂m
We are interested in the conditions under which the system exhibits limit cycle
behavior. As 1.4.1 and 1.4.2 showed, the speciﬁcation of ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial decisions,
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(1.37), leads to asymptotically stable dynamics, whereas households’ portfolio dynamics, (1.39) and (1.42), produces several cases presented in Table 1. Our analytic
result suggests that if households’ portfolio dynamics is neither strongly stabilizing
nor strongly destabilizing, our baseline system of (1.37), (1.39) and (1.42) tends to
generate limit cycles. Our analysis of limit cycles is based on the Hopf bifurcation
theorem. The Hopf bifurcation occurs if the nature of the system experiences the
transition from stable ﬁxed point to stable cycle as we gradually change a parameter
value of a dynamical system (Medio, 1992, section 2.7). I will use λ as the parameter for the analysis of bifurcation. λ is particularly useful for the analysis not only
because it has an obvious behavioral importance but also because it provides analytic tractability due to the fact that changes in λ do not aﬀect steady state values.
Proposition 118 provides the main results of our analysis of long waves:
Proposition 1 Consider the three dimensional system of (1.37), (1.39) and (1.42)
and the Jacobian matrix (1.45) where the partial derivatives are taken at the steady
state values. Let
√
(|Fm |2 − ζ ′ Gα )2 + 4ζ ′ |Fm ||Gm |Fα
b≡
<0
2|Fm |
}
{
′
(I) (Case I and Case II) Suppose that Gα < 0 and Gz < min |Fm |, ζ|F|Gmα| | .19
(|Fm |2 − ζ ′ Gα ) −

Then a Hopf bifurcation occurs at λ = λ∗ ≡ κre ∂r
+ |b|. As λ falls passing
∂z
e

through λ∗ , the system with a stable steady state loses its stability, giving rise
to a limit cycle.
18

The proof of Proposition I is found in Appendix B but the proof is concerned about only the
existence of a limit cycle. The computation of the coeﬃcient that shows whether the limit cycle is
stable is very complicated and hard to interpret. Therefore, we extensively use simulation exercises
to observe the stability of cycles.
19

Note that Case I automatically satisﬁes the second condition since Gz < 0 in Case I.
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{
(II) (Case III) Suppose that Gz < 0 and 0 < Gα < min

|Fm ||Gz | Fα |Gm |
, |Fm |
ζ′

}
. Then

a Hopf bifurcation occurs at λ = λ∗ ≡ κre ∂r
+ |b|. As λ falls passing through
∂z
e

λ∗ , the system with a stable steady state loses its stability, giving rise to a limit
cycle.
(III) (Case IV) Suppose that Gα > 0 and Gz > 0. Then the steady state is unstable.
There exists no limit cycle by way of the Hopf bifurcation.
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Figure 1.7. A Limit Cycle in the 3D System of Long Waves (Case I)

Part (I) in the proposition suggests that the existence of a limit cycle requires
at least three conditions: ﬁrst, the mitigation eﬀect of a high proportion of equity
holdings on increasing optimism (|κα |) is suﬃciently large so that Gα < 020 ; second,
households’ optimistic or pessimistic view on stock markets is not excessively persis{
}
ζ ′ |Gα |
tent (Gz < min |Fm |, |Fm | ); third, the rate of loss of relevance of past events (λ)

20

Or the positive eﬀect of changes in α on ż via its eﬀect on the rate of return on equity should
not be too large.
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should not be too large (λ < λ∗ ).21 The second and third conditions imply that for
the existence of a limit cycle, λ should be of appropriate magnitude:
{
}
ζ ′ |Gα |
∂re
∂re
κre
− min |Fm |,
< λ < κr e
+ |b|
∂z
|Fm |
∂z

(1.48)

All of these conditions imply that to get a limit cycle, households’ portfolio dynamics
should be neither strongly stabilizing nor strongly destabilizing.
One interesting aspect of Part (I) in Proposition 1 is that the interaction between
two stable subsystems - ﬁrms’ debt and households’ portfolio dynamics - can generate
an unstable steady state and a limit cycle in the whole system (Case I). Thus, in this
case, the source of the resulting long waves does not lie in a particular sector but purely
in the interaction between both ﬁrm and household sectors. Figure 1.7 depicts the
emergence of a limit cycle in this case in a three dimensional space. Figure 1.8 shows
the trajectories of the debt-capital ratio and the equity-deposit ratio in this case. The
(a) Debt-Capital Ratio: Firms

(b) Equity-Deposit Ratio: Households
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Figure 1.8. Long Waves

debt-capital ratio and the equity-deposit ratio steadily increase for about twenty nine
21

If λ exceeds λ∗ , then the system will be stabilized.
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years and twenty seven years, respectively.22 This expansion is followed by a sharp
fall in m and α, which have signiﬁcant negative impacts on eﬀective demand and
trigger an abrupt downturn in the real sector (See section 1.5 below).
Part (I) also covers Case II where the subsystem of households’ portfolio dynamics
is unstable. As shown in 1.4.2, in Case II, portfolio dynamics alone can create a limit
cycle. Part (I) in the proposition suggests that the system can still have a limit
cycle when the portfolio dynamics is combined with ﬁrms’ debt dynamics. Then
what is the implication of introducing the debt dynamics into portfolio dynamics?
The qualitative analysis does not tell much about the answer to this question. A
numerical experiment, however, provides a case in which the amplitude and period
of long waves get larger and the quantitative eﬀect is very large as we move from the
2D subsystem of portfolio dynamics to the full 3D system (Figure 1.9).23
D
2D Household Portfolio Subsystem

1.5

1

0.5

Full 3D system
t

Figure 1.9. Comparison Between 2D and 3D Systems (Case II)

22

The functions and parameter values for this simulation, which are also used for the simulation
in section 1.6, are found in Appendix C. A suﬃciently long period of time (from t = 0 to t = 30000)
is taken in all simulation exercises in this paper.
23

In the simulation behind Figure 1.9, the exogenous debt-capital ratio in the subsystem of household portfolio dynamics is conﬁgured to the same value as the steady state level of m in the full 3D
system.
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Part (II) in the proposition concerns Case III where the household portfolio subsystem yields a saddle point steady state. Thus, this part of Proposition 1 shows
how stabilizing debt dynamics and households’ portfolio dynamics with the saddle
property are combined to produce a limit cycle. Not surprisingly, not all saddle
cases can generate a limit cycle. First, the destabilizing eﬀect that makes the ﬁxed
point in the 2D household subsystem saddle − the magnitude of Gα − should be
{
}
z | Fα |Gm |
mild: Gα < min |Fmζ||G
,
. Second, Gz should be negative. If it is positive
′
|Fm |
(Gz > 0), the condition for the saddle point, Gα > 0, eliminates the possibility of the
emergence of a limit cycle by way of the Hopf bifurcation. Proposition 1-(III) makes
this point. Intuitively, if both Gα > 0 and Gz > 0 (Case IV), the portfolio dynamics
in the household sector is excessively destabilizing in the sense that stabilizing forces
in ﬁrms’ debt dynamics cannot contain such a strong destabilizing eﬀect.
To understand the mechanism behind the long waves, it is illuminating to compare
the full system with the subsystem of debt dynamics. As seen in section 1.4.1, with
households’ portfolio composition (α) ﬁxed, the debt-capital ratio (m) monotonically
converges to its steady state value m∗ (α) (See Figure 1.5). The main reason for
this convergence is the inverse relation between m and

ρT
:
rm

a rising debt-capital

ratio deteriorates ﬁrms’ proﬁt-interest ratio. Thus, for any given α, m and

ρT
rm

move

in the opposite direction. However, once households’ portfolio composition evolves
endogenously, this kind of strict inverse relationship breaks down because changes in
α also aﬀect

ρT
.
rm

Figure 1.10 illustrates this. In Figure 1.10, the horizontal dotted

line represents the threshold level (= τ −1 (0)) of the proﬁt-interest ratio that makes
ṁ zero. In the area above the horizontal line, the debt-capital ratio increases and
in the area below the line, it decreases. With α held ﬁxed, the movement along the
curve AB is not possible since for any given α, a rise in m is incompatible with a rise
in

ρT
.
rm

However, increases in α fueled by households’ optimism during an expansion

have a positive eﬀect on the proﬁt-interest ratio by raising aggregate demand. Thus,
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Figure 1.10. The Relationship Between the Debt-Capital Ratio and the ProﬁtInterest Ratio

from A to B, the economy experiences increases in both α and m (The positive eﬀect
of the rise in α on the proﬁt-interest ratio dominates the negative eﬀect of the rise
in m and consequently the proﬁt-interest ratio also increases during this period).
However, households’ optimistic views on stock markets eventually fade as both m
and α increase. As a result, the negative eﬀect of a rise in the debt ratio starts
to be dominant at some point and the proﬁt-interest ratio begins falling (point B).
Because the proﬁt-interest ratio is still above the threshold level, the debt ratio still
keeps increasing and the proﬁt-interest ratio falls along the curve BC. When the
proﬁt-interest ratio passes through point C, the debt-capital ratio starts to fall. If
α is ﬁxed, this fall in the debt-capital ratio quickly restores proﬁtability but during
contractions, α falls as well and the proﬁt-interest ratio tends to relatively slowly
improve along the curve from C to A. When the economy reaches point A, a new
cycle begins.
Figure 1.11 depicts the same story from a slightly diﬀerent angle. The solid line
plots a trajectory of the actual debt-capital ratio over time (m) and the dotted line
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Figure 1.11. Actual and Desired Debt Ratios

a trajectory of the desired debt ratio (m∗ (α)). Figure 1.5 suggests that the actual
debt ratio m tends to gravitate toward the desired ratio m∗ (α). However, when α
changes, the desired ratio becomes a moving target of the actual ratio. From this
perspective, a period of expansion (contraction) is the time when the actual ratio is
below (above) the desired ratio, i.e. m < m∗ (m > m∗ ), and consequently the actual
debt ratio is increasing (decreasing). In words, a stock market boom (rising α) tends
to raise the tolerable level of the debt-capital ratio which the actual ratio is chasing.
When the relation between m and m∗ is reversed, a long downturn begins (See point
C in Figure 1.11).

1.5

Short cycles

The model of long waves in section 1.4.3 can be combined with a model of short
cycles. To complete our model of short cycles, we need to introduce short-run accumulation function and ﬁrms’ pricing/output decisions.
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In our analysis of long waves, the degree of capacity utilization is set at its long
run average in order to remove its short-run impact on proﬁtability and to focus
on the trend proﬁtability. However, when it comes to short cycles, the utilization
rate can deviate from the desired rate due to falsiﬁed demand expectations and slow
adjustment of capital stocks. As brieﬂy discussed in section 1.3.1.3, we introduce the
following accumulation function for the analysis of short cycles.

g = ϕ(u); ϕ′ (u) > 0, ϕ(u∗ ) = n

(1.9)

In 1.3.4, using this accumulation function (1.9) and the consumption function
(1.14), I derived the proﬁt share that ensures the goods market equilibrium. For
convenience, I reproduce the expression for the equilibrium proﬁt share.

π(u, m, α) =
+ + +

ϕ(u) + δ − (1 − c1 )uσ + c2 (1 + α)m + c1 sf (δ + rm)
c1 sf uσ

(1.28)

The positive eﬀect of u on π is obtained from the Harrodian assumption (1.30):
investment rises faster in response to changes in u than saving. Note that both the
debt-capital ratio and the equity-deposit ratio have an expansionary eﬀect on the
proﬁt share.
Regarding ﬁrms’ pricing/output decisions, this paper adopts a Marshallian approach elaborated in Skott (1989A, 2008B). The Keynesian literature often assumes
that prices are sticky while output adjusts instantaneously and costlessly to absorb
demand shocks but the Marshallian approach assumes the opposite. Output does not
adjust instantaneously due to a production lag and substantial adjustment costs. For
instance, increases in production and employment require substantial search, hiring
and training costs. Hiring or layout costs include not only explicit costs but also
hidden costs such as a deterioration in industrial relations and morale. The approach
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assumes the adjustment of prices is fast compared to slow output expansion. In this
framework, fast adjustments in prices and the proﬁt share establish product market
equilibrium for a given level of output (and stocks of real capital and ﬁnancial assets). In a continuous-time setting, sluggish output adjustment can be approximated
by assuming that output is predetermined at each moment and that ﬁrms choose the
rate of growth of output, rather than the level of output. Then output growth is
determined by comparing the costs and beneﬁts involved in the output adjustment
which in turn are determined by the labor market conditions and the proﬁt signal in
the goods market, respectively. Thus we can formulate:

Ŷ = h(π, e); hπ > 0, he < 0

(1.49)

where e is the employment rate. A higher proﬁtability induces ﬁrms to expand
output more rapidly whereas the tightened labor market gives ﬁrms negative incentives to expand production.24 Assuming a ﬁxed-coeﬃcient Leontief technology,
Y = min{σK, νL}, the employment rate can be expressed as:

e=

Y /ν
L̄

(1.50)

where ν is constant labor productivity and L̄ is available labor force which exponentially grows at a constant natural rate n. (1.50) implies:

ê = Ŷ − n

From the deﬁnition of u, we have:
24

For more details about the behavioral foundation of (1.49), see Skott (1989A, Ch.4).
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(1.51)

û = Ŷ − K̂

(1.52)

Putting together (1.9), (1.28), (1.49), (1.51) and (1.52), we get the following system of short cycles.

û = h(π(u, m, α), e ) − ϕ(u)

(1.53)

ê = h(π(u, m, α), e ) − n

(1.54)

+ + +

+ + +

−

+

−

When m and α are ﬁxed, the system of (1.53) and (1.54) exhibits essentially the
same dynamic properties as Skott (1989A). As Skott shows, under plausible assumptions, the system of (1.53) and (1.54) guarantees the existence of a steady growth
equilibrium and the steady state is locally asymptotically unstable unless the negative eﬀect of employment on output expansion is implausibly large.25 Once the
boundedness of the trajectories is proved, the system (1.53) and (1.54) will generate
a limit cycle by way of the Poincare-Bendixson theorem (See Skott 1989A, Appendix
6C for the proof). The limit cycle is characterized by a clockwise movement in e − u
space. The underlying mechanism is the interaction between destabilizing output
dynamics and stabilizing labor market dynamics. Simply put, a high level of eﬀective
demand associated with a high level of output creates strong proﬁtability which tends
to stimulate output growth. This kind of positive feedback between demand and production tends to destabilize the system. Output growth, however, cannot last forever
25

Local stability is determined by inspecting the trace and the determinant of the Jacobian matrix
of (1.53) and (1.54), denoted as J(u, e). They are given
[
]
(hπ πu − ϕ′ )u he u
J(u, e) =
, T r(J) = (hπ πu − ϕ′ )u + he e, Det(J) = −ϕ′ he ue > 0
hπ πu e
he e
The determinant is always positive, so the possibility of saddle point instability is excluded. If the
sign of Tr is negative (positive), the equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable (unstable). The
sign of the trace will be positive unless the negative employment eﬀect is implausibly large (Skott,
1989A).
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because it increases the employment rate and the tightened labor market negatively
aﬀects the condition of output growth.

1.6

Putting all together: long waves and short cycles

This section ﬁnally puts all elements together in order to integrate long waves
with short cycles. Our full model of long waves and short cycles is a ﬁve dimensional
dynamical system that consists of (1.37), (1.39), (1.42), (1.53), and (1.54). We have
seen that (1.37), (1.39), and (1.42) provide a model of long waves, whereas (1.53)
and (1.54) generate a mechanism of short cycles. By using (1.34) as our deﬁnition of
trend proﬁtability based on u = u∗ , the system of long waves becomes independent of
that of short cycles, while the latter depends on the former. This kind of unilateral
dependence can be relaxed by adopting an alternative formulation of trend proﬁtability. For instance, we can use a weighted moving average of current proﬁt rates as a
measure of the trend rate of proﬁt (See Appendix D). Then the two systems become
interdependent but as long as the alternatively deﬁned trend rate of proﬁt exhibits
suﬃciently smooth movements over time, the qualitative results based on (1.34) still
remain valid. The rest of this section presents our simulation results based on (1.37),
(1.39), (1.42), (1.53) and (1.54).26
As seen in section 1.5, if m and α are ﬁxed, (1.53) and (1.54) produce a limit cycle
under plausible conditions. It can be shown that the resulting limit cycle exhibits
a clockwise movement on the e-u space, or alternatively, the e-π space. Figure 1.12
(a) presents an example of the limit cycle on the e-π space. The system of (1.37),
(1.39) and (1.42), however, generates long waves of the debt-capital ratio (m) and
the equity-deposit ratio (α), which are represented in Figure 1.8. As m and α change
endogenously, the limit cycle in Figure 1.12 (a) breaks down and the clockwise move-

26

Parameter values and functions used for this simulation are available in Appendix C. The simulation is based on Case I in Table 1.
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(a) Short Cycles without Long-Run Dynamics

(b) Long Waves and Short Cycles
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Figure 1.12. Proﬁt-Employment Cycle

ment of e and π spirals up to the northeast or down to the southwest, depending on
the direction of changes in m and α. Figure 1.12 (b) illustrates this. The upward
spiral from A to B represents a long expansion driven by increases in the debt-capital
ratio and the equity-deposit ratio, whereas the downward spiral from B to A an
economic downturn prompted by sharp decreases in m and α.
Figure 1.13 (a) and (b) reproduce Figure 1.8 (a) and (b) for convenience.27 Figure
1.13 (c) displays Tobin’s q (=(1 + α)m). Corresponding changes in household wealth
have immediate consequences for aggregate demand via the wealth eﬀect. Figure
1.13 (d) shows ﬂuctuations of net issues of equity as a share of gross investment. The
pattern is a mirror image of changes in the debt-capital ratio. Increases in debtcapital ratio during a long expansion lead to a fall in the ratio of net equity issues,
27

Figure 1.8 (b) shows the steady increase in the equity-deposit ratio during a long expansion.
This implies that ﬁrms’ debt/equity ratio steadily falls during that period (Note that ﬁrms’ stock
of debt is always equal to total household deposit in this model. Thus, ﬁrms’ debt/equity ratio
is given by 1/α.). Minsky often uses the debt/equity ratio to refer to the degree of indebtedness.
The result in this paper, however, shows that rising indebtedness, measured by the debt-capital
ratio (m), is consistent with falling debt-equity ratio (1/α). Interestingly, Lavoie and Seccareccia
(2001) question the empirical relevance of Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis based on their
ﬁnding that the debt-equity ratio is not procyclical. The result of this paper suggests that Minsky’s
Instability Hypothesis does not necessarily imply the procyclical movement of debt-equity ratio.
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Figure 1.13. Simulation Paths I

which amounts to the substantial volume of stock buybacks (negative net issues of
equity).28
During each long expansion, the proﬁt share exhibits a strong upward movement
with mild cyclical ﬂuctuations around the trend (Figure 1.14(a)). The similar pattern
characterizes the movements in the proﬁt rates (Figure 1.14(b)). During crises, the
rate of proﬁt net of depreciation and interest payment (πuσ − δ − rm) tumbles even
28

Increasing stock buybacks in corporate ﬁrms have been highlighted in the ﬁnancialization literature (For an analysis of ﬁnancialization and critical reviews on related studies, see Skott and Ryoo
(2008)), where rises in stock buybacks are viewed as a consequence of shareholder value orientation
in management and ﬁnance. The result of the analysis in this paper proposes an alternative view on
this development: increasing stock buybacks may be seen as a consequence of increasing ﬁnancial
fragility embodied in ﬁrms’ decisions on the liability structure during long expansions.
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Figure 1.14. Simulation Paths II

to negative rates. A change in the debt structure has large impacts on the real sector
performance through its eﬀect on the proﬁtability. This is prominently shown in the
behavior of the employment rate (Figure 1.14(c)). Figure 1.14 (d) depicts a trajectory
of the rate of return on equity. During long booms, the rate of return on equity is
strong and sound on average but during crises, it suddenly drops to signiﬁcantly
negative rates.
Figure 1.15(b) shows the growth rate of output where the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered
trend is added.29 A ﬁnancial sector induced crisis triggers a deep recession in the real
29

The ﬁltered series is only for illustrative purpose since it simply smoothes the original series and
it does not adequately capture asymmetric features and structural breaks in the original series.
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Figure 1.15. Simulation Paths III

sector which is reﬂected in the negative growth rates during periodic deep downturns.
Capacity utilization and capital accumulation follow the pattern similar to that of
output growth(Figure 1.15 (a) and (c)). Figure 1.15(d), ﬁnally, plot the ratio of
consumption to disposable income. The series follows the basic long waves/short
cycles patten as shown in the proﬁt share and the employment rate but the movement
in the consumption/income ratio is noticeably smooth compared to other simulated
series.30
30

The long run behavior of consumption is closely related to movements in household net worth
H
H
H
H
2N W
to income ratio: YCH = c1 Y +c
= c1 + c2 NYWH where NYWH = uσ−sf(1+α)m
(πuσ−δ−rm) .
YH
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1.7

Conclusion

The U.S. economy is going through a deep recession triggered by the biggest
ﬁnancial crisis since the Great Depression. A Minskian perspective suggests that the
explanation of this crisis should be found in endogenous changes in ﬁnancial fragility.
This study has modeled a Minskian theory of long waves. The model clariﬁes the
underlying mechanism of endogenous changes in ﬁnancial fragility and the interaction between real and ﬁnancial sectors. At a theoretical level, the study provides a
promising way of integrating two types of instability principles: Minsky’s Financial
Instability Hypothesis and Harrod’s Instability Principle. While both principles provide a source of cycles, they have distinct frequencies and amplitudes in this model.
The Minskian instability hypothesis creates long waves and the Harrodian instability
principle produces short cycles. The limit to the upward trend created by Minskian
instability is imposed by ﬁnancial crisis, while explosive trajectories implied by Harrodian instability are contained by stabilizing labor market dynamics.31 When two
principles are combined into a coherent stock-ﬂow consistent framework, the proposed
pattern of long waves and short cycles emerges.
A purely mathematical model of this kind may clarify the logic of interactions but
clearly has many limitations. The depth of the current crisis and the time needed to
initiate a new cycle depend on institutional and policy dimensions. Minsky devotes a
large part of his analysis to the institutional and historical developments of ﬁnancial
markets and policy responses. Thus, the patterns of long waves are heavily aﬀected
by these elements. The full account of long waves and crises is possible only when
one takes a serious look at these dimensions.
31

The following quote from Minsky (1995, 84) is suggestive: “As reasonable values of the parameters of the endogenous interactions lead to an explosive endogenous process, and as explosive
expansions and contractions rarely occur, then constraints by devices such as the relative inelasticity of ﬁnance or an inelastic labor supply need to be imposed and be eﬀective in generating what
actually happens.”
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Disregarding the historical contingencies of actual movments, it may be useful to
extend the model in a number of directions. First, it may be desirable to explicitly
treat the banking sector as an active proﬁt-seeking unit. Bankers’ perception of tranquility, possibly aﬀected by their own proﬁtability, may not always agree with those
of the ﬁrm and household sectors.32 Next, this paper did not explore the implications
of households’ indebtedness. Instead, it has focused on an increasing share of stocks
(riskier asset) in households’ ﬁnancial wealth as an indicator of increasing fragility
in the household sector. It would be interesting to see the eﬀect of the introduction
of the evolution of household debt into the model.33 Third, the proposed model is
inﬂation neutral in the sense that the decisions on real quantities such as investment,
consumption and output expansion are made with no reference to inﬂation and the
banking sector holds the real interest rate at a constant level. In some account of
Minskian ideas (e.g see Fazzari et al., 2008), changes in the inﬂation rate play an
important role. Finally, the assumption of a closed economy in this paper is another
major limitation. Unfettered international capital ﬂows, in contrast to the belief of its
proponents, have created growing instability and global imbalances (Blecker, 1999).
Several authors suggest that Minsky’s theory can be extended to an international
context (e.g. Wolfson, 2002), but few attempt has been made to formalize the ideas
and to propose precise mechanisms behind them. Addressing these issues is left for
future research.

32
Setterﬁeld (2004) assumes that the private sector (the aggregate of ﬁrm and household sectors)
and the banking sector have diﬀerent fragility functions but does not try to justify the assumed
shapes of those functions.
33
To introduce this aspect, the model may have to be extended to allow heterogeneity among
households as long as the household sector as a whole is in a net credit position.
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CHAPTER 2
MACROECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF
FINANCIALIZATION

2.1

Introduction

Along with neoliberalism and globalization, ﬁnancialization has become a buzzword in recent years.1 The precise deﬁnition is not always clear but in a broad
sense the term refers to “the increasing role of ﬁnancial motives, ﬁnancial markets,
ﬁnancial actors and ﬁnancial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies” (Epstein 2005a, p. 3). More speciﬁcally, ﬁnancialization has
been associated with a number of developments. These developments include shifts
in central bank policy toward a near-exclusive focus on price stability, large increases
in ﬁnancial ﬂows both internationally and in domestic ﬁnancial markets, improved
ﬁnancing for households and elements of consumption / credit driven growth, changes
in corporate governance and attempts to align managerial incentives with shareholder
interests via stock option plans, and an increased inﬂuence of ﬁnancial institutions
and institutional investors. Financial pressures, it is argued, have induced changes in
management strategy from “retain and invest” to “downsize and distribute” (Lazonick & O’Sullivan (2000, p. 18)) and have aﬀected ﬁrms’ dividend, new issue and debt
ﬁnance policies. In some accounts non-ﬁnancial corporations have been “forced to
1

Eatwell and Taylor (2000), Blecker (1999), Crotty (2005), Stockhammer (2004, 2006), Duménil
and Lévy (2001), Boyer (2000), Aglietta and Breton (2001) and Froud et al (2000) are among
the contributions to the growing literature on ﬁnancialization. An International Working Group
on Financialisation has also been set up with the aim of bringing together “an interdisciplinary
network of researchers and practitioners interested in ﬁnancialization and all the issues around
relations between the capital market, ﬁrms and households.” (http://www.iwgf.org/Events.htm).
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fund most of their capital investment externally in the neoliberal era” (Crotty 2005,
p. 99).
These various changes associated with ﬁnancialization may have implications for
macroeconomic performance. Crotty (2005) has argued that ﬁnancialization weakens
non-ﬁnancial corporations and constrains the growth of aggregate demand. In a similar vein, Duménil and Lévy (2001) suggest that ﬁnancialization leads to instability
and undermines growth and employment. Meanwhile, most of mainstream economics
has been praising the potential beneﬁts of ﬁnancial liberalization, and some nonmainstream contributors have also seen ﬁnancialization as a spur to growth. Thus,
Boyer (2000) has suggested the potential for ﬁnance-led growth regimes as an alternative to the defunct Fordist regime.
Although most of the existing literature on ﬁnancialization has been descriptive
and empirical, more precise analytical treatments of some of the macroeconomic linkages have been presented by Boyer (2000), Aglietta and Breton (2001), Dutt (2005),
Stockhammer (2004, 2006), and Hein and van Treeck (2007).
According to Aglietta and Breton “[g]rowing ﬁnancial liberalization has profoundly
changed the connections between ﬁnance and the rest of the economy” (2001, p. 434).
Their analysis, however, is hard to follow, and the formal model does little to elucidate the mechanisms that could support the claims that are being made in the paper.2
Boyer’s model of ﬁnance-led growth basically boils down to proﬁt-led / exhilirationist
regimes with a proﬁt-wealth-consumption nexus as a driving force. Given the cen2

It is diﬃcult, for instance, to justify their assumption of an exogenously given and constant
(average) net rate of return (E(ρ)). The ﬁrm’s credit constraint, second, is peculiar, as is the
assumption that a risk premium is added to the risk-free interest rate only if the quantity constraint
is binding. This problem has implications for the analysis of the ﬁrm’s optimization problem. In this
analysis, the crucial ﬁrst order condition with respect to the debt ratio d overlooks the dependence
of the interest rate r on the debt ratio. Intuitively, why would any ﬁrm ever want to choose d = dmax
if by reducing its debt ratio marginally the interest rate on its debt drops by a ﬁnite amount? The
calculation of solutions for r and dmax in the constrained regime is also wrong since it overlooks
the fact that the default probability is itself a function of r (aside from this important point, the
expressions for r and dmax also contain a minor error).
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trality of this nexus, however, a more careful modeling of the stock-ﬂow relations
and of the eﬀects of ﬁnancialization on wage formation would have been desirable.
Boyer, for instance, assumes an exogenously given, constant q−ratio. This constancy
assumption with respect to a key ﬁnancial variable seems particularly unsatisfactory
in a model that addresses the eﬀects of ﬁnancialization. The mechanism through
which an increase in the ‘proﬁtability norm’ generates a decline in the wage bill (for
given values of output and the capital stock) is also unclear, as is the determination
of the “proﬁtability norm”.3
The Stockhammer and Dutt papers do not suﬀer from weaknesses of the same
kind. Stockhammer’s 2004 analysis, however, is partial and his 2006 model is rudimentary in its treatment of the ﬁnancial system; Dutt’s analysis focuses exclusively
on the relaxation of households’ credit constraint and considers neither capital gains
nor ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial decisions and balance sheets. Hein and van Treeck, ﬁnally, analyse
the eﬀects of changes in ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial behavior in a Kaleckian model. They assume,
however, that these changes have no eﬀect on the debt-capital ratio, the equity-capital
ratio and the accumulated earnings-capital ratio. Since changes in ﬁnancial behavior will, in general, lead to movements in these ratios, their analysis appears to be
conﬁned to the very short run.
In this chapter we explore the macroeconomic implications of changes in ﬁrms’
ﬁnancial decisions (retention rate, new equity issues, debt ﬁnance), ‘animal spirits’
(shifts in the investment function), household ﬁnancial behavior (saving and portfolio
decisions), and the level of interest rates. These changes are among the ones that
have been highlighted by the ﬁnancialization literature but clearly make up only a
small subset of the issues that have been raised.
3

Is this norm ﬁxed without any feedback from actual proﬁt rates? On p. 124 it is suggested
that, as an extension, the norm could be determined “using an adaptive process taking into account
the past record of the achieved rate of proﬁt”, but this extension is not pursued in the paper and it
would seem to undermine the exogenous ‘ﬁnancialization’ argument.
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Three further limitations should be emphasized at the outset: (i) we limit ourselves to a closed economy, (ii) the emphasis is on the medium- and long-run eﬀects
with little or no attention to questions of stability and short-run ﬂuctuations, and (iii)
we ignore ﬁscal policy altogether and our treatment of monetary policy is kept almost
embarrassingly simple. We limit the analysis in this way partly to keep it tractable,
but also because many of the arguments advanced by the ﬁnancialization literature
concern the medium- and long-run eﬀects of the changes in ﬁnancial behavior and appear to be unrelated to open-economy complications or government policy. Thus, our
simpliﬁcations may be justiﬁed by the limited objective of our analysis: to examine
the logic underlying some of the claims that have been made in the ﬁnancialization
literature.
The speciﬁcation of expectations would be critical in a full dynamic analysis of
the trajectory of the economy but, given our focus on the medium and long run,
we simply assume that expectations are being met. If the economy follows a steady
growth path, this assumption will be satisﬁed for any standard process of expectations formation. More generally, ﬂuctuations around a steady growth path will be
associated with an approximate consistency between average expectations and average outcomes. It should be noted, however, that ﬁnancialization may aﬀect the
properties of cyclical ﬂuctuations, leading perhaps to an increase in the amplitude of
ﬂuctuations, and our analysis is clearly incomplete since we ignore these eﬀects on
the higher moments of the variables. A more radical perspective, ﬁnally, may regard
increasing ﬁnancialization as merely a phase in a long cycle of endogenous changes
in ﬁnancial behavior and Minskian fragility. From this Minskian perspective our fo-
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cus in this chapter may be misleading and our neglect of the dynamic interactions
underlying the observed changes in ﬁnancial behavior represents a major limitation.4
Two diﬀerent settings are examined. The economy may be ‘mature’ in Kaldor’s
(1966) terminology and have a growth rate that is constrained by the available labor
force. Alternatively, in the ‘dual-economy’ setting, the labor supply to the modern
/ capitalist sector of the economy is perfectly elastic. Both of these settings are analyzed using two alternative models: one is derived from Skott (1981, 1988, 1989)
and the other from Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002). Both of the models are in a
broadly structuralist/ post Keynesian tradition and both pay explicit attention to
balance sheets and ﬁnancial stock-ﬂow relations. The two models diﬀer in a number
of respects. Interestingly, however, the diﬀerences with respect to the speciﬁcation of
ﬁnancing, saving and portfolio decisions have little eﬀect on the qualitative results.
By contrast, the eﬀects of ﬁnancialization depend critically on the labor market assumptions (labor-constrained vs dual) and the speciﬁcation of the investment function
(Harrodian vs Kaleckian).
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In section 2.2 we discuss some of
the stylized facts relating to ﬁnancialization and comment on the dangers of a purely
partial analysis. Section 2.3 outlines our general framework, and Sections 2.4 and
2.5 consider the implications of changes in key ﬁnancial variables in the context of
the diﬀerent models. Section 2.6, ﬁnally, discusses the main results and oﬀers a few
concluding comments and suggestions for further research.
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Figure 2.1. The Retention Rate (1952-2005)
Notes: The retention rate adjusted for inﬂation = 1−{ Net Dividends ÷ (U.S.
Internal Funds + Net Dividends + Inﬂation rate × Net Liabilities)}. The inﬂation
rates are based on the CPI and Net Liabilities refer to nonfarm nonﬁnancial
corporate net liabilities. U.S internal funds = Proﬁt (before taxes and after net
interest payments) − Taxes on corporate income − Net dividends + Consumption
of ﬁxed capital + capital consumption adjustment.
Sources: Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, Table
F.102 and Table B.102; Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Consumer Price Index.
Authors’ calculation.

2.2
2.2.1

Evidence
Some stylized facts

The stylized facts are largely well-known, and we conﬁne ourselves to a brief
description of some US data. The retention rate, ﬁrst, has declined from around 85%
in the 1970s to about 73% (Figure 2.1). It is worth pointing out that this change
marks a return to retention rates that are at or below the levels of the 1950s. Looking
4

Minskian models of endogenous movements in ﬁnancial fragility have been presented by, among
others, Taylor and O’Connell (1986), Lavoie (1986/87), Delli Gati and Gallegati (1990), Semmler
(1987), Skott (1994).
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at the whole period since 1950, the aberration may have been the high retention rates
of the 1970s and 1980s.
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Figure 2.2. The Rate of Net Issues of Equities (1952-2005)
Notes: Net issues of nonﬁnancial corporate equities divided by the market value of
nonﬁnancial corporate equities outstanding
Sources:Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, Table
F.213 and Table B.102. Authors’ calculation.
The behavior of non-ﬁnancial corporations with respect to new equity issues shows
a clearer picture. Whether measured in terms of the value of new issues divided by
the market value of outstanding equities (Figure 2.2) or, alternatively, by the share
of new investment ﬁnanced by new equity (Figure 2.3), there has been a signiﬁcant
decline in new issues. In the 1950s-1970s a small positive fraction of gross investment
- on average about 5 percent - was ﬁnanced by new issues. Since 1980, however,
the rate of net issues has been negative in most years, and on average non-ﬁnancial
corporations have spent an amount equal to about 12 percent of their gross ﬁxed
investment to buy back equity.
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Figure 2.3. The Ratio of Net Issues of Equities to Fixed Investment (1952-2005)
Notes: Net issues of nonﬁnancial corporate equities divided by nonfarm nonﬁnancial
corporate (gross) ﬁxed investment Quarterly data.
Sources:Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, Table
F.213 and Table F.102. Authors’ calculation.
Debt ﬁnance has become increasingly important. As shown in Figure 2.4, the
ratio of debt to the replacement value of capital has increased from a level just above
30 percent in the 1950s to about 60 percent. The ratio increased steadily in the
1950s and 1960s reaching about 50 percent in the early 1970s before dropping back to
about 35 percent around 1980. Thus, the increase has been very steep over the last
25 years. It should be noted, however, that Figure 2.4 depicts gross debt. Insofar
as non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms hold increasing amounts of ﬁnancial assets, the movements in
net debt could be very diﬀerent. Data issues make it diﬃcult to get a clear picture
of changes in net debt.
Real rates of interest have ﬂuctuated substantially (Figure 2.5). The early 1980s
saw historically very high interest rate, but rates gradually decrease in the late 1980s
and early 1990s and, after another increase in the mid 1990s, are now at, and in some
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Figure 2.4. The Ratio of Gross Debt to Capital: Nonfarm Nonﬁnancial Corporations
(1952-2005)
Notes: Gross debt = commercial paper + municipal securities + corporate bonds +
bank loans + other loans and advances + mortgages. Capital = replacement cost of
structures + replacement cost of equipment and software.
Sources: Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States,
Table B.102. Authors’ calculation.
cases below, their historical average. Thus, there is little support for common view
that ﬁnancialization has led to persistently high real rates of interest.
Turning now to household behavior, the well-known rise in the ratio of personal
consumption to disposable personal income comes out clearly in Figure 2.6. The
ratio of households’ net ﬁnancial wealth to disposable income, however, has shown
much more stability (Figure 2.7). The stock market boom of the 1990s shows up in
this ratio, but the value of the ratio is now back at the level that characterized the
“golden age” of the 1950s and 1960s. The eﬀects of stock market ﬂuctuations, ﬁnally,
show up strongly in the ratio of capital gains to disposable income in Figure 2.8. The
distribution of these gains has been very unequal, but as an average for the household
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Figure 2.5. Real Rates of Interest (1952-2006)
Notes: Nominal rates minus CPI inﬂation rates
Sources: Federal Reserve Board, Federal Reserve Statistical Release; Bureau of
Labor Statistics, The Consumer Price Index. Authors’ calculation.
sector the capital gains (and losses) on ﬁnancial assets have been very signiﬁcant in
some periods.

2.2.2

Dangers of a partial analysis

While the stylized facts of changes in ﬁnancial variables are (relatively) clear, the
interpretation and importance of these changes for the performance of the economy
may not be obvious, and many of the arguments that have been advanced by the
ﬁnancialization literature have a partial ﬂavor. As a case in point we may consider
Stockhammer (2004). This paper, with its combination of theoretical argument and
econometric work, presents a clear and interesting analysis. The partial nature of the
analysis, however, is a limitation.
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Figure 2.6. The Ratio of Personal Consumption Expenditures to Disposable Personal Income (1952-2006)
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, National
Income and Product Account, Table. 2.9. Authors’ calculation.
Financialization, Stockhammer argues, has generated a shift in ﬁrms’ behavior
from growth objectives toward shareholder interests. He formalizes this argument
by assuming that the representative ﬁrm faces a growth-proﬁt tradeoﬀ. Managers
pick some point on this g − r frontier, and an increased emphasis on shareholder
interests (partly because of increased takeover threats and partly because of changes
in managerial pay structures) moves the optimal position in the direction of higher
proﬁt rates and lower growth.
The macroeconomic implications of this microeconomic analysis are not as straightforward as they may seem. Stockhammer does not specify ﬁrms’ ﬁnance constraint
or discuss ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing decisions in any detail. Presumably, however, the movements along a g − r frontier must be reﬂected - via the ﬁnance constraint - in changes
in retention rates, external ﬁnance or the rate of new share issues. The changes in
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Figure 2.7. The Ratio of Households’ Net Financial Worth to Disposable Personal
Income (1952-2006)
Notes: Net Financial Worth = Households’ Net Worth − Households’ Tangible
Assets. In other words, the gap between two graphs shown in the ﬁgure represents
households’ tangible assets divided by disposable person income
Sources: Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, Table
B.100. Authors’ calculation.
investment and ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial decisions interact with household and government behavior, and these macroeconomic interactions - equilibrium conditions for ﬁnancial
and goods markets - are ignored in the analysis. Putting it diﬀerently, an individual
ﬁrm may face a perceived g − r tradeoﬀ but this perceived tradeoﬀ does not extend
to the macroeconomic level: changes in accumulation and ﬁnancial behavior aﬀect
aggregate demand and thereby the position of the g − r frontier. Thus, the micro
tradeoﬀ may not be stable.
Stockhammer tests the theory by estimating an investment function that includes
“rentiers’ share of the non-ﬁnancial business sector” as an explanatory variable. It is
unclear, however, how one should interpret the results. One might have thought, ﬁrst,
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Figure 2.8. The Ratio of Capital Gains on Financial Assets to Disposable Personal
Income: Households and Nonproﬁt Organizations (1952-2005)
Notes: Capital Gains on Corporate Equities = (Holding gains on corporate equities
− inﬂation rate using the CPI × corporate equities outstanding held by households
and nonproﬁt organizations)/ disposable personal income. Capital Gains on
Financial Assets =(Holding gains on all ﬁnancial assets − inﬂation rate using the
CPI × all ﬁnancial assets held by households and nonproﬁt organizations)/
disposable personal income.
Sources:Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, Table
B.100 and Table R.100; Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Consumer Price Index.
Authors’ calculation.
that a shift in ﬁrms’ accumulation behavior would imply changes in the parameters
of the investment function. Stockhammer does not consider this possibility. Instead,
he argues, the behavioral shift is captured by an increase in the “rentiers’ share”,
and a negative coeﬃcient on this variable is seen as lending support to the theoretical
argument. Even assuming, however, that an increase in the “rentiers’ share” captures
ﬁnancial implications of a behavioral shift, a negative coeﬃcient on this variable in
the empirical work does not necessarily imply that the changes in ﬁnancial behavior
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have had a negative eﬀect on accumulation.5 Aggregate demand and thereby the
values of other explanatory variables in the regression may have been aﬀected by the
changes in ﬁnancial behavior, and these indirect eﬀects need to be taken into account.
Unlike in the 2004 paper, the macroeconomic dimension of shareholder-induced
shifts in ﬁrms’ investment behavior is analyzed by Stockhammer (2006) but this
happens in a setting without diﬀerentiated ﬁnancial assets and explicit stock-ﬂow
relations.

2.3
2.3.1

General framework
Firms, banks and households

This section presents our general framework. The framework leaves out open
economy issues, there is no analysis of the short run and stability issues, and very
limited attention to government policy. The purpose is to look at the interaction
between ﬁrms and households across labor, goods and ﬁnancial markets. Firms, it is
assumed, make decisions concerning pricing / output, accumulation, and ﬁnancing;
households receive a return on their ﬁnancial assets as well as wage income, and they
make consumption and portfolio decisions; banks accept deposits and make loans.
There are only two types of ﬁnancial assets, equity and bank deposits, and banks are
the only ﬁnancial institution in the model.6
5

In fact the coeﬃcient on rentiers’ share is not negative in all speciﬁcations and it is insigniﬁcant
in many. Moreover, there may be several explanations for a negative coeﬃcient. Net ﬁnancial
income, ﬁrst, is included in the gross proﬁt share and for any given proﬁt share, an increase in
ﬁnancial income implies a reduction in operating proﬁts which presumably reduces the incentive to
accumulate ﬁxed capital. As noted by Stockhammer, second, an increase in gross ﬁnancial income
may mirror an increase in the cost of capital. Firms have both ﬁnancial assets and liabilities and if
the return on these move together, a rise in the cost of capital will be associated with an increase in
gross ﬁnancial income. This correlation becomes particularly important if the cost-of-capital variable
that is included in the analysis provides a poor approximation to the actual cost of capital.
6

The liquid asset could also be interpreted as a short bond.
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This framework - which generalizes the one in Skott (1988, 1989) - covers a number
of special cases, including Harrodian speciﬁcations with or without labor constraints
and Kaleckian models.

2.3.1.1

Firms

2.3.1.1.1

Finance constraint Consider ﬁrst the ﬁnance constraint facing a sin-

gle ﬁrm. The ﬁrm invests in real capital and pays out dividends and interest on
its debt (bank loans). These expenses have to be matched by income ﬂows and the
proceeds from new issues of equity and new debt. As argued by the ﬁnancialization
literature, the ﬁrm may hold equity in other ﬁrms and own other ﬁnancial assets
(bank deposits). Income ﬂows therefore include both proﬁts and the interest and
dividend income from the ﬁrm’s current holdings of ﬁnancial assets. Algebraically,
the ﬁnance constraint can be written

pIj + DivjL + iMjL + v ṄjA + ṀjA = Πj + v ṄjL + ṀjL + iMjA + DivjA
where I, Π, Div, M and N denote real investment, nominal proﬁts, dividends, bank
loans / deposits and the number of shares. Subscripts j indicate ﬁrm, and superscripts
denote assets (A) and liabilities (L); thus MjA is ﬁrm j’s bank deposits and MjL the
ﬁrm’s bank loans. Bank loans and deposits carry the same nominal interest rate (i),
the price of investment goods (p) equals the general price of output in this one-sector
model and, for simplicity, it is assumed that all shares have the same price, v. A dot
over a variable is used to denote a time derivative (ẋ = dx/dt).
If we aggregate across ﬁrms, the cross holdings of ﬁnancial assets net out, and the
aggregate ﬁnance constraint for the ﬁrm sector simpliﬁes to:

pI + Div + iM = Π + v Ṅ + Ṁ
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where I, Π, Div, M and N without sub- and superscripts - denote aggregate investment and aggregate proﬁt, net dividend payments from ﬁrms to other sectors, net
debt to other sectors, and the aggregate number of shares held by other sectors.
We assume that dividends are given by

Div = (1 − sf )(Π − rM )

(2.1)

where r is the real rate of interest, r = i − p̂, and sf is the retention rate out of proﬁts
net of interest payments. This speciﬁcation is used by, among others, Lavoie and
Godley (2001-02) and Dos Santos and Zezza (2007),7 but clearly, other speciﬁcations
are possible. Skott (1989), for instance, assumes Div = (1 − sf )Π, and another
alternative would be to assume that dividends are set so as to leave suﬃcient retained
earnings to cover some fraction of current investment. These speciﬁcations all imply
that real dividend payments will be unaﬀected by a change in the rate of inﬂation,
keeping constant the real rate of interest. This ‘inﬂation neutrality’ ceases to hold
if the real rate of interest is replaced by the nominal rate in equation (2.1) since in
this case an increase in inﬂation reduces the ratio Div/Π of dividends to proﬁts.8 As
long as the inﬂation rate is constant, however, the switch to a nominal interest rate
in equation (2.1) would not aﬀect any of the qualitative results.
Using equation (2.1), the ﬁnance constraint can be rewritten

pI = sf (Π − rM ) + vN N̂ + M (M̂ − p̂)

(2.2)

7
Both Lavoie and Godley (2001-02) and Dos Santos and Zezza (2007) assume a constant price
level, but Lavoie and Godley’s discussion on p. 300 of changes in interest rates indicates that they
view the real interest rate is the relevant rate in the case of inﬂation.
8
As shown in Figure 2.1, the ratio (Π − rM − Div)/(Π − rM ) increased in the high inﬂation years
of the 1970s. Inﬂation eﬀects of this kind may have contributed to this increase.
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where a hat over a variable denotes the growth rate of the variable (x̂ = ẋ/x =
(dx/dt)/x). The ﬁnance constraint (2.2) shows that, given the levels of investment
and proﬁts and the inherited debt, ﬁrms cannot choose the retention rate, the rate of
new issues and the amount of new debt independently. One of these three variables
will have to accommodate so as to ensure that the ﬁnance constraint is being met.
In reality, of course, there may be dynamic feedback eﬀects: an unexpected need for
external ﬁnance in one period, for instance, may inﬂuence ﬁrm’s retention and/or
new issue policies in subsequent periods.
Our purpose is to examine the comparative statics of changes in ﬁnancial behavior
and from this perspective it does not matter much which ﬁnancial variable is designated as residual. In the analysis below we describe ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial behavior in terms
of their retention rate (sf ). New issue policies can be captured by the growth of the
number of shares (N̂ ) or by the share of investment that is being ﬁnanced by new
issues. Skott uses the former and Lavoie-Godley the latter parameterization, and we
follow these diﬀerent parameterizations in the respective versions of the model.9
2.3.1.1.2

Pricing / output: the growth function It is often assumed that

ﬁrms set prices and that output adjusts instantaneously and costlessly to match
demand. The empirical evidence in favour of signiﬁcant price rigidity is quite weak,
however,10 and output does not adjust instantaneously. Production is subject to a
9
One could also, following Eichner (1976) and Wood (1975) - assume that ﬁrms set the shares
of investment that are to be ﬁnanced by the three diﬀerent sources, with both sf and N̂ varying in
response to changes in accumulation. This case is considered in Skott (1989, chapter 7); it is also
the approach used in Godley and Lavoie (2007).
10
The study by Levy et al. (1997) of menu costs in ﬁve supermarkets, for instance, is often cited
in support of menu costs and price stickiness (e.g. Romer 2001, pp. 315-316). This study found
that on average 16 percent of all prices were changed each week. These frequent changes in prices
were not costless but the ﬁnding that menu costs constitute a signiﬁcant proportion of net proﬁts
is largely irrelevant for an evaluation of price ﬂexibility. With prohibitively high menu costs, for
instance, there would be no price changes and the share of menu cost in revenue would be zero;
negligible menu costs on the other hand may allow ﬁrms to change prices frequently as part of their
marketing strategies, and the observed share of menu costs in net proﬁts could be very high in this
case.
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production lag, and increases in production and employment give rise to substantial
search, hiring and training costs; ﬁring or layoﬀs also involve costs, both explicit costs
like redundancy payments and hidden costs in the form of deteriorating industrial
relations and morale.
In a continuous-time setting one may approximate the eﬀects of lags and adjustment costs by assuming that output is predetermined at each moment, that ﬁrms
choose the rate of growth of output at each moment, rather than the level of output,
and that this choice is made so as to balance the costs of changes against the beneﬁts
of moving toward a preferred level of output and employment. These costs and beneﬁts are determined by demand signals from output markets and cost signals from
input markets.
The demand signal can be captured by the prevailing proﬁt share if prices are
fully ﬂexible. By assumption the level of output is predetermined, and with ﬂexible
prices a rise in demand leads to an increase in the price of output. Wage contracts are
cast in terms of money wages and in the absence of perfect foresight or instantaneous
feedbacks from output prices to money-wage rates, the real wage rate and the share
of proﬁts in income respond to unanticipated movements in prices: a positive demand
shock generates a rise in the proﬁt share.
The assumption of fully ﬂexible prices is extreme, of course. Our reading of
the evidence suggests that prices are less sticky than output, but in general there
will be some stickiness in both prices and output, leaving changes in inventories
and/or quantity rationing as accommodating variables. For the aggregate economy,
however, quantity rationing is insigniﬁcant and movements in inventories tend to
amplify ﬂuctuations in other demand components - even in the short run - and thus
do not obviate the need for price adjustments. For simplicity, we therefore disregard
movements in inventories and assume that the demand signal is reﬂected in the proﬁt
share.
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Turning to the signals from input markets, we leave out intermediate inputs and
take labour to be the only input that is variable in the short run; changes in the
capital stock take longer to implement and, partly because of that, ﬁrms typically
maintain excess capital capacity. As far as production decisions are concerned, the
labour market therefore provides the relevant signal, and we use the employment rate
as the indicator of the state of the labour market. The rate of employment inﬂuences the costs of changing output through its eﬀects on the availability of labour
with the desired qualiﬁcations. High rates of employment increase the costs of recruitment, and since the quit rate tends to rise when labour markets are tight, the
gross recruitment needs associated with any given rate of expansion increase when
low unemployment makes it diﬃcult to attract new workers. High employment and
high turnover of the labour force, on the other hand, may allow ﬁrms to contract production and employment more rapidly without signiﬁcant redundancy costs. These
standard microeconomic eﬀects may be reinforced by broader Marxian eﬀects on the
social relations of production. A high rate of employment may have a negative impact
on ﬁrms’ growth plans because it strengthens workers vis-a-vis management and may
lead to increased shop-ﬂoor militancy.
The analysis suggests that the rate of growth of production will be positively related to the proﬁt share (π) and negatively related to the employment rate (e). Thus,
the pricing / output decisions can be described by the following ‘growth function’11

Ŷ = h(π, e); hπ > 0, he < 0.

(2.3)

The case of unlimited labor supplies can be obtained by setting he = 0, and the growth
function yields the standard Kaleckian assumption of a ﬁxed proﬁt share π̄ (a ﬁxed

11

Or ‘output expansion function’, using the terminology in Skott (1989, 1989a). The behavioral
foundations of the function are discussed in greater detail in Skott (1989, chapter 4).
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markup on wage cost) if we have both hπ = ∞ at π = π̄ and he = 0. There is also an
aﬃnity between the growth function (2.3) and Robinson’s (1962, pp. 48-49) analysis
of the rate of accumulation induced by a rate of proﬁt. Since Robinson assumes that
utilization is at an exogenously given normal level, the proﬁt rate and the proﬁt share
move together, and a constant utilization rate implies that the accumulation rate is
equal to the growth rate of output. Equation (2.3) generalizes the relation between
growth and proﬁts by allowing for the inﬂuence of labor market conditions.12 One
may note, ﬁnally, that a static counterpart to equation (2.3) can be obtained by
setting Ŷ = 0. The equation then deﬁnes the proﬁt share as an increasing function of
the employment rate. A short-run equilibrium relation of this kind could be derived
from proﬁt maximization if ﬁrms have monopsony power and the perceived elasticity
of labor supply to the individual ﬁrm is inversely related to the aggregate rate of
employment.13
2.3.1.1.3

Accumulation With a ﬁxed coeﬃcient production function, a general

speciﬁcation of the investment function includes the rate of capital utilization, the
proﬁt share, and ﬁnancial variables like the real rate of interest, the valuation ratio
(Tobin’s q), and the ratios of debt and retained earnings to the value of the capital
stock. Algebraically,
I
= f (u, π, r, q, m, c)
K

(2.4)

12

Comparing Robinson’s analysis to our ‘Harrodian - dual economy’ case below, the diﬀerence
is that in Robinson’s model competition and pricing decisions keep utilization at the normal level
while the proﬁt share and the growth rate are determined by the equilibrium condition for the
product market; the Harrodian - dual economy case assumes that the long-run properties of the
accumulation function pins down utilization at the normal level, with the proﬁt share and the
growth rate determined by the ‘growth function’ in combination with saving behavior.
13

A positive relation between employment and the proﬁt share could also arise from an inverse
relation between the perceived demand elasticity and aggregate employment or as a result of a ﬁxed
markup on variable cost in a setting with overhead labor.
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where u = Y /K is a measure of utilization, q is the valuation ratio (q =
m and c the ratios of debt and retained earnings to capital (m =

M
,c
pK

M +vN
),
pK

=

and

sf (Π−rM )
).
pK

There is no consensus in the structuralist / post Keynesian literature concerning
the long-run sensitivity of the accumulation rate to changes in the various arguments.14 In the analysis below, we explore both Harrodian and Kaleckian speciﬁcations.

2.3.1.2

Banks

Banks give loans to ﬁrms and accept deposits from households. Neither ﬁrms nor
households hold cash. When banks provide a loan to a ﬁrm, the money therefore
returns to the bank immediately, either as deposits from households or because other
ﬁrms use their increased revenues to reduce their debt. The loan and deposit rates are
equal and there are no costs involved in banking. Thus, banks make neither proﬁts
nor losses,15 and the ﬁrm sector has a net debt (M ) that must equal the total deposits
of the household sector (=money demand, M H ):

M = MH

Banks determine the nominal interest rate. This nominal rate, however, will
typically depend on inﬂation and to simplify the exposition, we treat the real rate
of interest r (= i − p̂) as the variable that is set by the banking system (and kept
constant in steady growth).

14

See, among others, Auerbach and Skott (1988), Dutt (1997), Kurz (1986), Lavoie (1995) and
Flaschel and Skott (2006).
15

The share valuation of banks therefore is zero, and this simple version of the model does not
capture the increasing share of the ﬁnancial sector in GDP and of ﬁnancial-sector proﬁts in total
proﬁts.
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2.3.1.3

Households

In analogy with ﬁrms, households face a budget (or ﬁnance) constraint. For the
household sector as a whole it takes the form

pC + v Ṅ H + Ṁ H = W + Div H + iM H

(2.5)

where C is consumption, W wage income, N H , M H indicate household holdings of
shares and deposits (money), and Div H is dividend payments received by the household sector.
The steady-growth implications of household consumption and saving behavior
can be described in terms of stock-ﬂow ratios of assets to income. Speciﬁcally, let

M H = β(i, r, re , π, ...)pY

(2.6)

vN H = α(i, r, re , π, ...)pY

(2.7)

where the stock-ﬂow ratios α and β may depend on a number of variables, including
the real rates of return on deposits (r) and equity (re ). Theories diﬀer with respect
to the determination of the (steady-growth) values of these stock-ﬂow ratios, and in
sections 2.4-2.5 we examine diﬀerent speciﬁcations. Some theories are cast in terms
of ﬂow-ﬂow relations (e.g. consumption as a function of distributed incomes and
capital gains, as in the Lavoie-Godley model) but even when this is the case, the
speciﬁcation of the ﬂow-ﬂow relations have implications for the steady-growth values
of the stock-ﬂow ratios, and the implied stock-ﬂow ratios provide a clearer picture of
the mechanisms behind the eﬀects of changes in ﬁnancial behavior.
The relation between the stock-ﬂow ratios and consumption is straightforward.
Using the budget constraint (2.5) and the dividend equation (2.1), the stock-ﬂow
relations (2.6)-(2.7) imply the following consumption function:
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C
= u[1 − sf (π − rβ) + β(p̂ − M̂ ) − αN̂ ]
K

2.4

(2.8)

Harrodian accumulation

In this section we follow the Harrodian tradition and assume that the degree of
excess capital capacity is at (or near) where ﬁrms want it to be. Firms will typically
want a reserve of excess capacity, but if the degree of excess capacity persistently
exceeds the desired reserve, they reduce their accumulation rate; conversely, if they
ﬁnd themselves with less than the desired excess capacity, they will gradually increase
their rate of accumulation. Thus, a steady growth path with a constant accumulation
rate requires the consistency of desired and actual degrees of excess capacity, that is,

u = u∗

(2.9)

where u is the output-capital ratio and u∗ denotes the value of u when ﬁrms have
the desired degree of excess capacity.16 Equation (2.9) expresses the steady-growth
accumulation function. The equation need not be satisﬁed outside steady growth,
but a simple Harrodian speciﬁcation implies that if K̂ ﬂuctuates within a relatively
narrow band, the time-average of the output-capital ratio u must be approximately
equal to u∗ when the average is taken over a long period. To see this, consider a
Harrodian investment function
d
K̂ = λ(u − u∗ ); λ > 0
dt
Integration implies that ū − u∗ =

K̂t1 −K̂t0
λ(t1 −t0 )

where ū is the average output-capital ratio

over the interval [t0 , t1 ]. If | K̂t1 − K̂t0 | is bounded below some constant for all (t0 , t1 ),
The u = u∗ condition is necessary but not suﬃcient. Firms must also make positive proﬁts, cf.
note 17 below.
16
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it follows that ū is close to u∗ if the period is long (ū converges to u∗ for t1 − t0 going
to inﬁnity).

2.4.1

A mature economy: labor-constrained steady growth

The growth rate in a mature economy is labor constrained and the employment
rate is constant in steady growth. The growth rate therefore must be equal to the
growth of the labor force and, for simplicity, we shall take this ‘natural rate of growth’
(n) to be an exogenously given constant. Thus, in steady growth

Ŷ = n

(2.10)

Using (2.9) and (2.10) the equilibrium condition for the product market can now be
written
C
+ n = u∗
K
or, using (2.6), (2.8), (2.9) and (2.10),

[1 − sf (π − rβ) − βn − αN̂ ] =

u∗ − n
u∗

(2.11)

The eﬀects of changes in ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial behavior (sf , N̂ ), bank policy (r), or household saving and portfolio behavior can be derived from this equation. The qualitative
results, however, depend on the properties of the α and β−functions that describe
household behavior.

2.4.1.1

Inelastic stock-ﬂow ratios

Assume ﬁrst that α and β are both independent of the various rates of return
and other variables in the expressions (2.6)-(2.7). In this case with α and β are
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parameters rather than functions and the constancy of the term on the right hand
side of equation (2.11) implies that
∂π
∂sf
∂π

π − βr
<0
sf
α
= − <0
sf
= −

∂ N̂
∂π
= β>0
∂r
∂π
N̂
= −
∂α
sf
sf r − n
∂π
=
∂β
sf

(2.12)
(2.13)
(2.14)

The signs of the eﬀects of changes in sf , N̂ and r are unambiguous. If ﬁrms raise
the retention rate or increase the rate of new issues, this will depress proﬁtability,
while an increase in the real interest rate raises the proﬁt share.17 The intuition is
simple. An increase in sf increases aggregate saving, given the share of proﬁts, and
to bring saving back into line with the steady-growth requirement, a reduction in the
proﬁt share is needed. An increase in the real interest rate (r) has the opposite eﬀect
since it reduces retained earnings and thus saving at any given share of proﬁts. An
increase in new issues (N̂ ), like increases in the retention rate, raises aggregate saving
but the mechanism may be a little less transparent. Saving goes up because the rise
in N̂ induces households to raise their saving. Share prices adjust so as to maintain
a constant ratio (= α) of the value of shares to income. The growth of real income is
given, and if the rate of new issues has gone up, this means that real share prices will
increase at a lower rate. Capital gains therefore are smaller and as a result households
choose to save a larger proportion of their wage, dividend and interest income.
17

A capitalist economy would not be viable if the steady growth path implied that proﬁts fell
short of real interest payments on the debt. Thus, the condition π − βr > 0 must hold, otherwise
accumulation would collapse.
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Financialization has been associated primarily with increased dividends (a decline
in sf ), a decrease in the rate of new issues (N̂ ) and an increase in the real rate of
interest (although, as shown in section 2.2, the evidence for interest rates is questionable). Strikingly, in this model all of these changes unambiguously generate a
rise in the steady-growth proﬁt share and the steady-growth employment rate. The
employment eﬀect follows immediately from the growth function (2.3): whenever the
proﬁt share goes up, the employment rate must do the same in order to keep the
growth rate unchanged.18
So far we have taken the stock-ﬂow ratios α and β to be constant parameters.
Even leaving aside the functional dependence of these ratios on, inter alia, the rates
of return, ﬁnancialization might generate a shift in the values of these parameters.
Thus, it could be argued that ﬁnancialization increases the availability of consumer
credit and thereby tends to reduce the ratio β. A reduction in β has two eﬀects: it
increases retained earnings (which tends to reduce consumption) but if the growth
rate of income is positive it also reduces the amount of saving that households need to
carry out in order to maintain the money-income ratio at the desired value. Depending
on parameter values, the balance of these two eﬀects can be positive or negative.19
18

In this paper we do not consider nominal wage formation and inﬂation explicitly. The NAIRU
literature is enormous; Skott has analysed reasons for the absence of a NAIRU in earlier work (Skott
1997, 1999, 2005).
19

Our results for changes in β are closely related to those of Dutt’s (2005) analysis of changes
in consumer debt. Using a Kaleckian (stagnationist) model, Dutt shows that the short-run eﬀect
of an increase in households’ debt-income ratio (corresponding to a decrease in β in this model) is
unambiguously positive. This short-run result is not surprising since the the transition to a higher
debt ratio is associated with extra consumption. The long-run eﬀects on growth are ambiguous,
however. In the long run, the debt ratio has increased (β has decreased), and this increase in the
debt ratio implies a shift of disposable income from low-saving workers to high-saving capitalists.
This contractionary eﬀect may or may not be oﬀset by a positive eﬀect. Consumer debt grows at the
same rate as output (and the capital stock) and this expansionary eﬀect - consumers being allowed
to increase their debt when output grows - depends on the growth rate. Thus, in Dutt’s model, an
increase in consumer debt will raise the growth rate if the initial growth rate is high while if output
grows slowly, the increase in debt will reduce the growth rate. In this version of our model, the
growth rate is exogenous but the analogous result in our model is that a decrease in β raises the
proﬁt share if the growth rate is high but reduces the proﬁt share if the growth rate is small is low.
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Changes in the α ratio are not usually seen as a key mechanism behind changes
in economic performance.20 Moreover, in this model the eﬀects of autonomous shifts
in α depend on the values of N̂ . This result is quite intuitive. The value of the
equity-income ratio (α) simply does not aﬀect saving if there are no new issues.
Households can only save in the form of shares if other sectors (ﬁrms) are willing to
sell shares. If that is not the case then an increase in the desire to own shares will
simply generate higher share prices, and the desire will be met without any extra
saving. With positive new issues, a higher valuation of shares (a higher α) implies an
increase in household saving; with negative new issues, on the other hand, a higher
valuation of shares implies that households receive higher revenues from their net sale
of shares, and their saving out of wages, dividends and interest income is reduced.
In addition to the changes in ﬁnancial behavior, ﬁnancialization may have been
associated with a downward shift in the investment function. In this Harrodian
setting, such a shift would be reﬂected in a rise in the desired output-capital ratio u∗ .
This kind of change has the consequences that one would expect. Equation (2.11)
implies that a rise in u∗ leads to a decline in the proﬁt share and, using the growth
function (2.3), a fall a employment. Thus, according to this model the changes
associated with neoliberalism and ﬁnancialization have contradictory eﬀects. The
net eﬀect may have been a deterioration of economic performance, but the negative
impact comes from the shift in the investment function, rather than from the changes
in ﬁnancial behavior that have been highlighted in the literature.
How general are these conclusions? The assumption of exogenous α− and β−
ratios is clearly restrictive, but the qualitative results survive as long as α and β are
One might consider the possibility that u∗ depend on the valuation ratio (Tobin’s q) and thereby
on α and β. A high valuation ratio indicates a rate of proﬁt that exceeds the cost of ﬁnance.
The desired output-capital ratio may therefore be inversely related to the valuation rate. This
expansionary impact of an increase and α and β is considered by Skott (1988, 1989).
20
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relatively insensitive to changes in the ﬁnancial parameters (sf , N̂ , r) and the proﬁt
share (π).
Diﬀerentiating equation (2.11) totally, we get

−sf dπ − πdsf + (sf r − n)dβ + β(sf dr + rdsf ) − αdN̂ − N̂ dα = 0

(2.15)

where
∂α
∂α
∂α
dsf +
dr +
dN̂ +
∂sf
∂r
∂ N̂
∂β
∂β
∂β
dβ =
dsf +
dN̂ +
dr +
∂sf
∂r
∂ N̂

dα =

∂α
dπ
∂π
∂β
dπ
∂π

(2.16)
(2.17)

sf , N̂ , r and π may not inﬂuence α and β directly but they will do so indirectly
via their eﬀects on the various rates of return. Thus, the partial

∂α
∂sf

includes the

indirect eﬀect on α of changes in rates of return generated by the change in sf .
The rate of return on equity, for instance, is given by re =
(1−sf )(π−rβ)
α

(1−sf )(π−rβ)pY
vN

+ v̂ − p̂ =

+ n − N̂ and an increase in sf reduces re 21

Using (2.15)-(2.17) we get
∂π
∂sf
∂π
∂ N̂

= −
= −

∂β
∂α
π − βr − (sf r − n) ∂s
+ N̂ ∂s
f
f

sf − (sf r − n) ∂β
+ N̂ ∂α
∂π
∂π
α − (sf r − n) ∂∂βN̂ + N̂ ∂∂α
N̂
+ N̂ ∂α
sf − (sf r − n) ∂β
∂π
∂π

sf β + (sf r − n) ∂β
− N̂ ∂α
∂π
∂r
∂r
=
∂β
∂α
∂r
sf − (sf r − n) ∂π + N̂ ∂π

(2.18)
(2.19)
(2.20)

The signs of the partials of the proﬁt share with respect to these three ﬁnancial
parameters are the same as in (2.12)-(2.14) as long as

21

Mathematically, perverse results are possible in which a rise in sf increases the return. This
could happen, for instance, if there is a strong inverse relation between α and re . The conditions
that would give these perverse results can be ruled out on economic grounds.
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∂β
∂α
− N̂
∂sf
∂sf
∂β
∂α
α > (sf r − n)
− N̂
∂ N̂
∂ N̂
∂β
∂α
sf β > −(sf r − n)
+ N̂
∂r
∂r
∂β
∂α
sf > (sf r − n)
− N̂
∂π
∂π

π − βr > (sf r − n)

These ‘inelasticity conditions’ will automatically be satisﬁed if (sf r − n) = N̂ = 0,
irrespective how sensitive are α and β to variations in their arguments. Empirically,
both sf r − n and N̂ are close to zero, having at times been positive and at times
negative. In fact, setting (sf r − n) = N̂ = 0 is arguably a reasonable empirical
benchmark. Thus, the qualitative results in (2.12)-(2.14) survive - at least as an
outcome that holds for a range of empirically very plausible parameter values - in a
more general model in which the stock-ﬂow ratios are determined endogenously. It
should be noted also that the diﬀerent speciﬁcations used in Skott (1981, 1988, 1989)
are special cases of the general model with endogenous α and β ratios;22 all of these
special cases satisfy the inelasticity conditions for any reasonable set of parameters,
as does the ﬂow-ﬂow speciﬁcation used by Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002) and the
stock-ﬂow speciﬁcation in Godley and Lavoie (2007) (see below).
Overall, then, while the implications of assuming elastic stock-ﬂow ratios are clear
- the comparative statics will be reversed - inelastic ratios appear to be the more
interesting and empirically relevant case.23
Skott (1989), for instance, assumes that β is exogenous and that vN = α(π, u, r, β)pY = (π −
− rβ)pY where δ is the rate of depreciation; thus, share valuation is proportional to proﬁts net of
depreciation and real interest payments.
22

δ
u

23

We use the terms ‘inelastic’ and ‘elastic’ to denote the cases when the conditions hold and fail
to hold, respectively. Intermediate cases in which some but not all of the conditions hold are clearly
possible; in these cases only some of the signs of the partials in (2.12)-(2.14) will be preserved.
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2.4.1.2

The Lavoie-Godley speciﬁcation of consumption

In the Lavoie-Godley model, consumption is a function of distributed income and
capital gains. Thus, the consumption function is speciﬁed as a ﬂow-ﬂow relation.
Using our notation, a general version of their consumption function can be written
as:
C
= ψ(y, γ),
K

ψy > 0, ψγ > 0

(2.21)

where y is households’ distributed income and γ is capital gains, both variables as
ratios of the capital stock (y = [1 − sf (π − rβ) + p̂β]u and γ =

vN (v̂−p̂)
).
pK

The

proportion of the investment expenditure that is ﬁnanced by equity issues is denoted
as x. Lavoie and Godley take this proportion as the parameter describing new issue
policies (instead of N̂ ). By deﬁnition
I
vN
N̂ = x = xg
pK
K
where g is the accumulation rate. Thus, the ratio of capital gains to capital can be
written
γ = αug − xg
The equilibrium condition (2.11) is general and still holds in the Lavoie-Godley
speciﬁcation and - using the deﬁnition of x - the equation can be written
[
xn ]
u∗ − n = u∗ 1 − sf (π − rβ) − βn − ∗ = ψ(y, γ)
u

(2.22)

The steady growth value of β (and α) is aﬀected by the consumption / saving function
(2.21) and household portfolio decisions. In the Lavoie-Godley model these portfolio
decisions are described by
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M
β
≡
= z(r, re , y, q), zr > 0, zre < 0, zy > 0, zq < 0
M + vN
α+β
where re is the rate of return on equities (re =

(1−sf )(π−βr)u+n(αu−x)
)
αu

(2.23)

and q can be

written as (α + β)u.
For some functional forms of ψ in (2.22) and z in (2.23) it may be possible to
obtain analytical expressions for α and β, as in our general representation for the
stock-ﬂow ratios, (2.6) and (2.7); other speciﬁcations - including the ones used by
Lavoie and Godley - may preclude explicit analytical expressions but the stock-ﬂow
implications can still be evaluated numerically.
With the relevant deﬁnitions, (2.22) and (2.23) determine the equilibrium values of
π, α and β. Each exogenous variable (sf , x, r, among others) aﬀects the equilibrium
stock-ﬂow ratios α and β as well as the proﬁt share π, and we get expressions that
are analogous to (2.18)-(2.20):

∂π
∂sf

= −

∂β
π − βr − (sf r − n) ∂s
f

sf − (sf r − n) ∂β
∂π

n − (sf r − n)u∗ ∂β
∂π
∂x
= −
∂x
sf u∗ − (sf r − n)u∗ ∂β
∂π
sf β + (sf r − n) ∂β
∂π
∂r
=
∂β
∂r
sf − (sf r − n) ∂π
The total eﬀect on the proﬁt share of each parameter can be decomposed into the
eﬀect for a given α and β, and the derived eﬀect via changes in α and β. The ﬁrst
eﬀect is clear and straightforward as shown in section 2.4.1.1. Our main concern here
is whether ‘the inelasticity conditions’ for stock-ﬂow ratios hold in the Lavoie-Godley
speciﬁcation.
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Table 2.1. Harrodian mature economy I
Constant α and
β regime

Variable α and
β regime

The retention ratio

-0.238

-0.238

Equity issues

-0.386

-0.228

Real interest rate

2.589

2.575

Utilization

-1.948

-1.634

-

0.0717

Propensity to hold equity

1. Numbers in the table show the partial derivatives of the proﬁt share with respect
to the parameters listed in the ﬁrst column.
2. The structure and parameter values of the model are the same as in Lavoie and
Godley (2001-2002) including the speciﬁcation of consumption, but the closure of
the model is diﬀerent.

Using Lavoie and Godley’s values for the parameters,24 we ﬁnd that in the Harrodian mature economy, the indirect eﬀects via changes in α and β are quite small,
with the direct eﬀects corresponding to constant stock-ﬂow ratios explaining most of
the total eﬀects. Table 2.1 shows the numerical results. The numbers in Table 2.1
indicate the derivatives of the proﬁt share with respect to each exogenous parameter,
evaluated at the equilibrium associated with Lavoie and Godley’s original values of parameters. A thorough examination of whether our ‘inelasticity conditions’ are robust
with respect to reasonable variations in all parameter values has been left for future
research; preliminary results, however, show robustness as we vary the parameters of
the consumption function.25
Lavoie and Godley have changed their consumption function in recent work. Godley and Lavoie (2007) use a stock-ﬂow speciﬁcation with consumption as a linear

24

Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002) did not report parameter values but have provided the values in
private correspondence. These parameter values and our procedure of decomposition are given in
Appendix E.
25

Below we report some of the sensitivity results for the ‘Kaleckian - dual economy’ case, which
is the case that is closest to Lavoie and Godley’s own model.

86

Table 2.2. Harrodian mature economy II
Constant α and
β regime

Variable α and
β regime

The retention ratio

-0.296

-0.296

Equity issues

-0.342

-0.261

Real interest rate

1.023

1.005

Utilization

-1.102

-0.564

-

0.091

Propensity to hold equity

1. Numbers in the table show the partial derivatives of the proﬁt share with respect
to the parameters listed in the ﬁrst column.
2. The structure and parameter values of the model are the same as in Lavoie and
Godley (2001-2002) except the speciﬁcation of consumption and the closure of the
model. The alternative speciﬁcation of consumption is given by the one in Godley
and Lavoie (2007).

function of income and wealth. This speciﬁcation is closer in spirit to our analysis in
section 2.3.1.3 and, using their new speciﬁcation and parameter values, our inelasticity conditions are still satisﬁed; Table 2.2 lists the derivatives of the proﬁt share for
this case.26

2.4.2

Dual economies: endogenous growth

We now turn to the case of dual economies, that is, economies in which the labor
force does not constrain the rate of growth. This case may correspond to economies
with large amounts of hidden unemployment in backward, non-capitalist sectors, or it
could depict the case where the labor supply to the capitalist sector is perfectly elastic
for other reasons (immigration, women’s participation rate, endogenous fertility, or
technical progress).
C
= c1 {u − sf (πu −
The numerical results in Table 2.2, 2.4, 2.8, 2.9, and 2.10 are based on K
rm)} + c2 q where c1 = 0.75 and c2 = 0.064, which is equivalent to the one in Godley and Lavoie
(2007) if there is no consumer loan, no bank proﬁt and no inﬂation.
26
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The growth function can be simpliﬁed in a dual economy of this kind. The employment rate no longer serves as a relevant signal and therefore drops out of the
growth function. Hence,
Ŷ = h(π); h′ > 0
In steady growth we still have g = Ŷ = K̂ and u = u∗ , and the equilibrium condition
for the product market takes the form

[1 − sf (π − rβ) − βh(π) − αN̂ ] = 1 −

2.4.2.1

1
h(π)
u∗

(2.24)

Inelastic stock-ﬂow ratios

In the case with exogenous α and β ratios, equation (2.24) gives the following
comparative statics:
π − rβ
sf + (β − u1∗ )h′ (π)
α
= −
sf + (β − u1∗ )h′ (π)
∂ N̂
∂π
βsf
=
∂r
sf + (β − u1∗ )h′ (π)

∂π
∂sf
∂π

= −

∂π
N̂
= −
∂α
sf + (β − u1∗ )h′ (π)
∂π
sf r − n
=
∂β
sf + (β − u1∗ )h′ (π)

The signs of these partials depend on the magnitude of h′ (π). The expression
β − u1∗ =

M −pK
pY

is negative for any empirically reasonable speciﬁcation, and it follows

that compared to the labor constrained case, the comparative statics are unchanged
if h′ is ‘small’ but reversed if h′ is ‘large’. The standard Kaleckian formulation with
π = π̄ corresponds to the limiting case with h′ → ∞. This may be an extreme case,
but in the absence of labor constraints one would expect a high sensitivity of growth
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to variations in proﬁtability. Thus, the large-h′ case with the reversal of comparative
statics for the proﬁt share seems the most reasonable.
Changes in the proﬁt share inﬂuence the growth rate in a dual economy, rather
than the employment rate as in the labor-constrained economy. Expressions for the
growth rate eﬀects are readily obtained in the limiting case with a constant markup
formulation (h′ (π) → ∞ at π = π̄). In this limiting case equation (2.24) can be
rewritten
[1 − sf (π̄ − rβ) − βg − αN̂ ] = 1 −

1
g
u∗

and
∂g
∂sf
∂g

=

=
∂ N̂
∂g
=
∂r
∂g
=
∂α
∂g
=
∂β

(π̄ − rβ)u∗
>0
1 − βu∗
αu∗
>0
1 − βu∗
sf βu∗
−
<0
1 − βu∗
N̂ u∗
1 − βu∗
(g − sf r)u∗
1 − βu∗

The signs of the eﬀects of changes in sf , N̂ and r are clear. If ﬁrms raise the
retention rate or increase the rate of new issues, this will increase the rate of capital
accumulation, while an increase in the real interest rate slows down accumulation.
The intuition is simple. Since u∗ and π̄ are unaﬀected by changes in sf , N̂ and r, the
eﬀects on accumulation of changes in sf , N̂ and r derive exclusively from their direct
impacts on saving and the amount of available ﬁnance. Given that u = u∗ and π = π̄,
an increase in sf or N̂ must increase the amount of ﬁnancial resources available to
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ﬁrms - raising the rate of capital accumulation - while a rise in r has the opposite
eﬀect on accumulation since it reduces the amount of retained earnings.27

2.4.2.2

The Lavoie-Godley speciﬁcation of consumption

As we have seen in section 2.4.1.2, households’ consumption/saving and portfolio
decisions in Lavoie-Godley (2001-2002) implicitly deﬁne the stock-ﬂow ratios, α and
β, as functions of a number of variables, and the accumulation rate becomes an
additional inﬂuence on α and β in the dual economy. Analogously to the analysis in
section 2.4.1.2, we obtain the following comparative statics.

∂g
∂sf

=

∂g
=
∂x

∂β
π̄ − rβ − (sf r − g) ∂s
f
1
(1
u∗

− βu∗ − x) + (sf r − g) ∂β
∂g
1
g
u∗

1
(1
u∗

− (sf r − g) ∂β
∂x

− βu∗ − x) + (sf r − g) ∂β
∂g

sf β + (sf r − g) ∂β
∂g
∂r
= − 1
∗ − x) + (s r − g) ∂β
∂r
(1
−
βu
f
u∗
∂g
We follow a decomposition procedure that is similar to the one in 2.4.1.1 in order
to check if the inelasticity conditions for the stock-ﬂow ratios hold in Harrodian dual
economies. Table 2.3 reports the numerical results based on Lavoie and Godley’s
parameter values.
The signs of the derivatives of g with respect to the parameters are the same in the
variable α and β regime as in the constant α and β regime, that is, our ‘inelasticity
conditions’ hold in Harrodian dual economies with a Lavoie-Godley speciﬁcation of
consumption and portfolio behavior. However, the absolute values of the derivatives
in the case of constant α and β are much greater than those in the case of variable
27

It is easy to understand these comparative statics by looking at the closed-form solution for the
[s (π̄−rβ)+αN̂ ]u∗
.
rate of capital accumulation, i.e. g = f 1−βu∗
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Table 2.3. Harrodian dual economy I
Constant α and
β regime

Variable α and
β regime

The retention ratio

0.073

0.037

Equity issues

0.118

0.021

Real interest rate

-0.790

-0.396

Utilization

0.595

0.348

Proﬁt share

0.305

0.154

-

-0.011

Propensity to hold equity

1. Numbers in the table show the partial derivatives of the growth rate with respect
to the parameters listed in the ﬁrst column.
2. The structure and parameter values of the model are the same as in Lavoie and
Godley (2001-2002) including the speciﬁcation of consumption, but the closure of
the model is diﬀerent.

α and β. Thus, the adjustment of α and β caused by changes in the parameters
produce signiﬁcant and partially oﬀsetting eﬀects on accumulation.
The implications of the alternative speciﬁcation of the consumption function in
Godley-Lavoie (2007) are given in Table 2.4. The inelasticity conditions are satisﬁed
and the eﬀects of the changes in α and β are more modest in this case.

2.5

A Kaleckian model

Our Kaleckian model diﬀers from Harrodian models with respect to the speciﬁcation of accumulation. Unlike in the Harrodian framework, the utilization rate u
becomes an accommodating variable, and a shift in aggregate demand may generate a permanent change in utilization.28 The proﬁt share, by contrast, is treated as
exogenous, π = π̄, and the labor supply is taken be perfectly elastic (that is, the

28

A steady growth path for the Kaleckian model may have utilization at the normal or desired level,
despite the accommodating changes in utilization. This equalization of actual and desired utilization
rates can be achieved if the desired utilization rate itself adjusts to the actual rate (Lavoie 1995,
Dutt 1997).
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Table 2.4. Harrodian dual economy II
Constant α and
β regime

Variable α and
β regime

The retention ratio

0.101

0.081

Equity issues

0.117

0.071

Real interest rate

-0.349

-0.273

Utilization

0.376

0.329

Proﬁt share

0.341

0.272

-

-0.025

Propensity to hold equity

1. Numbers in the table show the partial derivatives of the growth rate with respect
to the parameters listed in the ﬁrst column.
2. The structure and parameter values of the model are the same as in Lavoie and
Godley (2001-2002) except the speciﬁcation of consumption and the closure of the
model. The alternative speciﬁcation of consumption is given by the one in Godley
and Lavoie (2007).

model describes the dual-economy case). The Kaleckian model, ﬁnally, often imposes
‘stagnationist’ assumptions which ensure that an increase in the proﬁt share will reduce utilization; most of our results for the comparative statics of changes in ﬁnancial
behavior do not depend on these additional assumptions.

2.5.1

Inelastic stock-ﬂow ratios

By using the deﬁnition of α and β, Tobin’s q, the debt-capital ratio, and the ratio
of retained earnings to capital can be written as:

q = (α + β)u
m = βu
c = sf (π − rβ)u
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Thus, for given values of π̄, α and β, the accumulation function (2.4) becomes a
function of utilization only:
I
= f (u, π̄, r, q, m, c) = f (u, π̄, r, (α + β)u, βu, sf (π̄ − rβ)u) ≡ ϕ(u; α, β, r, π̄, sf )
K
From (2.8) and the product market equilibrium condition, we now have

ϕ(u; α, β, r, π̄, sf ) = [sf (π̄ − rβ) + βϕ(u) + αN̂ ]u

(2.25)

We may interpret the terms in the bracket on the right hand side of (2.25) as the
average saving rate. Following the Kaleckian tradition, we assume that the traditional
Keynesian short-run stability assumption holds in the long run, too, that is, we assume
that saving is more responsive than investment to changes in the utilization rate. If
the α− and β−ratios are exogenous, we then have

sf (π̄ − rβ) + β(ϕ′ u + g) + αN̂ − ϕ′ > 0

(2.26)

and - assuming positive autonomous investment, ϕ(0; α, β, r, π̄, sf ) > 0 - it can be
shown that there is a unique positive solution for u in the interval (0, β1 ).
For empirically reasonable magnitudes of the negative eﬀect on capital accumulation of the debt-capital ratio, accumulation is increasing in the utilization rate, i.e.
ϕ′ (u) > 0,29 and we have the following comparative statics for the utilization rate:

29

The mathematical condition for ϕ′ (u) > 0 is β|fm | < fu + fq (α + β) + fc sf (π̄ − rβ).
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∂u
(1 − βu)fπ + usf {(1 − βu)fc − 1}
=
∂π
sf (π̄ − rβ) + β(ϕ′ u + g) + αN̂ − ϕ′
∂u
(π̄ − rβ)u{(1 − βu)fc − 1}
=
<0
∂sf
sf (π̄ − rβ) + β(ϕ′ u + g) + αN̂ − ϕ′
∂u
αu
= −
<0
∂ N̂
sf (π̄ − rβ) + β(ϕ′ u + g) + αN̂ − ϕ′
∂u
(1 − βu)(fr − fc sf βu) + sf βu
=
∂r
sf (π̄ − rβ) + β(ϕ′ u + g) + αN̂ − ϕ′

(2.27)
(2.28)

du
fq (1 − βu)u − N̂ u
=
dα
sf (π̄ − rβ) + β(ϕ′ u + g) + αN̂ − ϕ′
(sf r − g)u + (1 − βu)(fq + fm − fc sf r)u
du
=
dβ
sf (π̄ − rβ) + β(ϕ′ u + g) + αN̂ − ϕ′
The stagnationist case is obtained if an increase in the proﬁt share generates
a decline in utilization. Comparing (2.27) and (2.28) it is readily seen that in this
stagnationist case an increase in the retention rate must depress the rate of utilization:
it follows from (2.26) and (2.27) that (1−βu)fc < 1 is a necessary condition for

∂u
∂π

< 0.

However, the determinate sign of the partial derivative of the utilization rate with
respect to the retention ratio can also be justiﬁed directly by the empirically mild
assumption that (1 − βu)fc < 1.30 Given this assumption, an increase in sf lowers the
utilization rate since, for a given u, saving rises more sharply than investment, and
the utilization rate must decrease in order to restore the product market equilibrium.
Analogously - and independently of whether

∂u
∂π

< 0 - the average saving rate rises

as N̂ increases since more household income goes to purchasing equities rather than
buying consumer goods. This depresses the level of eﬀective demand and results in a
lower rate of utilization.
The increase in the real interest rate has a negative impact on both saving and
investment. It lowers the amount of corporate saving, and the decrease in retained
earnings depresses accumulation for a given rate of utilization. Saving falls more
30

It is diﬃcult to see how an increase in retained earnings - keeping constant u, π, r, q, m - can
lead to a more than one-for-one increase in investment, that is, one would expect fc ≤ 1.
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sharply than investment if the direct negative impact on investment of changes in r
is not too large, i.e. (1 − βu)(fr − fc sf βu) + sf βu > 0. Under this assumption, to
restore the product market equilibrium, a higher utilization rate is required. However,
if (1 − βu)(fr − fc sf βu) + sf βu < 0, the higher real interest rate requires a lower
utilization rate for the product market equilibrium. The eﬀects of changes in α and
β, again, are ambiguous.
The eﬀects on accumulation of changes in the ﬁnancial variables are given by:

∂g
∂u
= fπ + sf ufc + ϕ′
∂π
∂π
∂u
∂g
= fc (π̄ − rβ)u + ϕ′
∂sf
∂sf
∂g
∂u
= ϕ′
<0
∂ N̂
∂ N̂
∂u
∂g
= fr − fc sf βu + ϕ′
∂r
∂r
The result for

∂g
∂π

(2.29)
(2.30)
(2.31)
(2.32)

in equation (2.29) is parallel to Marglin and Bhaduri’s (1990) anal-

ysis of wage and proﬁt led growth in a stagnationist regime. The direct and positive
eﬀect on accumulation of an increase in the proﬁt share may or may not be dominated by the eﬀect of a decline in utilization. A rise in the retention rate - equation
(2.30) - also produces conﬂicting eﬀects on accumulation. The ﬁrst term in (2.30),
fc (π̄ − rβ)u, captures a direct positive impact on accumulation from an increase in
the amount of internal funds, but an increase in the retention rate also has a negative
eﬀect on accumulation by lowering the utilization rate (the second term in (2.30),
∂u
, is negative). Which eﬀect dominates is an empirical matter but - using the exϕ′ ∂s
f

pressions for

∂u
∂π

and

∂u
∂sf

- it follows that in this model

for growth to be proﬁt led.31
31

We have
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∂g
∂sf

> 0 is a suﬃcient condition

The eﬀect on capital accumulation of an increase in the rate of equity issues is
more clear-cut. An increase in N̂ leads to a lower rate of utilization, and the lower
utilization rate depresses capital accumulation.
Real interest rates have ambiguous eﬀects. The direct eﬀect on accumulation of
a rise in the real rate of interest is negative but the derived eﬀect on accumulation
via changes in the utilization may be positive: fr − fc sf βu in (2.32) is negative, but
the sign of ϕ′ ∂u
in (2.32) can be positive or negative, leaving unclear the sign of the
∂r
total eﬀect. The ambiguity that characterizes the eﬀects of changes in α and β on
utilization also carry over to the eﬀects on the growth rate.
Financialization, ﬁnally, may have been associated with a downward shift in the
accumulation function, f (or ϕ). A downward shift of this kind leads to a lower
utilization rate, and this fall in utilization exacerbates the decline in accumulation.
Strikingly, the comparative static results for a Kaleckian dual economy resemble
those for the mature Harrodian economy. A fall in the rate of new equity issues is
expansionary in both models. In the Kaleckian model it leads to a higher utilization
rate and a higher accumulation rate; in the Harrodian model proﬁts and employment
both increase. A decrease in the retention rate, moreover, may (but need not) increase
both the utilization rate and the capital accumulation rate in the Kaleckian model
and it raises proﬁts and employment in the Harrodian case.
∂g
∂π

=
=
=

=

∂u
∂π
(1 − βu)fπ + usf {(1 − βu)fc − 1}
fπ + sf ufc + ϕ′
sf (π̄ − rβ) + β(ϕ′ u + g) + αN̂ − ϕ′
(1 − βu)fπ
fπ + ϕ′
sf (π̄ − rβ) + β(ϕ′ u + g) + αN̂ − ϕ′
(π̄ − rβ)u{(1 − βu)fc − 1}
sf
[(π̄ − rβ)ufc + ϕ′
+
]
π̄ − rβ
sf (π̄ − rβ) + β(ϕ′ u + g) + αN̂ − ϕ′
fπ + sf ufc + ϕ′

fπ + ϕ′

(1 − βu)fπ
sf (π̄ − rβ) +

β(ϕ′ u

+ g) + αN̂ −
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ϕ′

+

sf
∂g
π̄ − rβ ∂sf

2.5.2

The Lavoie-Godley speciﬁcation of consumption and accumulation

In Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002), the accumulation function is given by

g = γ0 + γ1 sf ( π̄u − rm) − γ2 rm + γ3 q + γ4 u
where γ0 , γ1 , γ2 , γ3 , and γ4 are positive constants. Using the deﬁnitions of q, m, α
and β, this accumulation function can be rewritten:

g = γ0 + [γ1 sf ( π̄ − rβ) − γ2 rβ + γ3 (α + β) + γ4 ]u

(2.33)

If the α and β ratios are constant, we have a special linear version of our function
ϕ(u) in the previous section, and the sensitivity of investment to the utilization rate
depends on the various parameters, including α and β. The Lavoie-Godley speciﬁcation of consumption and portfolio behavior, however, implies that the α and β ratios
are endogenous and that the response of investment to changes in u will be aﬀected
by the endogenous adjustment of the stock-ﬂow ratios α and β.
The consumption function and households’ portfolio choice have been described
already in section 2.4.1.2. For convenience we reproduce the key equations (2.22)(2.23) here:
[
xg ]
u − g = u 1 − sf (π̄ − rβ) − βg −
= ψ(y, γ)
u

(2.34)

β
= z(r, re , y, q)
α+β

(2.35)

where γ = αug − xg, y = [1 − sf (π̄ − rβ) + p̂β]u, re =

(1−sf )(π̄−βr)u+g(αu−x)
,
αu

and

q = (α + β)u. Unlike in section 2.4.1.2, g and u are endogenously determined while
π is a parameter.
The system (2.33)-(2.35) determines four endogenous variables, g, u, α and β
((2.34) contains two equations). This system is equivalent to the steady-growth sys-
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tem in Lavoie and Godley (2000-2001).32 It can be compared to one in which accumulation is described by (2.33), but in which α and β are assumed constant (that is,
in which we drop (2.35) and the last equation in (2.34)).
Table 2.5. Kaleckian dual economy I
Utilization

Accumulation

Constant
α and β
regime

Variable
α and β
regime

Constant
α and β
regime

Variable
α and β
regime

The retention ratio

-0.162

-0.186

-0.024

-0.028

Equity issues

-0.342

-0.352

-0.085

-0.087

Real interest rate

1.055

0.197

-0.163

-0.327

Proﬁt share

-0.680

-0.780

-0.099

-0.118

-

0.296

-

0.092

Regimes

Propensity to hold equity

1. Numbers in the table show the partial derivatives of the utilization rate and the growth
rate share with respect to the parameters listed in the ﬁrst column.
2. The structure and parameter values of the model are the same as in Lavoie and Godley
(2001-2002) including the speciﬁcation of consumption.

Table 2.6. Eﬀects of changes in ﬁnancial variables on stock-ﬂow ratios in Kaleckian
dual economy I
sf

x

r

0.55

0.75

0.95

-0.05

0.05

0.15

0.01

0.0275 0.05

α

1.951

2.079

2.179

2.040

2.079

2.075

1.814

2.079

2.660

β

2.426

2.589

2.717

2.537

2.589

2.587

2.226

2.589

3.377

Notes: 0.75(sf ), 0.05(x), 0.0275(r), and the values for the parameters other than sf , x,
and r are the same as those used in Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002).

Analytical solutions are hard to obtain, but using the original parameter values in
Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002) our inelasticity conditions for stock-ﬂow ratios survive
in this Kaleckian Lavoie-Godley system. Table 2.5 describes the numerical results.
32

The only small diﬀerence between Lavoie and Godley steady-state system and ours lies in the lag
structure of variables. In our analysis, we make all level variables in each equation contemporaneous.
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Qualitatively, the macroeconomic eﬀects of ﬁnancialization on the steady state are
the same in the ﬁxed α, β system and the Lavoie-Godley model. In both models, the
eﬀects of an increase in the retention rate are negative for both utilization and accumulation. Thus, given the parameter conﬁguration, the direct positive impact of a rise
in sf on accumulation is dominated by its negative utilization eﬀect on accumulation.
A rise in the share of investment ﬁnanced by new issues has a contractionary eﬀect
on both utilization and accumulation. An increase in the real interest rate on the
utilization rate has a positive eﬀect on the utilization rate, but this positive utilization eﬀect is oﬀset by the negative eﬀect of the higher interest rate on accumulation:
accumulation slows down in the face of the higher real rate of interest.
The similarity between the systems with constant and endogenous α and β ratios is
not just qualitative. The derivatives of u and g with respect to the various parameters
are also similar in magnitude. Thus, the eﬀects on u and g of induced adjustments of
α and β are quantitatively small.33 This result is not surprising since, as indicated by
Table 2.6, the values of the α and β ratios appear to be rather insensitive to variations
in the ﬁnancial parameters (the parameter changes in the table are very substantial).
The sensitivity of the qualitative results to variations in parameters of the consumption function is shown in Table 2.7. The eﬀect of changes in the real interest
rate could not be signed unambiguously for the case with a constant α and β, and it
is therefore not surprising that the eﬀect of changes in r on utilization may depend
on the precise parameters. The eﬀects that could be signed with a constant α and
β are robust: the direction of the eﬀects is preserved in the variable α, β case for all
meaningful combinations of the consumption parameters. The violations in the top
left corner of Table 2.7 arise when, as a result of low consumption, the model gener33

There is one possible exception: the quantitative eﬀect of the real interest rate on utilization
diﬀers substantially in the two systems. Our numerical exercises, however, show that the diﬀerence
tends to decrease if we consider non-marginal, discrete changes in the interest rate.
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Table 2.7. Sensitivity analysis in Kaleckian dual economy I

a2

a1

0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95

1000

▽

▽

▽

▽

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

♦

♦

♦

100

▽

▽

▽

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

♦

♦

♦

10

▽

▽

▽

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

♦

♦

♦

7.5

▽

▽

▽

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

♦

♦

♦

4.5

▽

▽

▽

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

♦

♦

♦

3.0

▽

▽

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

♦

♦

♦

1.5

▽

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

♦

♦

♦

1.0

▽

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

♦

♦

♦

×

0.5

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

♦

♦

♦

♦

×

1. The table shows that our stock-ﬂow inelasticity conditions hold for a wide range of
values of the consumption parameters a1 and a2 in the original Lavoie and Godley
model (2001-2002).
2. Cases indicated by “⃝”: The conditions for the stock-ﬂow inelasticity hold for the
partial derivatives of u and g with respect to changes in sf , x and r. usf < 0, ux < 0,
ur > 0, gsf < 0, gx < 0, and gr < 0.
3. Cases indicated by “♦”: The results are the same as cases with “⃝” except that ur > 0
in the case of ﬁxed α and β but ur < 0 in the case of variable α and β.
4. Cases indicated by “▽”: The results are the same as cases with “⃝” except that usf > 0
and gsf > 0 for both ﬁxed and variable α and β. However, in these cases, π − rβ < 0.
5. Two cases indicated by “×”, no economically signiﬁcant solution is obtained.

ates an outcome with low utilization, high indebtedness, and an inability of ﬁrms to
cover the real interest payments on their loans (π − rβ < 0).
Turning, ﬁnally, to the alternative speciﬁcation in Godley and Lavoie (2007), a
similar picture emerges. Table 2.8 compares the eﬀects of parameter changes using
this speciﬁcation to the constant α, β case. Table 2.9 illustrates the sensitivity of
α and β to variations in sf , x and r, and Table 2.10 indicates the sensitivity of the
inelasticity conditions to variations in the consumption parameters. All the results
are in line with what we observed for the 2001-02 speciﬁcation.
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Table 2.8. Kaleckian dual economy II
Utilization

Accumulation

Constant
α and β
regime

Variable
α and β
regime

Constant
α and β
regime

Variable
α and β
regime

The retention rate

-0.470

-0.487

-0.076

-0.079

Equity issues

-0.806

-0.742

-0.186

-0.173

Real interest rate

0.587

0.154

-0.128

-0.223

Proﬁt share

-1.592

-1.64

-0.257

-0.267

-

0.391

-

0.104

Regimes

Propensity to hold equity

1. Numbers in the table show the partial derivatives of the utilization rate and the growth
rate with respect to the parameters listed in the ﬁrst column.
2. The structure and parameter values of the model are the same as in Lavoie and Godley
(2001-2002) except the speciﬁcation of consumption. The alternative speciﬁcation of
consumption is given by the one in Godley and Lavoie (2007).

2.6

Conclusion

Financialization is a short-hand expression for a number of developments over
the last 30 years. The term is convenient but these developments may not have the
coherence and unity suggested by the term and they may not signal the transition to
some new ‘regime’.
This chapter is an attempt to show how the macroeconomic eﬀects of some of
the observed changes in ﬁnancial behavior can be analyzed using existing theoretical
frameworks. The models in sections 2.4-2.5 diﬀer along three dimensions: (i) the role
of labor constraints (mature vs dual economies), (ii) accumulation regimes (Harrodian
vs Kaleckian speciﬁcations), and (iii) the speciﬁcation of household behavior (elastic
vs inelastic stock-ﬂow ratios). All three dimensions are important when it comes
to evaluating the eﬀects of the behavioral changes that have been associated with
ﬁnancialization.
Looking ﬁrst at the third dimension, the comparative statics in the elastic stockﬂow case are reversed compared to the case with inelastic stock-ﬂow ratios. Phrased
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Table 2.9. Eﬀects of changes in ﬁnancial variables on stock-ﬂow ratios in Kaleckian
dual economy II
sf

x

r

0.55

0.75

0.95

-0.05

0.05

0.15

0.01

0.0275 0.05

α

0.804

0.824

0.830

0.855

0.824

0.777

0.799

0.824

0.861

β

0.994

1.023

1.035

1.058

1.023

0.967

0.978

1.023

1.089

Notes: 0.75(sf ), 0.05(x), 0.0275(r), and the values for the parameters other than sf , x,
and r are the same as those used in Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002). The structure and
parameter values of the model are the same as in Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002) except
the speciﬁcation of consumption. The alternative speciﬁcation of consumption is given by
the one in Godley and Lavoie (2007).

in this way, however, the result is not interesting since reversal of the results formed
the basis for the deﬁnition of elastic stock-ﬂow ratios. More interesting is the ﬁnding
that all our speciﬁcations fall into the category of inelastic stock-ﬂow ratios. We
may not be able to conclude from this that all reasonable speciﬁcations are inelastic.
We have shown, however, that a range of empirically plausible speciﬁcations will be
stock-ﬂow inelastic; it is striking, in particular, that models like that of Lavoie-Godley
(2001-02) which have been built up from ﬂow-ﬂow relations also generate stock-ﬂow
ratios that are inelastic.
Assuming inelastic stock-ﬂow ratio, some of the main results for the other two
dimensions are summarized in Table 2.11. Consider a change in new issue policies.34
A decrease in new issues will be expansionary in the mature Harrodian economy as
well in the Kaleckian dual economy. Expansionary means diﬀerent things in the two
regimes: the growth rate is exogenously given in the mature economy and expansionary refers to an increase in the rate of employment; in the dual economy, on the other
hand, the labor supply is inﬁnitely elastic (and the rate of employment ill-deﬁned),
and an expansionary eﬀect is one that raises the growth rate.
34

The eﬀects of changes in retention rates are a little less clear in that - essentially for MarglinBhaduri reasons - the growth eﬀects are ambiguous in the Kaleckian dual-economy case.
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Table 2.10. Sensitivity Analysis in Kaleckian dual economy II

c2

c1

0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.85 0.95

0.003

▽

▽

⃝

⃝

♦

♦

0.005

▽

⃝

⃝

⃝

♦

♦

0.01

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

♦

♦

0.02

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

♦

♦

0.04

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

♦

♦

0.06

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

♦

♦

0.08

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

♦

♦

0.10

⃝

⃝

⃝

⃝

♦

♦

0.20

⃝

⃝

⃝

♦

♦

♦

1. The table below shows that our stock-ﬂow inelasticity conditions hold for a wide
range of values of c1 and c2 when we modify the speciﬁcation of the consumption
function in Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002) keeping intact other parts of the model.
The alternative speciﬁcation of consumption is given by the one in Godley and Lavoie
(2007).
2. Cases indicated by “⃝”: The conditions for the stock-ﬂow inelasticity hold for the
partial derivatives of u and g with respect to changes in sf , x and r. usf < 0, ux < 0,
ur > 0, gsf < 0, gx < 0, and gr < 0.
3. Cases indicated by “♦”: The results are the same as cases with “⃝” except that
ur > 0 in the case of ﬁxed α and β but ur < 0 in the case of variable α and β.
4. Cases indicated by “▽”: The results are the same as cases with “⃝” except that
usf > 0 and gsf > 0 for both ﬁxed and variable α and β. However, in these cases,
π − rβ < 0.

The Harrodian dual economy produces the opposite result: a decrease in new
issues reduces the growth rate.35 Intuitively, the growth rate (along the steady growth
path) is constrained by saving in the Harrodian dual economy, and a decrease in new
issues reduces saving and thereby the growth rate. This argument is a straightforward
generalization of what happens in the textbook version of Harrod’s model. In a mature
35

The Harrodian dual economy could be split into two cases, depending on the sensitivity of the
growth function with respect to changes in the proﬁt share. We focus on the high-sensitivity case,
cf. section 2.4.1.2.
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Table 2.11. The eﬀects of a decrease in the retention ratio or the rate of net issues
of equities in diﬀerent regimes

Harrodian

Mature Economies

Dual Economies

Proﬁt share: Increase
Employment: Increase

Growth: Decrease
Utilization: Increase
Growth: Ambiguous when sf ↓
Growth: Increase when N̂ ↓

Kaleckian

economy, by contrast, the growth rate of output and the rate of accumulation will
adjust to the natural rate. A decrease in new issues tends to reduce saving, and an
increase in proﬁts is needed to compensate for this reduction and maintain the rate of
accumulation at the natural rate. An increase in proﬁtability, in turn, must be oﬀset
by a rise in employment in order to keep the growth rate of output at the natural rate.
Basically, moving from a mature to an dual-economy setting turns an expansionary
change into a contractionary change.
Moving from a Harrodian to a Kaleckian economy also tends to reverse the comparative statics. This, again, generalizes results that are well-known from comparisons of the textbook Harrod model with standard stagnationist formulations (e.g.
Rowthorn (1981) and Dutt (1984)). The only diﬀerence is that here we have expanded the models to include ﬁnancial factors that are usually left out.
These comparisons between mature and dual-economy versions of the Harrodian
model and between Harrodian and Kaleckian versions of the dual economy provide
some intuition for the similarity between the mature Harrodian economy and the
Kaleckian dual economy: these latter economies diﬀer in two dimensions and the two
reversals of the comparative statics oﬀset each other.
Of course, the dependence of the comparative statics on the speciﬁcation of the
model is not surprising. One contribution in this study, however, is to clarify the
conditions under which the diﬀerent results obtain. Moreover, most studies of ad-
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vanced capitalist economies by heterodox economists seem to be informed by either a
Harrodian mature-economy perspective or by the Kaleckian dual-economy framework
(our own preference lies with the former, but the majority view probably favors the
latter). The two perspectives are quite diﬀerent, but our results in this paper show
that when it comes to an evaluation of the eﬀects of the changes in ﬁnancial behavior
over the last 30 years, the qualitative conclusions are rather similar. A downward
shift of the accumulation function will - not surprisingly - be contractionary in both
frameworks, but contrary to the fears among some heterodox economists, key developments associated with the process of ﬁnancialization have expansionary eﬀects:
decreases in retained earnings, a decline in new issues of equity and increased reliance
on external ﬁnance tend to be expansionary in both frameworks.
Financialization involves broader issues that go beyond the questions discussed in
this chapter. One set of issues concerns international capital ﬂows and the constraints
implied by these ﬂows on the policy options of nation states. Leaving aside the international dimension, issues of power provide an another example. It is often claimed
that ﬁnancialization is associated with the increased power of ﬁnancial institutions.
Auerbach (1988), however, presents the case for an alternative view:
The present relationships between banks and ﬁrms, far from signalling
the growing dominance of ﬁnancial institutions represent a precisely contrary development. They result from the eﬀorts of ﬁnancial institutions to
accommodate themselves to a far more insecure environment, one made
insecure by the activities of ﬁnancial institutions in competition with each
other and by the ever more stringent demands made upon them by their
clients, especially their business customers. (p. 198)
Disregarding power issues, an increase in competition and insecurity may have implications for ﬁnancial stability as well as for the time horizons used by both ﬁrms and
ﬁnancial institutions. A relatively recent but now largely forgotten literature questioned the relative merits of competitive, market-based Anglo-Saxon ﬁnancial systems
compared to German-Japanese systems. The latter, it was argued, might help to al-
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leviate a short-termist bias (e.g. Cosh et al 1990). More generally, a competitive
ﬁnancial system would not necessarily - even if it were fully ‘eﬃcient’ - produce good
macroeconomic results if the investment in physical and/ or human capital gives rise
to signiﬁcant externalities (as suggested by traditional development theory, post Keynesians like Kaldor, and recent endogenous growth theory). In the case of positive
externalities, ‘artiﬁcially low’ interest rates may be desirable (Auerbach and Skott
1992).36
One may note, ﬁnally, that concerns over the excesses and questionable beneﬁts of
the ﬁnancial system have been voiced before and that even the extent of resources that
are put into the ﬁnancial system may cause concern. Thus, Tobin (1984; reprinted
1987) confessed
to an uneasy Physiocratic suspicion, perhaps unbecoming in an academic,
that we are throwing more and more of our resources, including the cream
of our youth, into ﬁnancial activities remote from the production of goods
and services, into activities that generate high private rewards disproportionate to their social productivity. (1987, p. 294)
Tobin’s conclusion was motivated in part by the fact that 16 out of an elite group
of 46 executives whose earnings exceeded one million dollars in 1983 were oﬃcers of
ﬁnancial companies. He also noted that graduates from the School of Organization
and Management at Yale who took jobs in ﬁnance had starting salaries four times
the poverty threshold for four-person families, and observed that the average holding
period for shares was only 19 months and that the Department of Finance categories
of Finance and Insurance generate 4.5-5 per cent of GNP (1987, p. 282). TheseX

36

The relatively strong German and Japanese economic performance during the Golden Age could
be explained, of course, by other factors, unrelated to the ﬁnancial systems. Likewise, the relatively poor performance by the two economies in the more recent years may not reﬂect a need for
reforms of the ﬁnancial and/or labor market systems, as claimed by OECD and other international
organisations. See Nakatani and Skott (2007) for discussion of the Japanese case.
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numbers seem almost quaint by today’s standards,37 and developments over the last
20 years can only reinforce ones Physiocratic suspicions.

37

In 2005, among CEO’s in the top 189 eﬃcient ﬁrms classiﬁed by Forbes, 164 earned more
than $2 million (or approximately $1 million in 1983 dollars) and 46 of them belonged to ﬁnancial
companies (diversiﬁed ﬁnancials, banking, and insurance). The average compensation of those 46
CEO’s in ﬁnancial companies was $9.6 million or about 170 times the median U.S. family income
in 2004 (see The State of Working America 2006/2007 published by Economic Policy Institute). In
2004, the average holding period for shares had dropped to 12.1 months (NYSE Historical Statistics,
http://www.nysedata.com). Finance and Insurance, as categorized by the Department of Commerce,
accounted for 5.5% of employee compensation, about 5% of the employed labor force, 7.5% of aftertax corporate proﬁts, and about 3% of personal consumption in 1983; in 2005 those corresponding
ﬁgures were 7.6%, 4.3%, 11.1% and 5.9% in 2005, respectively (calculated from U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Account).
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CHAPTER 3
FINANCE, SECTORAL STRUCTURE AND THE BIG
PUSH

3.1

Introduction

Complementarities among diﬀerent investment projects may cause coordination
failures where no investment project can break even if it is implemented alone, while
simultaneous implementation of the investment projects (big push) makes individual
projects proﬁtable. The idea of big push dates back to Baran (1957), Myrdal (1957),
Nurkse (1958), and Rosenstein-Rodan (1943). Due to the presence of pervasive complementarities, uncoordinated investment decisions may lead to an underdevelopment
trap where no investment project is actually made and, in order to avoid this underdevelopment trap, coordinated implementation of investment projects may be needed.
Murphy et al. (1989) formulates this big push idea. Several contributions have
since been made in the big push literature (i.e. see, among others, Ciccone and Matsuyama, 1996; Rodriguez-Clare, 1996; Rodrick, 1996; Skott and Ros, 1997). While
existing studies have focused on various mechanisms that generate big push results,
less attention has been paid to the role of the ﬁnancial sector in addressing the problem of coordination failure generated by investment complementarities.1 Da Rin and
1

There have been a number of empirical studies in the literature regarding ﬁnance and development. See Demirguc-Kunt (2006) and Levine (2003) for survey. One important topic in this
literature is whether ﬁnancial development explains countries’ growth performance. Many studies
along this line accept the view that “the role of ﬁnancial markets and institutions arise to mitigate the eﬀects of information and transaction costs that prevent direct pooling and investment
of society’s savings” (Demirguc-Kunt, 2006, p.1) From this perspective, good ﬁnancial markets are
identiﬁed as “deep” markets which mean more liquid stock markets and larger banking sectors.
The role of ﬁnancial institutions in coordinating investment projects in the presence of investment
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Hellman (2002) is an important exception. They investigate the implications of introducing banks with market power into the Murphy-Schleifer-Vishny type model, and
show that private banks can act as catalysts for industrialization and solve the coordination failure if the banks have suﬃcient monopoly power to secure proﬁts from costly
coordination and are suﬃciently large to mobilize a critical mass of ﬁrms. Thus, Da
Rin and Hellman suggest that banks’ proﬁt maximizing behavior is consistent with
mobilizing the critical mass of complementary investments.
It is diﬃcult to deny the argument that the existence of banks with suﬃcient
size and market power can solve coordination failures caused by investment complementarities. In principle, a complete monopolist can internalize gains generated
by complementary investment projects and ineﬃciency caused by externality can be
eliminated by the monopolist. An agent with a ‘suﬃcient’ degree of market power
may be able to mimic the solution by the monopolist. However, more important
questions are how the suﬃcient level of market power that can solve a coordination
failure is determined, and what kinds of factors aﬀect the determination of the critical
level of market power.2 This chapter focuses on the eﬀect of sectoral structure on
the determination of the critical level of market power. In the Da Rin and Hellman
model, the decision-making by the bank with market power is on whether to ﬁnance
ﬁrms investing in the modern sector characterized by investment complementarities

complementarities, which is the main focus of this paper, has received less attention in this line of
research.
2

There is some empirical support for a positive relationship between bank concentration and the
growth of particular types of ﬁrms. For example, Petersen and Rajan (1995) argues that younger
ﬁrms have easier access to credit if banks have market power because banks with market power
expect themselves to be able to extract future proﬁts with those younger ﬁrms. This argument is
based on the assumption that that new entrants in an industry are characterized by more innovative
technologies, which would confer banks with market power increasing opportunities of sharing proﬁts
with the ﬁrms. Their argument is based on the existence of relationship banking. Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) suggest that higher bank concentration is conducive to the growth of industries where
young ﬁrms heavily rely on external ﬁnance. However, in general, the empirical ﬁndings regarding
the relationship between concentration and the growth of ﬁrms are mixed. More importantly, the
implications of investment complementarities for the role of banks with market power have received
little attention in these studies.
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or invest at a risk-free interest rate. In our model, we explicitly introduces the traditional sector in which investment projects are strategically substitutable. The bank
with market power considers ﬁnancing investment projects in the traditional sector
as well as those in the modern sector, and its proﬁt maximization determines optimal credit allocation over the sectors. The characteristics of traditional and modern
sectors interact with the bank’s decision on loan allocation. In particular, I explore
a possibility that the existence of strong traditional sectors is an obstacle to private
coordination by the bank with market power. The bank with market power may
fail to provide a solution to the problem of coordination failure if they ﬁnd it more
proﬁtable to ﬁnance ﬁrms in the traditional sector than in the modern sector. This
will be the case if the economy has relatively strong traditional sectors which provide
ample proﬁt opportunities for banks with market power.
The role of market power in promoting or discouraging the industrialization process has been analyzed by de Fontenay (2004) but with a focus on industrial ﬁrms.
de Fontenay suggests that ﬁrms with market power have a dual role in industrialization process: ﬁrms with market power may encourage investment in complementary
industries but other ﬁrms may be discouraged from investing by the risk of hold-up
by the ﬁrm with market power. de Fontenay maintains that whether the positive or
negative impact will be dominant depends on the market structure and institutions
by which ﬁrms with market power are organized. The analysis in de Fontenay (2004)
makes a point similar to ours: the introduction of market power into big push models
may not provide a solution to coordination failures and the role of market power
depends on the underlying structural aspects of an economy.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In section 3.2 we develop a model
which pays explicit attention to sectoral structure. Section 3.3 discusses the intersectoral and intrasectoral relations that characterize the real sector of an economy.
Section 3.4 studies multiple equilibria under a competitive banking system. Section
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3.5 investigates the conditions under which banks with market power induce or fail to
induce industrialized equilibrium. In section 6, we discuss some implications of our
results.

3.2

Model

We consider an economy in which a ﬁnal good is produced by two intermediate
good sectors. The model shares some common features found in big push models
(incl. Ciccone and Matsuyama, 1996; Murphy et al., 1989; Rodriguez-Clare, 1996).
Banking structure and ﬁrms’ belief structure are introduced along the line of Da Rin
and Hellman (2002).
3.2.1

Production processes

The economy has a ﬁnal good Z which is produced by two goods X and Y under
a perfectly competitive condition. The production process is characterized by the
following CES production function:
[
Z = αX

1− 1ϵ

+ βY

1− 1ϵ

ϵ
] ϵ−1

, (ϵ > 1)

(3.1)

where ϵ is the elasticity of substitution of X and Y . The price of Z, PZ , is normalized
at one.
Good X is produced by a perfectly competitive ﬁrm using a ﬁnite number of
intermediate goods x(i)’s indexed by i = 1, 2, ..., n. The intermediate goods, x(i)’s,
are produced by monopolistically competitive ﬁrms, and the elasticity of substitution
among x(i)’s in producing X is denoted as σ. Thus, the production technology for
good X is represented by

[
X=

n
∑

σ
] σ−1

1− σ1

x(i)

i=1
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, (σ > 1)

(3.2)

We will call the set of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms 3 producing x(i)’s “sector
I”. n is the number of ﬁrms which actually invest in sector I. In our model, n is
endogenously determined by ﬁrms’ entry decisions.
Similarly, good Y is produced by perfectly competitive ﬁrms each of which uses
as inputs a variety of intermediate goods y(j)’s indexed by j = 1, 2, .... Formally,

[
Y =

m
∑

τ
] τ −1

1− τ1

y(j)

, (τ > 1)

(3.3)

j=1

The set of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms producing y(i)’s will be called “sector
II”. m is the number of ﬁrms which actually invest in sector II.
Given that there are two sectors I and II, one may want to call ϵ the inter-sectoral
elasticity of substitution and σ and τ the intra-sectoral elasticity of substitution.
As we will see, the relative magnitude of ϵ, σ and τ will produce several sectoral
structures (The meaning of a ‘sectoral structure’ used in this paper becomes clear in
section 3.3).
Turning to the intermediate gods x(i) and y(j), production of x(i) units of each
variety in sector I requires a · x(i) units of labor and a start-up cost KI . Both a and
KI are assumed to be exogenously given. Similarly, production of y(j) units of each
variety requires b · y(j) units of labor and a start-up cost KII where b and KII are
constant. Since the eﬀect of the diﬀerence between KI and KII is not our primary
focus, we will assume that KI = KII ≡ K. The presence of the start-up cost4 implies
that there is an increasing returns to scale.
3

The Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition (Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Ethier
(1982)) is “grossly unrealistic” (Fujita, Krugman, and Venables, 2000). For our purposes, however,
it provides a tractable and useful way of representing coordination problems in the entry decisions.
4

A general discussion on the implications of diﬀerent ﬁxed cost assumptions for industrialization
theories is found in Gans (1997).
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The crucial assumption in this model is that the start-up cost must be ﬁnanced
by borrowing from banks. Since bank ﬁnancing of ﬁrms in intermediate good sectors
is essential in this model, banks’ decisions to extend loans and set interest rates play
an important role in initiating production processes in the intermediate good sectors
which in turn aﬀects equilibrium of the model.
Each ﬁrm i is charged the interest rate ri and each ﬁrm j is charged rj . Banks
set these interest rates to maximize their proﬁt. Let us denote the price of x(i), the
price of y(j), and the wage rate as px (i), py (j), and w, respectively. Proﬁts earned
by ﬁrm i in sector I and ﬁrm j in sector II then can be written as:

πI (i) = px (i) · x(i) − w · a · x(i) − (1 + ri )K

(3.4)

πII (j) = py (j) · y(j) − w · b · y(j) − (1 + rj )K

(3.5)

Thus, each ﬁrm’s proﬁt in intermediate good sectors depends on the price of the
intermediate good it produces, the demand for the good, the wage rate, the level of
ﬁxed cost and the interest rate charged by banks.

3.2.2

Banking sector

There are two types of banks in the model. On the one hand, there are a number
of competitive fringe banks each of which can ﬁnance up to K; in other words, each
fringe bank cannot ﬁnance more than one ﬁrm. Financing K incurs some costs of
ρc K to each fringe bank. On the other hand, there is a big bank − a bank with
market power − which can ﬁnance up to A ﬁrms where A > 1. The big bank’s cost
of ﬁnancing K is given ρm K where ρm < ρc . This implies that the big bank has a
cost advantage over competitive fringe banks. Da Rin and Hellman (2002) sees this
cost advantage as coming from the big bank’s “superior skills, a lower cost of capital,
or some regulatory advantages.”(p.376)
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Each fringe bank will oﬀer a ﬁrm a particular rate of interest. The big bank will
oﬀer A ﬁrms interest rates. Firms that receive oﬀers from banks will decide whether
to accept the oﬀer. Whether a ﬁrm i or j accepts a particular loan oﬀer depends on
the proﬁtability of its investment project: proﬁts given by (3.4) and (3.5) must be
nonnegative in order for ﬁrms to accept the oﬀers.
It is assumed that Bertrand competition prevails among fringe banks. Thus, fringe
banks’ behavior is characterized by marginal cost pricing (r = ρc ) and in equilibrium
each fringe bank will make zero proﬁt. In contrast, the big bank has market power and
sets its interest rates. There are two constraints on the exercise of this market power.
On the one hand, because there are fringe banks, interest rates cannot exceed ρc . We
may call this the Bertrand constraint. On the other hand, the lending capacity of the
big bank is ﬁxed: it can ﬁnance only up to A ﬁrms. We may call this the capacity
constraint. If the big bank ﬁnances n ﬁrms in sector I and m ﬁrms in sector II, then
the capacity constraint is given by n + m ≤ A. Each of two constraints may or may
not be binding in equilibrium.
Due to its market power and its capability to make positive proﬁt, the big bank
has a strategic position which may aﬀect the model’s outcome. In the later part of
this paper, we look for some conditions under which the model generates multiple
equilibria: one equilibrium is characterized by the full development of sector I and
the other by no development of sector I due to a coordination failure. Under those
conditions, ﬁrms in sector I become strategically complementary (deﬁned in 3.3.2)
and the entry decisions of ﬁrms into sector I suﬀer from a coordination problem. A
crucial question is under what circumstances the market power of the big bank can
solve this coordination problem. The answer, it turns out, depends critically on the
sectoral structure of an economy as well as the degree of market power.
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3.2.3

Model closure

Full employment is assumed. Given a ﬁxed size of labor force, L, the labor market
equilibrium condition is
n
∑

a · x(i) +

i=1

m
∑

b · y(j) = L

(3.6)

j=1

For expositional convenience, we normalize the units of intermediate goods so that
( σ )
( τ )
a = 1 and τ −1
b = 1.5
σ−1

3.3
3.3.1

Sectoral structure
Proﬁt functions

Banks oﬀer interest rates to ﬁrms and ﬁrms which receive banks’ oﬀers decide
whether to accept those oﬀers by considering their proﬁts net of interest payments.
A ﬁrm will accept an oﬀer only if its investment project is expected to be proﬁtable.
Given the interest rates and ﬁrms’ expectations of m and n, we can derive proﬁt
functions for individual producers in sector I and sector II. The determination of
those interest rates itself will be discussed later.
Proposition 2 In the model described in section 3.2, intermediate good producers
have the following proﬁt functions for given m, n and interest rates:

ϵ

[

ϵ

α αn
πI (n, m, ri ) =

πII (n, m, rj ) =

ϵ−1
σ−1

ϵ

+β m

ϵ−1
τ −1

1
] ϵ−1

ϵ−1

ϵ−1

ϵ−1

ϵ−1

aαϵ n σ−1 + bβ ϵ m τ −1
1
[
] ϵ−1
ϵ−1
ϵ−1
ϵ−τ
β ϵ αϵ n σ−1 + β ϵ m τ −1
m τ −1
aαϵ n σ−1 + bβ ϵ m τ −1

Proof. See Appendix F.
5

ϵ−σ

n σ−1

This implies that b > a (b < a) whenever τ > σ (τ < σ).
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(1 − a)L − (1 + ri )K

(3.7)

(1 − b)L − (1 + rj )K

(3.8)

ʌI

ʌII

ʌI(n, m0)
m1> m0

ʌI(n, m1)
n1> n0

0

n

0

ʌII(n0, m)

m

ʌII(n1, m)
(a)

(b)

Figure 3.1. Proﬁt Functions of Intermediate Good Producers

The relationship between individual ﬁrm’s proﬁt and other ﬁrms’ investment decisions is determined by intersectoral (ϵ) and intrasectoral (σ and τ ) elasticity of
substitution. In the following section, we classify diﬀerent cases of the proﬁt functions according to the interﬁrm and intersectoral relations

3.3.2

Strategic complementarity and substitutability

In order to characterize the properties of proﬁt functions of intermediate good
producers, we will use the following terminology:
• Firms in a sector are strategically complementary if each ﬁrm’s proﬁt is increasing in the number of ﬁrms investing in that sector.
• Firms in a sector are strategically substitutable if each ﬁrm’s proﬁt is decreasing
in the number of ﬁrms investing in that sector.
• Sector X is strategically complementary to Sector Y if each ﬁrm’s proﬁt in
Sector Y is increasing in the number of ﬁrms investing in Sector X.
• Sector X is strategically substitutable to Sector Y if each ﬁrm’s proﬁt in Sector
Y is decreasing in the number of ﬁrms investing in Sector X.
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Note that the ﬁrst two statements deﬁne intrasectoral relations within a sector
while the last two statements deﬁne intersectoral relations. For instance, ﬁrms in
sector I are strategically complementary (substitutable) if

∂πI
∂n

I
> 0 ( ∂π
< 0).
∂n

6

We deﬁne a sectoral structure as a particular combination of intersectoral and intrasectoral relations. Several sectoral structures can obtain depending on parameters,
ϵ, σ and τ . Below we focus on a particular case in which multiple equilibria naturally
I
emerge: ﬁrms in sector I are strategically complementary among themselves ( ∂π
>0
∂n
II
for all n and m), ﬁrms in sector II are strategically substitutable ( ∂π
< 0 for all
∂m
I
n and m), and sector I and II are strategically substitutable to each other ( ∂π
<0
∂m

and

∂πII
∂n

< 0 for all n and m). This case is illustrated by Figure 3.1 (a) and (b). In

Figure 3.1(a), ﬁrm’s proﬁt in sector I is increasing in n and the function shifts down
as m increases. In Figure 3.1(b), ﬁrm’s proﬁt in sector II is decreasing in m and the
function shifts down as n increases. Proposition 37 speciﬁes the restrictions on the
parameter values required to obtain this type of sectoral structure.
Proposition 3 Given the proﬁt functions (3.7) and (3.8), for any n and m,
I
(i) Firms in sector I are strategically complementarity ( ∂π
> 0) if and only if σ < 2
∂n

and σ < ϵ.
II
< 0) if and only if τ > 2
(ii) Firms in sector II are strategically substitutable ( ∂π
∂m

and τ > ϵ
I
(iii) Sector I and II are strategically substitutable for each other ( ∂π
< 0 and
∂m

0) if ϵ >

b
a

∂πII
∂n

<

+1

6

These inequalities may hold only locally: the signs of relevant partial derivatives depends on
the level of n and m. If there is no dependency of the signs of those partials on n and m, strategic
complementarity or substitutability may be said to hold globally.
7
This proposition is obtained by examining the partial derivatives of (3.7) and (3.8) with respect
to n and m but the procedure is rather tedius.
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Proposition 3 (i) tells us that a suﬃciently low intra-sectoral elasticity of substitution in sector I (σ) compared to the inter-sectoral elasticity ϵ makes the proﬁt level
of intermediate good producers in sector I increase in n. When σ < 2 and σ < ϵ,
ﬁrms’ investment projects in sector I become global strategic complements.8 For
expositional convenience, we will call sector I, the sector characterized as strategic
complementarities, ‘the modern sector.’
Proposition 3 (ii) shows that a suﬃciently high elasticity of substitution in sector
II makes proﬁts made by intermediate good producers in sector II decrease in m.
We will call sector II ‘traditional sector.’ It is worth noting that our ‘traditional’
sector is ‘traditional’ not because the sector has decreasing or constant returns to
scale technology rather than increasing returns but because it is characterized by
strategically substitutable ﬁrms. In fact, in our model, ﬁrms in our ‘traditional sector’
(sector II) have increasing returns to scale technology due to the existence of ﬁxed
start-up cost (See equation (3.5)).9
Proposition 3 (iii) gives us a condition under which the modern sector (sector
I) and the traditional sector (sector II) are strategic substitutes for each other, i.e.
individual ﬁrm’s proﬁt function in one sector is decreasing in the number of ﬁrms
8

σ < 2 is not necessary for local complementarity but for global complementarity. While the
assumption for global complementarity (σ < 2) is not essential for our analysis, it greatly simpliﬁes
our analysis without losing any insight. If we have only σ < ϵ not σ < 2, the proﬁt function (3.7)
is initially increasing in n but beyond some point decreasing in n for any given m. In this case,
we cannot have an outcome where n is increasing without bound. However, it is still possible to
obtain two equilibria in which the values of n are ﬁnite. In contrast, σ < ϵ is essential to obtain
local complementarity. Thus, even when goods in sector I are highly substitutable (a high value
of σ which exceeds 2), investment projects in sector I can be strategically complementary for some
ranges of n and m as long as σ < ϵ. This aspect is closely related to the notion of Hicks-Allen
complements. See Matsuyama (1995).
9

The characteristics of individual producers’ technology are not necessarily seen as the ultimate
determinant of making an economy ‘traditional’ or ‘less developed.’ Even old large plantation
methods of production may exhibit increasing returns to scale for a certain range of production
scale. For instance, there is no unanimous consensus regarding the degree of scale economies of
large-scale slave plantations in the antebellum southern economy in the U.S. See Ransom and Sutch
(2001, pp.73-78).
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actually investing in the other sector. This requires a suﬃciently large intersectoral
elasticity of substitution (ϵ >

b
a

+ 1).

Due to the parameter restrictions in Proposition 3, the economy has potential
to exhibit multiple equilibria. The following two sections provide an analysis of the
eﬀects of banking structure on the determination of equilibrium.

3.4

Multiple equilibria in a competitive banking system

Let us assume that there is no bank with market power and all banks, which can
ﬁnance at most one ﬁrm, are subject to Bertrand competition. Then banks will adopt
marginal cost pricing, i.e. ri = rj = ρc for all i and j. The solution to the model
without bank with market power is simply the same as the solution to the model
where each intermediate good producer faces (1 + ρc )K of ﬁxed start-up cost with
interest payments.
Consider ﬁrms’ entry decisions in sector I and II. Firms’ expected proﬁts are
determined by their expectations on the number of ﬁrms investing in sectors and
banks’ interest rate policies. Firms are assumed to share a common belief. We will
focus on two particular types of beliefs, the optimistic and the pessimistic belief
following Da Rin and Hellman (2002). The optimistic belief is deﬁned as the one in
which ﬁrms believe that the largest n in the equilibrium set and the corresponding
value of m will be realized. The pessimistic belief is deﬁned as the one in which ﬁrms
believe that the smallest n in the equilibrium set and the corresponding value of m
will be realized.
Whenever a ﬁrm’s investment project is expected to generate nonnegative proﬁt,
it will decide to invest. The following assumptions will be imposed to make our
problems non-trivial.
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[
m̄ ≡
[
n̄ ≡

ϵ
ϵ−1

β L
(τ − 1)(1 + ρc )K
(σ − 1)(1 + ρc )K
ϵ
α ϵ−1 L

−1
] ττ −2

≥1

(3.9)

>1

(3.10)

σ−1
] 2−σ

It can be shown that the ﬁrst inequality ensures the positiveness of the equilibrium m when pessimistic beliefs prevail. Without the second inequality, n always
diverges to ∞ and m converges to 0 and, therefore, the case with multiple equilibria
is eliminated. As long as n̄ > 1, a single investment alone in sector I will not be
proﬁtable for any nonnegative m. Industrialization requires mobilizing a minimum
number n̄ of investment projects in sector I.
Suppose that every ﬁrm believes that the modern sector (sector I) will expand
without bound. This implies that they believe that the traditional sector (sector
II) will eventually vanish because due to the strategic substitutability between those
two sectors the indeﬁnite expansion of the modern sector eventually makes any investment project in the traditional sector unproﬁtable. This belief system is self-fulﬁlling.
Because for any n > n̄ and m = 0, which is implied by the optimistic belief, any individual investment project in sector I is proﬁtable and n will grow without bound.
At a suﬃciently large value of n, any investment project in sector II becomes unprofitable given that every ﬁrm in sector II believes nobody else will make in the sector.
Thus, ﬁrms’ optimistic belief leads to industrialization equilibrium where the modern
sector will be fully developed.
Now assume that every ﬁrm believes the modern sector will never develop (n = 0).
This belief implies that they must believe that m̄ number of ﬁrms will enter the
traditional sector in equilibrium. This belief system again generates a self-fulﬁlling
equilibrium. The modern sector will never develop under this pessimistic belief.
We have shown that the model generates multiple equilibria in which one equilibrium represents industrialization with a fully developed modern sector and the other
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an underdevelopment trap with no development of the modern sector. Note that the
introduction of banks without market power does not change the basic feature of the
model. Actual equilibrium depends on the belief structure only. In section 3.5, we
will examine the implication of introducing a bank with market power into our model.

3.5

Market power and industrialization

We consider decision-making by a bank with market power and its eﬀect on the
outcome of the model.
It is easy to see that under the optimistic beliefs, the existence of the big bank
will make little diﬀerence. To see this, let us assume that every ﬁrm which considers
investing in the modern sector believes that the modern sector will expand without
bound and the traditional sector will eventually vanish. Then for any ﬁnite interest
rate every ﬁrm will invest in the modern sector because the belief that n → ∞ and
m → 0 implies that the expected proﬁt made by a ﬁrm in sector I eventually becomes
positive due to intersectoral and intrasectoral relations speciﬁed in the model (see
Figure 3.1 (a) and equation (3.7)). In addition, no ﬁrm will invest in the traditional
sector because the proﬁt in the sector becomes negative as n → ∞ and m → 0 for
a ﬁnite interest rate (see Figure 3.1 (b) and equation (3.8)). The big bank’s proﬁt
maximization implies that both the capacity constraint and the Bertrand constraint
must be binding. Otherwise, the big bank could increase its proﬁt by slightly increasing interest rates or the amount of loans. Thus, in equilibrium, the big bank will end
up with ﬁnancing A ﬁrms in the modern sector at ρc , the maximum permissible rate
under the Bertrand constraint. Other ﬁrms will be ﬁnanced by fringe ﬁrms at the
same rate of interest. The only diﬀerence between this case and the case without the
big bank is that the big bank will make positive proﬁts, (ρc − ρm )KA.
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The rest of this section will focus on the case of pessimistic beliefs. The main
purpose is to clarify the relation between the sectoral structure and the minimum
degree of market power required to solve coordination failures.
3.5.1

Bank decision problem

In this section, we are interested in the relationship between the size of the bank’s
lending capacity (A) (in short, the bank size below) and the sectoral structure of an
economy. For the rest of the paper, we replace the proﬁt functions (3.7) and (3.8) of
intermediate good producers by their linear versions (3.11) and (3.12) below where
all parameters are positive constants.10
πI (n, m, ri ) = ϕ0 + ϕ1 n − ϕ2 m − (1 + ri )K

(3.11)

πII (n, m, rj ) = γ0 − γ1 n − γ2 m − (1 + rj )K

(3.12)

The discussion on the sectoral structure in section 3.3 allows us to give natural
interpretations to parameters in (3.11) and (3.12). Following our assumptions in
section 3.3, ﬁrms in the modern sector (sector I) are strategically complementary
I
= ϕ1 > 0), ﬁrms in the traditional sector (sector II) are strategically substitutable
( ∂π
∂n
II
= −γ2 < 0).
( ∂π
∂n

The cross derivatives of (3.11) and (3.12) which describe intersectoral relations are
both negative − sector I and II are strategically substitutable to each other − and
their magnitudes are given by ϕ2 and γ1 . Constant terms in (3.11) and (3.12) (ϕ0 and
γ0 ) are the shifting parameters which determine the ‘height’ of the proﬁt functions for
any given n and m. The levels of ϕ0 and γ0 may reﬂect government subsidy policies,
distribution of foreign aids over sectors, and the degree of abundance of sector-speciﬁc
resources or technology.
10

By this linear speciﬁcation, we do not lose main qualitative features of the model in section 3.2
and 3.3.
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The bank with market power has two alternatives regarding optimal loan allocation over sectors. In the ﬁrst alternative, the bank decides to induce an industrialized
equilibrium. In order to do this, the bank has to ﬁnd a way of mobilizing the ﬁrms
in the critical mass of industrialization. If it succeeds in mobilizing the critical mass,
the modern sector would fully develop on its own while the traditional sector would
vanish. We expect there are some costs involved in mobilizing the critical mass and
solving coordination failures. These costs will be reﬂected in the bank’s proﬁt calculation.
In the second alternative, the bank decides not to mobilize the critical mass of
industrialization. In this case, the bank will extend loans to ﬁrms in the traditional
sector and may extend loans to a limited number of ﬁrms in the modern sector.11
In each alternative, the bank decides on interest rates and allocate loans so as to
maximize its proﬁts and, by comparing the proﬁts from each alternative, the bank
will decide whether to induce an industrial equilibrium or an underdevelopment trap.
Let us analyze two cases one by one.

3.5.2

Proﬁts from inducing industrialization

The critical mass of industrialization n∗c is deﬁned as the value of n which satisﬁes
πI (n, m∗ , ρc ) = ϕ0 + ϕ1 n − ϕ2 m∗ − (1 + ρc )K = 0, where m∗ is ﬁrms’ common belief
on the number of ﬁrms investing in sector II. We then have:

n∗c ≡

ϕ2 m∗ + (1 + ρc )K − ϕ0
ϕ1

(3.13)

Let us assume that n∗c > 1 for all m∗ ≥ 0. Without this assumption, the model
does not have a coordination problem since any single investment project in sector I
11

The number of ﬁrms in the modern sector to which the bank would grant loans must be smaller
than that of ﬁrms in the critical mass because otherwise the modern sector would fully develop on
its own which contradicts the scenario in this second alternative.
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will be proﬁtable no matter how many other ﬁrms invest in the sector. In order for
the big bank to mobilize ﬁrms in the critical mass, it has to subsidize those ﬁrms by
managing interest rates. If ﬁrms’ expectations on m is m∗ ,12 the big bank will charge
the interest rates by the following rule in order to make investment projects of the
ﬁrms in the critical mass break even:

ρ∗i =

ϕ0 + ϕ1 i − ϕ2 m∗
− 1 for all i ∈ [1, n∗c ]
K

(3.14)

(3.14) is obtained by solving πI (i, m∗ , ri ) = 0 for ri .13 The big bank cannot charge
ﬁrm i in the critical mass any interest rate above the level speciﬁed in (3.14) because
if so, it will fail to induce the ﬁrm to invest,14 thereby failing to mobilize the critical
mass. Moreover, the bank has no reason to charge ﬁrm i any other rate lower than
the rate speciﬁed in (3.14) because it has the proﬁt maximizing objective. Thus,
the interest rates given by (3.14) are the maximum permissible rates on the loans
extended to the ﬁrms in the critical mass. It is worth noting that (3.14), together
with our assumption that n∗c > 1 for all m∗ ≥ 0, implies that the rates charged to
ﬁrms in the critical mass (ρ∗i ) must be strictly lower than the competitive rate (ρc ),
in other words, ρc > ρ∗i for all i ∈ [1, n∗c ].
While the big bank charges the rates dictated by (3.14) to ﬁrms in the critical
mass, the bank will charge ρc for other ﬁrms outside the critical mass, i.e. i ∈ (n∗c , A]
because it is subject to the Bertrand competition. It is trivial to see the capacity
In order for ﬁrms’ beliefs to be rational, m∗ must be zero in the case where the bank induces an
industrialization equilibrium.
12

13

In Da Rin and Hellman (2002), the condition dictating this type of interest rate policy is called
‘elimination constraint.’ Unlike their model, the interest rate policy given by (3.14) in our model
depends on sector I ﬁrms’ expectations on m. Keeping others constant, a rise in m∗ requires
a lower interest rate (ρ∗i ). Intuition is simple. Since we assume that two sectors are strategically
substitutable, if ﬁrms in sector I expect sector II to expand, they expect their proﬁts to be negatively
aﬀected, thus a lower interest rate is required to make them break even.
14

For any i ∈ [1, n∗c ], if ri > ρ∗i , then πI (i, m∗ ri ) < 0
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constraint will be binding and no credit will be granted to ﬁrms in sector II, i.e.
n = A and m = 0.
Now we can derive the bank’s proﬁts denoted as ΠH earned from inducing industrialization:
∗

ΠH

nc
∑
=
(ρ∗i − ρm )K + (A − n∗c )(ρc − ρm )K

(3.15)

i=1
∗

nc
∑
=
(ρ∗i − ρc )K + (ρc − ρm )KA
i=1

nc [
∑
ϕ0 + ϕ1 i − ϕ2 m

]

∗

=

i=1

K

(3.16)

− 1 − ρc K + (ρc − ρm )KA

1
= − ϕ1 n∗c (n∗c − 1) + (ρc − ρm )KA
2

(3.17)

Two remarks follow from observing (3.17). First, the bank’s proﬁt from inducing
industrialization is increasing in its size A:

dΠH
dA

= (ρc − ρm )K. Second, since we

assume that n∗c > 1, − 21 ϕ1 n∗c (n∗c − 1) in (3.20) is always negative. Thus, the bank’s
proﬁt in this case must be strictly lower than (ρc − ρm )KA, i.e. ΠH < (ρc − ρm )KA.
The analysis in this section can be summarized by Proposition 4:
Proposition 4 Suppose that pessimistic beliefs prevail, n∗c > 1 for all m∗ ≥ 0, and
the bank with market power decides to induce industrialization. Then:
(i) Let ρ∗i be such that πI (i, m∗ , ρ∗i ) = 0. The bank with market power will charge
ρ∗i to ﬁrm i in the critical mass (i ∈ [1, n∗c ]) and ρc to ﬁrms outside the critical
mass (i ∈ [n∗c , A]). The ﬁrms in sector I not ﬁnaced by the big bank will be
ﬁnanced by fringe banks at ρc
(ii) ρ∗i < ρc for all (i ∈ [1, n∗c ]).
(iii) The bank’s proﬁt is given by ΠH = − 21 ϕ1 n∗c (n∗c − 1) + (ρc − ρm )KA and ΠH <
(ρc − ρm )KA
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3.5.3

Proﬁts from inducing an underdevelopment trap

Now suppose that the bank with market power considers inducing an underdevelopment trap. We want to ﬁnd the bank’s optimal interest rates and loan allocation.
Let us deﬁne mL such that:
mL ≡

γ0 − (1 + ρc )K
γ2

(3.18)

mL is the equilibrium number of ﬁrms investing in the traditional sector if there
is no bank with market power and every competitive bank will charge ρc subject to
Bertrand competition.
Depending on whether mL > A or mL ≤ A, we have two diﬀerent cases.
3.5.3.1

Strong traditional sector: mL > A

Let us start with the case in which mL > A. In this case, the bank size is less
than the equilibrium number of ﬁrms investing in the traditional sector which would
occur if there is no bank with market power. This condition may hold for the country
which has large proﬁtable traditional sectors due to high γ0 or low γ2 .
Suppose that the bank with market power decides to induce an underdevelopment
trap. Then it will use its entire resources to ﬁnance ﬁrms in the traditional sector at
ρc under the Bertrand constraint. There is no reason why the big bank extends loans
to ﬁrms in sector I because the bank should provide loans to ﬁrms in sector I at a rate
strictly lower than ρc . Instead, the big bank can provide its entire loans to ﬁrms in
sector II at ρc . The loan oﬀers from competitive fringe banks at ρc will be accepted
by ﬁrms which could not obtain ﬁnance from the big bank. In equilibrium exactly
mL ﬁrms in the traditional sector will make break-even since every bank will charge
ρc .15 Thus, in equilibrium, A ﬁrms in sector II will be ﬁnanced by the big bank and
15

Given that ﬁrms believe the modern sector would not develop at all (they should believe this
in order for their beliefs to be rational), the proﬁt of a representative ﬁrm in sector II is given by
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mL − A in the same sector by fringe banks. Let us denote as ΠL the level of proﬁt
in the underdevelopment trap. As long as mL > A, ΠL = (ρc − ρm )KA . From this
and Proposition 4 (iii), we have:

ΠH < ΠL if mL > A.

In other words, as long as mL > A, the bank with market power will induce an
underdevelopment trap because it is more proﬁtable to induce the underdevelopment
trap than an industrialization equilibrium. From (3.18), mL is positively related to
γ0 and negatively to ρc , K and γ2 . Thus, the higher γ0 and the lower ρc , K and γ2 ,
the more likely the condition mL > A be met for a given size of A. The analysis
in this section suggests that under the condition mL > A, banks with market power
may fail to be a catalyst for industrialization since their proﬁt maximization motives
guide them to manage the traditional sector rather than stimulate the modern sector.
Proposition 5 follows:
Proposition 5 Suppose that mL > A and pessimistic beliefs dominate. Then:
(i) In an underdevelopment equilibrium, mL ﬁrms will enter sector II where mL ≡
(γ0 − (1 + ρc )K)/γ2 .
(ii) If the bank with market power chooses an underdevelopment trap, it will charge
ρc to A ﬁrms in sector II. mL −A ﬁrms in sector II will be ﬁnanced by competitive
fringe banks.
(iii) If the bank with market power chooses an underdevelopment trap, it will make
a proﬁt of ΠL = (ρc − ρm )KA which is always greater than the proﬁt if it would
πII (0, m, ρc ) = γ0 − γ2 m − (1 + ρc )K. Firms will keep entering sector II up to the point where
πII (0, m, ρc ) = 0 which gives us the equilibrium level of m.
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make in the case of industrialization. Thus, the bank’s ﬁnal decision is, indeed,
to induce an underdevelopment trap as long as mL > A.
3.5.3.2

Weak traditional sector: mL ≤ A

Let us look at the other case in which mL ≤ A. This case represents an economy
with a relative weak traditional sector. This may be due to low γ0 or high γ2 . The
bank’s proﬁt maximization problem is given by:

max

m,n,r,ri

s.t.

(r − ρm )Km +

n
∑

(ri − ρm )K

(3.19)

i=1

r ≤ ρc

(3.20)

m+n≤A

(3.21)

πII (n, m, r) = 0

(3.22)

πI (n + 1, m, ρc ) ≤ 0

(3.23)

πI (i, m, ri ) = 0

(3.24)

r represents the uniform rate of interest the bank charges on the loans granted
to ﬁrms in the traditional sector.16 ri ’s are the rates of interest on the loans to
ﬁrm i in the modern sector. (3.19) is the bank’s objective function showing its total
proﬁt. (3.20) and (3.21) are the Bertrand constraint and the loan capacity constraint,
respectively. (3.22) describes the equilibrium relation between m, n and r which is
implied by the zero proﬁt condition for a representative ﬁrm in the traditional sector.
(3.23) ensures that the economy should not industrialize: if this condition does not
hold, the modern sector may fully develop on its own. (3.24) shows the interest rate
discriminating policy set by the big bank. This policy speciﬁes the rate of interest for
16

The bank does not have any incentive to interest-rate-discriminate ﬁrms in the traditional sector
while it does have in the modern sector characterized by strategic complementarities among ﬁrms.

128

each ﬁrm i in the critical mass which makes each ﬁrm i break even at a given level
of m. Based on the analysis of this maximization problem, proposition 6 follows and
the proof is given in Appendix G.
Proposition 6 Suppose that mL ≤ A and pessimistic beliefs dominate. Then the
bank with market power has a proﬁt maximization problem given by (3.19)-(3.24).
(i) The proﬁt maximization problem has a global maximum.
Let us write the maximized proﬁt as a function of A and denote this as ΠL (A).
Then, ΠL (A) has the following properties (ii)-(v).
(ii) ΠL (A) is bounded from above. In other words, the capacity constraint (21) will
eventually become slack.
(iii) ΠL (A) is nondecreasing in A and continuous.
(iv) ΠL (mL ) > ΠH (mL ).
(v) As long as the capacity constraint (3.21) is binding,

dΠL (A)
dA

< (ρc − ρm )K.

Proof. See Appendix G.
Proposition 6 along with proposition 4 and 5 will be used to construct the proﬁt
curves of the big bank in 3.5.4 and to see the bank’s ﬁnal decision on sectoral credit
allocation.

3.5.4

Bank’s ﬁnal decision on sectoral allocation

The bank with market power will make its ﬁnal decision on whether to induce
industrialization or underdevelopment by comparing proﬁts ΠH and ΠL . Based on
proposition 4(iii), 5(iii) and 6(ii)-6(v), we can construct proﬁt curves of the big bank as
shown in Figure 3.2. As the bank size (A) increases, the bank proﬁt from promoting
industrialization (ΠH ) is unboundedly increasing starting from a negative level of

129

proﬁt, − 12 ϕ1 n∗c (n∗c −1), while the proﬁt from inducing an underdevelopment trap (ΠL )
is nondecreasing starting from origin and eventually bounded since the expansion of
the modern sector has a limit in this regime and as a result beneﬁts from investment
complementarities in the modern sector are limited.
Bank Profit
(3 H , 3 L )

3H

3L

Slope ( ȡc ȡm)K

0

I1 nc*(nc*1) / 2

A1

mL

Induce De-industrialization
A  A*

A*

Bank Size
(A)

Promote Industrialization
A ! A*

Figure 3.2. Bank’s Decision

Proposition 4, 5 and 6 imply that there exists a unique A∗ such that ΠL (A∗ ) =
ΠH (A∗ ). A∗ is the minimum bank size required for the bank to induce an industrialization equilibrium. For a range of the bank size A < A∗ , the bank with market
power decides not to promote industrialization. This case does not exclude a limited
expansion of the modern sector, but the bank will not push forward the process of
industrialization to the extent that the modern sector can develop on its own in this
regime because it undermines its own proﬁtability. Only when A exceeds the critical
value A∗ , the bank has an incentive to promote industrialization. Two remarks are
in order.
First, the minimum degree of market power required to induce the big bank to
promote industrialization (A∗ ) depends on the position of ΠH and ΠL , which in turn
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is aﬀected by the sectoral structure. Any change in a parameter which will shift up
the bank proﬁt in an underdevelopment case will raise A∗ . In Figure 3.3, an upward
shift in ΠL increases the critical level from A∗ to A∗∗ . Changes in parameters which
are favorable for ﬁrms’ proﬁts in sector II (i.e. a rise in γ0 or a fall in γ1 or γ2 ) tend
to shift up the bank’s proﬁt function in an underdevelopment trap case and raise the
critical value of A.
Bank Profit
(3 H , 3 L )

3H

3 'L
3L

0

mL

mL' A*

A**

Bank Size
(A)

Figure 3.3. The Eﬀect of an Increase in Proﬁtability in the Traditional Sector

Second, it is worth noting that the critical value A∗ is greater than mL . We may
interpret mL as a status quo size of the traditional sector. Thus, the existence of a
strong traditional sector may be captured by a high value of mL which makes the
condition mL > A more likely to hold. As long as mL > A, the bank with market
power will induce an underdevelopment trap because the traditional sector provides
proﬁt opportunities better than the modern sector (Proposition 5 (iii)).
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3.6

Implications

The analysis in the previous section suggests that the conditions under which the
bank with market power can play a catalytic role for industrialization depend critically
on the sectoral structure of an economy. A degree of market power suﬃcient to solve
a coordination problem for one economy may not be suﬃcient to solve it for another
economy. Banks with market power may fail to solve coordination problem when
they have strong proﬁt opportunities in traditional sectors. Thus, the conditions
under which the bank’s proﬁt maximization motive is compatible with the goal of
promoting industrialization may not be met under some circumstances. In this regard,
Epstein’s institutional study (2005b) is suggestive. Epstein emphasizes that central
banks not only in the developing countries but also in the now developed countries
have engaged in sectoral policies in order to support economic sectors. Historical
cases supporting this arguments includes some ‘private central banks’ such as some
continental European central banks in the nineteenth century, the Bank of France,
the Bank of the Netherlands, and the Bank of Italy. After discussing these examples,
Epstein adds a caveat:
“One should not overestimate the extent to which these central banks were
agents of development in the sense of having a developmental vision and
intent. These central banks were private, not public. As a result, their
interest was in making a proﬁt. At times, this concern even conﬂicted
with their activities as central banks. Still, however imperfectly, these
central banks helped mobilize and allocate ﬁnance to industry and to
government in the service of economic development, sometimes directed
by a developmental vision from the state.” (Epstein, 2005b, p.10)
Epstein’s study suggests that there can be conﬂicts between private proﬁt maximizing motives and a national interest of industrialization. Despite these conﬂicts,
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some optimistic perspective may suggest that spontaneous coordination among private agents can achieve a Pareto-optimal outcome and avoid a Pareto inferior outcome
if they recognize that they will get huge gains from spontaneously coordinating themselves. However, proponents of a big push have given doubts to this possibility,17 and
the analysis in this chapter suggests that the presence of proﬁt opportunities in the
traditional sector can be an obstacle to that kind of spontaneous coordination. This
may be why government sponsored development banks, rather than private agents,
have played a crucial role in promoting industrialization or sectoral development in
many developing countries (Chang, 2002).18

17

See Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and Matsuyama (1995).

18
Armendariz de Aghion (1999) emphasizes the role of development banking from another perspective such as coﬁnancing arrangements and coownership with private ﬁnancial institutions.
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APPENDIX A
DATA SOURCES AND CALCULATIONS FOR FIGURES
IN CHAPTER 1

¤ Figure 1.1 Nonfarm Nonﬁnancial Corporations (1952-2007)
(a) The Ratio of Debt to Capital Debt (credit market instruments) = commercial paper + municipal securities + corporate bonds + bank loans + other
loans and advances + mortgages. Capital = replacement cost of structures +
replacement cost of equipment and software. Sources: Federal Reserve Board,
Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, Table B.102. Author’s calculation.
(b) The Ratio of Debt to Proﬁt Debt = credit market instruments. Proﬁt measures are before tax and after depreciation. Sources: Flow of Funds Accounts
of the United States, Table B.102 and Table F.102; Author’s calculation.
(c) The Ratio of Interest Payment to Proﬁt Interest Payment = (nominal
bank prime rate − CPI inﬂation) × credit market instruments. Proﬁt measures
are before tax and after depreciation. Sources: Flow of Funds Accounts of the
United States, Table B.102 and Table F.102; Federal Reserve Board, Federal
Reserve Statistical Release; Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Consumer Price
Index. Author’s calculation.
(d) The Ratio of Net Issues of Equities to Fixed Investment Net issues of nonﬁnancial corporate equities divided by nonfarm nonﬁnancial corporate (gross) ﬁxed investment. Sources: Flow of Funds Accounts of the United
States, Table F.102. Author’s calculation.
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¤ Figure 1.2 Households (1952-2007)
(a) The Ratio of Personal Consumption Expenditures to Disposable
Personal Income Sources: Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States,
Table F.6 and F.100. Author’s calculation.
(b) Debt-Income Ratio Household debt and income refer to credit market instruments and disposable personal income in the accounts, respectively. Sources:
Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, Table B.100. Author’s calculation.
(c) The Ratio of Equity Holding to Deposit Holding: Households and
Nonproﬁt Organizations (1952-2007) Sources: Flow of Funds Accounts
of the United States, Table B.100. Author’s calculation.
¤ Figure 1.2 : Nonfarm Nonﬁnancial Corporations (1952-2007)
(d) The Rate of Return on Equity

The rate of return on equity = (net

dividends + capital gains) ÷ market value of equity outstanding. Capital
gains = ∆ market value of equity − net new equity issues. CPI inﬂation rates
are used to obtain the real rates. Sources: Flow of Funds Accounts of the
United States, Table B.102 and Table F.102; Bureau of Labor Statistics, The
Consumer Price Index. Author’s calculation.
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1

To prove the existence of a limit cycle for the system of (1.37), (1.39), and (1.42),
we need to show that the Jacobian matrix (1.45) evaluated at (m(λ), α(λ), z(λ), λ),
where (m(λ), α(λ), z(λ)) is a ﬁxed point of the system,1 should have the following
properties:
• The Jacobian matrix has a pair of complex conjugate eigenvalues β(λ) ± θ(λ)i
such that β(λ∗ ) = 0, θ(λ∗ ) ̸= 0, and β ′ (λ∗ ) ̸= 0 and no other eigenvalues with
zero real part exist at (m(λ∗ ), α(λ∗ ), z(λ∗ ) , λ∗ )
where λ∗ is a Hopf bifurcation point.
To apply the above condition for the Hopf bifurcation to the current context, I
will use the fact that the Jacobian matrix will have a negative real root and a pair of
pure imaginary roots if and only if:
(R1) Tr(J) = Fm + Gz < 0
(R2) J1 + J2 + J3 = Fm Gz − ζ ′ · Gα > 0
(R3) Det(J) = −ζ ′ · (Fm Gα − Fα Gm ) < 0
(R4) −Tr(J)(J1 + J2 + J3 ) + Det(J) = −(Fm + Gz )(Fm Gz − ζ ′ · Gα ) − ζ ′ · (Fm Gα −
Fα Gm ) = 0
Let us denote the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix as µ(λ) and β(λ) ± θ(λ)i.
1

Note that in our case the ﬁxed point is independent of the value of λ.
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Proof of (I)
Suppose that Gα < 0. Then (R3) is always met. In order to satisfy (R1) and
{
}
′
(R2), we should have Gz < min |Fm |, ζ|F|Gmα| | . (R4) is quadratic in Gz . (R4) can be
rewritten as:
a1 G2z + a2 Gz + a3 = 0

(B.1)

where

a1 ≡ −Fm > 0
a2 ≡ −(F2m − ζ ′ Gα ) S 0
a3 ≡ ζ ′ Fα Gm < 0

Solving (B.1) for Gz , we obtain one negative and one positive real roots. Let us
select the negative root2 , which is given as:

b≡

(|Fm |2 − ζ ′ Gα ) −

√
(|Fm |2 − ζ ′ Gα )2 + 4ζ ′ |Fm ||Gm |Fα
<0
2|Fm |

e

(B.2)

e

Since Gz = κre ∂r
− λ, the value of λ that satisﬁes (R4) is: λ = κre ∂r
+ |b|. Let
∂z
∂z
{
}
′
e
+|b|. We have shown that if Gz < min |Fm |, ζ|F|Gmα| | and λ = λ∗ , then the
λ∗ ≡ κre ∂r
∂z
Jacobian matrix has a negative real root and a pair of imaginary roots: µ(λ∗ ) < 0,
β(λ∗ ) = 0, and θ(λ∗ ) ̸= 0. To prove λ∗ is indeed the bifurcation point, we still need
to show that β ′ (λ∗ ) ̸= 0. To prove β ′ (λ∗ ) ̸= 0, let us use the following fact:

µ(λ) + 2β(λ) = Fm + Gz
2µ(λ)β(λ) + β(λ)2 + θ(λ)2 = Fm Gz − ζ ′ · Gα
µ(λ)[β(λ)2 + θ(λ)2 ] = −ζ ′ · (Fm Gα − Fα Gm )
2

It can be shown that the positive root is irrelevant for the analysis.
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Totally diﬀerentiating both sides with respect to λ, we get










′

1
2
0

 µ (λ)  −1 


 


 β ′ (λ) = |F |
2β(λ)
2[µ(λ)
+
β(λ)]
2θ(λ)


  m


 

[β(λ)2 + θ(λ)2 ]
2µ(λ)β(λ)
2µ(λ)θ(λ)
θ′ (λ)
0
The right hand side of (B.3) is obtained using the fact that

∂Gz
∂λ

(B.3)

= −1 and λ does not

aﬀect all other partial derivatives than Gz . Evaluating (B.3) at λ = λ∗ , we have:
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∗
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0
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 0
 β ′ (λ∗ ) = |F |
∗
∗
2µ(λ
)
2θ(λ
)
m



 

 


′ ∗
∗ 2
∗
∗
θ (λ )
0
θ(λ )
0
2µ(λ )θ(λ )
Solving this for β ′ (λ∗ ), we ﬁnally get:
β ′ (λ∗ ) =

2µ(λ∗ )θ(λ∗ )|Fm | − 2θ(λ∗ )3
< 0 since µ(λ∗ ) < 0
4µ(λ∗ )2 θ(λ∗ ) + 4θ(λ∗ )3

Thus, β ′ (λ∗ ) is strictly negative.
Proof of (II)
Suppose that Gα > 0 and Gz < 0. Then (R1) is always satisﬁed. To meet (R2)
{
}
z | Fα |Gm |
and (R3), we need Gα < min |Fmζ||G
, |Fm | . The rest of the proof is essentially
′
the same as that of (I).
Proof of (III)
Routh-Hurwitz necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the local stability of a three
dimensional system are (R1), (R2) and (R3) with replacing the equality in (R4) by the
inequality: −Tr(J)(J1 + J2 + J3 ) + Det(J) > 0. Suppose that Gα > 0 and Gz > 0.
Then (R2) is always violated and the ﬁxed point is unstable. At the same time, since
(R2) is not met, it is impossible to get a limit cycle a la the Hopf bifurcation.
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APPENDIX C
FUNCTIONS AND PARAMETER VALUES FOR THE
SIMULATION IN CHAPTER 1

Investment function is linear in the utilization rate and consumption function in
household disposable income and wealth.

g = γ0 + γ1 u

(C.1)

I
=g+δ
K

(C.2)

C
= c1 [uσ − sf (πuσ − δ − rm)] + c2 q
K
The condition for the goods market equilibrium (Y = C + I) gives us the equilibrium proﬁt share:

π =

ϕ(u) + δ − (1 − c1 )uσ + c2 (1 + α)m + c1 sf (δ + rm)
c1 sf uσ

≡ π(u, m, α)

The growth function is assumed to take the following nonlinear form.

Ŷ = h(π, e) = h0 +

h1
1 + exp[−h2 (π + h3 ln(h4 − e) + h5 ))]

(C.3)

Given this speciﬁcation and chosen parameter values, the response of output
growth to changes in the proﬁt share is small at high and low values of the proﬁt
share but large at intermediate values.
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Nonlinearity plays an important role in ﬁrms’ debt dynamics and households’
portfolio dynamics (C.4 and C.5). Function τ and ζ is very steep at

ρT
rm

= τ −1 (0) and

z = 0, respectively.

ṁ = τ

(ρ )
T

rm

= τ0 +

τ1 − τ0
( ρT
)
1 + exp[−τ2 rm
− τ3 ]

where ρT = π(u∗ , m, α)u∗ σ and u∗ =
α̇ = ζ(z) = ζ0 +

(C.4)

1
(n − γ0 )
γ1

ζ1 − ζ0
1 + exp[−ζ2 (z − ζ3 )]

(C.5)

ż = κ (re |u=u∗ − r, α) − λz = κ0 + κ1 (re |u=u∗ − r) − κ2 α − λz
where re |u=u∗ =

(C.6)

ρT − δ − rm + (1 + α)(ṁ + mn) + α̇m − n
.
αm

Table C.1. Parameter values
γ0

γ1

h0

h1

h2

h3

h4

h5

σ

-0.93

1.2

-0.02

0.07

60

0.4

1.1

0.423

0.5

n

δ

sf

r

c1

c2

κ0

κ1

κ2

0.03

0.09

0.7

0.04

0.65

0.04

0.066

0.007

0.06

λ

ζ0

ζ1

ζ2

ζ3

τ0

τ1

τ2

τ3

0.0105

-0.24

0.03

30

-0.7

-0.15

0.011

20

10.6
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APPENDIX D
ALTERNATIVE MEASURE OF THE TREND RATE OF
PROFIT

A weighed moving average speciﬁcation may provide an alternative measure of
the trend rate of proﬁt:
∫
ρT =

t

−∞

η exp [−η(t − ν)]ρν dν where µ > 0

(D.1)

where ρν is the current rate of proﬁt at each moment of time ν ∈ (−∞, t] and
η exp [−η(t − ν)] represents the weight attached to ρν in the calculation of the trend
rate of proﬁt at time t, which exponetially decreases as ν gets futhur back to the past.
This speciﬁcation implies that the trend proﬁt rate is constantly updated based on
the following averaging process.
ρ̇T = η(ρ − ρT )

where ρ = π(u, m, α)uσ. Note that the expression for the current proﬁt rate ρ includes
capicity utilization (u) as well as the debt ratio (m) and the equity-deposit ratio (α).
Thus, the system of short cycles and that of long waves become interdependent.
The two speciﬁcations, (1.34) and (D.1), produce qualitatively similar results.
The basic idea behind both speciﬁcations is to smooth actual proﬁtability and get a
measure of the long-run trend of proﬁtability and one would expect the two speciﬁcations to produce qualitatively similar results. Simulations conﬁrm that this is indeed
the case. Analytically, the speciﬁcation (1.34) is more tractable and the analysis in
Chapter 1 has been based on (1.34).
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APPENDIX E
PROCEDURE FOR NUMERICAL RESULTS IN 2.4.1.2,
2.4.2.2 AND 2.5.2.

In 2.4.1.2, 2.4.2.2, and 2.5.2 we used numerical methods to examine the comparative statics of two models: one with constant stock-ﬂow ratios, α and β, and the
other with Lavoie-Godley speciﬁcations on consumption and portfolio choice and induced variations in the stock-ﬂows ratios. The analysis was conducted in the context
of Harrodian mature economies (2.4.1.2), Harrodian dual economies (2.4.2.2), and
Kaleckian dual economies (2.5.2) and the results summarized in Table 2.1 to 2.10.
In this appendix, we present the procedure that was used to ﬁnd the values of the
derivatives of the endogenous variables with respect to ﬁnancial and other parameters. We do this in the context of Kaleckian dual economies (see Table 2.5 in 2.5.2)
where the model with variable stock-ﬂow ratios is the same as the one in Lavoie and
Godley (2001-2002). The procedure in the other cases is similar and, in fact, less
complicated. Note that Table 2.1, 2.3, 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7 are produced based on the
speciﬁcation of consumption in Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002) - the ﬂow-ﬂow speciﬁcation represented by (E.3) below- while the other tables (Table 2.2, 2.4, 2.8, 2.9
and 2.10) are produced based on that in Godley and Lavoie (2007). In the latter,
the consumption function (E.3) is replaced by

C
K

= c1 {u − sf (πu − rm)} + c2 q where

c1 = 0.75 and c2 = 0.064, keeping intact other equations and parameter values.
The Kaleckian dual economies with the variable α and β − Lavoie and
Godley (2001-2002)
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g = sf (πu − rm) + mg + xg

(E.1)

g = γ0 + γ1 sf ( πu − rm) − γ2 rm + γ3 q + γ4 u

(E.2)

u − g = a1 {u − sf (πu − rm)} +

a1
γ
a2

(E.3)

m = (1 − λ0 + λ1 r − λ2 re )q + λ3 {u − sf (πu − rm)}

where re =

(1−sf )(πu−rm)+γ
q−m

(E.4)

and γ = g(q − m) − xg.

The symbols used here are the same as the ones in the main text of this paper. The
inﬂation rate is assumed to be zero. (E.1) describes ﬁrms’ ﬁnance constraint, (E.2)
is the investment function, (E.3) describes the equilibrium condition for the product
market where the right-hand side speciﬁes households consumption behavior as a
function of household distributed income and capital gains. (E.4) shows households’
demand for money (portfolio choice). The following values are used by Lavoie and
Godley (2001-2002).

γ0 = 0.0075

γ1 = 0.5

sf = 0.75

x = 0.05

a1 = 0.8

a2 = 4.5

λ0 = 0.45

λ1 = 0.2

γ2 = 0.5

γ3 = 0.02

γ4 = 0.125

π = 0.2498

λ2 = 0.0133

λ3 = 0.0001 r = 0.0275

Given these parameter, (E.1)-(E.4) determine the steady-state values of u, g, q
and m. The system has multiple solutions due to nonlinearities of some equations.
The number of solutions is six but ﬁve of them can be discarded on economic grounds
since at least one of the variables − including re − is negative. The positive numerical
solution is:

u∗ = 0.188

g ∗ = 0.0545

q ∗ = 0.8789
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m∗ = 0.487

(E.5)

The partial derivatives of the solutions for u and g with respect to sf , x, r, π, and
λ0 are evaluated at (u∗ , g ∗ , q ∗ , m∗ ). The obtained values were reported in the third
and ﬁfth columns of Table 2.5.
Using the deﬁnitions of α and β, we obtain the following equilibrium values for α
and β:

α∗ =

q ∗ − m∗
= 2.07936
u∗

β∗ =

m∗
= 2.58914
u∗

Using these steady-state values of stock-ﬂow ratios, we can transform the variable
α and β regime to the constant α and β regime by dropping the consumption and
portfolio choice functions.

Constant α and β regime

g = sf (πu − rm) + mg + xg
g = γ0 + γ1 sf ( πu − rm) − γ2 rm + γ3 q + γ4 u
q = (α∗ + β ∗ )u
m = β ∗u

By construction, the above four equations must yield the same steady state values
as in (E.5). Then, the partial derivatives of the solutions for u and g with respect to
sf , x, r, π, and λ0 , again, are evaluated at (u∗ , g ∗ , q ∗ , m∗ ). The second and forth
columns of Table 2.5 report these values.

144

APPENDIX F
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2

Proof. The ﬁnal good producer solves the following cost minimization problem where
PX and PY are price indices for good X and Y :

Minimize PX X + PY Y

(F.1)

[
] ϵ
1
1 ϵ−1
subject to Z = αX 1− ϵ + βY 1− ϵ

(F.2)

{X,Y }

The ﬁrst-order conditions give us the solution to the minimization problem:
[
]− ϵ
X = αϵ PX−ϵ Z αϵ PX1−ϵ + β ϵ PY1−ϵ ϵ−1

(F.3)

[
]− ϵ
Y = β ϵ PY−ϵ Z αϵ PX1−ϵ + β ϵ PY1−ϵ ϵ−1

(F.4)

From the zero proﬁt condition for the ﬁnal good sector, we have:
[
]− 1
PZ = αϵ PX1−ϵ + β ϵ PY1−ϵ ϵ−1

PZ is the ﬁnal good price, which is normalized to unity (PZ = 1).
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(F.5)

A representative ﬁrm that produces good X faces the following cost minimization
problem:

n
∑

Minimize
n
{x(i)}i=1

px (i)x(i)

i=1

[

subject to X =

n
∑

σ
] σ−1

1− σ1

x(i)

(F.6)

i=1

The ﬁrst order conditions, along with (F.6), are given by:
(
px (i) − λ

σ
σ−1

) [∑
n

1
] σ−1

x(i)− σ = 0 for all i

1− σ1

1

x(i)

(F.7)

i=1

The zero proﬁt condition can be written:
n
∑

PX X −

px (i)x(i) = 0

(F.8)

i=1

Similarly, a representative ﬁrm that produces good Y has the following cost minimization problem:

m
∑

Minimize
m
{y(j)}j=1

py (j)y(j)

j=1

[
subject to Y =

m
∑

τ
] τ −1

1− τ1

y(j)

(F.9)

j=1

The ﬁrst order conditions and the zero proﬁt condition are:
(
py (j) − µ

τ
τ −1

) [∑
m

1
] τ −1

y(j)

1− τ1

y(j)− τ = 0 for all j
1

(F.10)

j=1

PY Y −

m
∑

py (j)y(j) = 0

(F.11)

j=1

(F.6), (F.7), (F.9) and (F.10) give each intermediate good producer a conditional
factor demand curve. The elasticity of demand for each i- and j-producer is σ and τ ,
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respectively.1 Thus, the proﬁt maximization behavior of each individual intemediate
good producer implies the following mark-up pricing rule:

By normalizing

(

σ
σ−1

)

a=

px (i) =

σ
aw for all i
σ−1

py (j) =

τ
bw for all j
τ −1

(

τ
τ −1

)

b = 1, we have:

px (i) = py (j) = w for all i, j

(F.12)

Furthermore, by symmetricity, we know that each producer produces the same quantity of output:
x(i) = x for all i

(F.13)

y(j) = y for all j

(F.14)

It follows from (F.6), (F.9), (F.13) and (F.14) that:

σ

x = n 1−σ X

(F.15)

τ

y = m 1−τ Y

(F.16)

(F.8), (F.12) and (F.15) are combined to give us the expression for the price index
for good X in terms of the wage rate and the number of i-producers.

1

1

PX = px n 1−σ = wn 1−σ
1

(F.17)

This follows the conventional assumption in the literature that intermediate good producers do
not engage in strategic interactions among them.
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Similarly, using (F.11), (F.12) and (F.16), we have the expression for the price index
for good Y .
1

1

PY = py m 1−τ = wm 1−τ

(F.18)

The zero proﬁt condition for the ﬁnal good sector, (F.5), together with (F.17) and
(F.18), yields the expression for the equilibrim wage rate for given m and n.
1
[
] ϵ−1
ϵ−1
ϵ−1
w(m, n) = αϵ n σ−1 + β ϵ m τ −1

(F.19)

Next, we need to ﬁnd the expressions for x and y for given m and n. Note that from
(F.3), (F.4), (F.17) and (F.18), the relative factor demand from the ﬁnal good sector
is given by:
X
=
Y

(

βPX
αPY

)−ϵ

(
=

βn1/(1−σ)
αm1/(1−τ )

)−ϵ
(F.20)

In symmetric equilibrium, the labor market clearing condition is written as:

anx + bmy = L

(F.21)

Then, (F.15), (F.16), (F.20) and (F.21) can determine x and y for given m and n.
ϵ−σ

x(m, n) =

αϵ n σ−1 L
ϵ−1

ϵ−1

(F.22)

ϵ−1

(F.23)

aαϵ n σ−1 + bβ ϵ m τ −1

ϵ−τ

y(m, n) =

β ϵ m τ −1 L
ϵ−1

aαϵ n σ−1 + bβ ϵ m τ −1

It is straightforward to see that (F.12), (F.19), (F.22), (F.23), (3.4) and (3.5)
imply the proﬁt functions (3.7) and (3.8).
1
[
] ϵ−1
ϵ−1
ϵ−1
ϵ−σ
αϵ αϵ n σ−1 + β ϵ m τ −1
n σ−1

πI (n, m, ri ) =

ϵ−1

ϵ−1

aαϵ n σ−1 + bβ ϵ m τ −1
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(1 − a)L − (1 + ri )K

(3.7)

β
πII (n, m, rj ) =

ϵ

[

ϵ

αn

ϵ−1
σ−1

ϵ

+β m
ϵ−1

ϵ−1
τ −1

1
] ϵ−1

ϵ−1

aαϵ n σ−1 + bβ ϵ m τ −1
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ϵ−τ

m τ −1

(1 − b)L − (1 + rj )K

(3.8)

APPENDIX G
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6

Proof. Using ﬁrms’ proﬁt functions (3.11) and (3.12), the maximization problem
(3.19)-(3.24) can be transformed to the following problem:
max [γ0 − γ1 n − γ2 m − (1 + ρm )K]m +
m,n

n
∑

[ϕ0 + ϕ1 i − ϕ2 m − (1 + ρm )K]

(G.1)

i=1

subjec to

γ1
n + m ≥ mL
γ2

(G.2)

m+n≤A

(G.3)

ϕ0 + ϕ1 (n + 1) − ϕ2 m − (1 + ρc )K ≤ 0

(G.4)

(G.2) rewrites the Bertrand constraint (3.20) in terms of n and m. (G.4) is the
deindustrialization constraint which is equivalent to (3.24).
(i) It is easy to show that (G.2), (G.3) and (G.4), along with nonnegative constraints
(m ≥ 0 and n ≥ 0), forms a nonempty compact set under the assumptions
A ≥ mL and n∗c > 1. Since the objective function (G.1) is continous, the
maximization problem has a global maximum in the constraint set.
(ii) From the objective function (G.1), we have:
∂ΠL
(m, n) = γ0 − 2γ2 m − (γ1 + ϕ2 )n − (1 + ρm )K
∂m
∂ΠL
(m, n) = ϕ0 + (1/2)ϕ1 − (γ1 + ϕ2 )m + ϕ1 n − (1 + ρm )K
∂n
Let us consider a set S0 such that S0 ≡ {(n, m) ∈ R2+ |

∂ΠL
(m, n)
∂m

< 0 and

∂ΠL
(m, n)
∂n

0}. Then construct another set S(A) such that S(A) ≡ {(n, m) ∈ R2+ | m + n =
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<

A and ϕ0 + ϕ1 (n + 1) − ϕ2 m − (1 + ρc )K ≤ 0}. It is easy to see S(A) is a
subset of the constraint set for the maximization problem. Furthermore, S(A) is
contained in S0 for a suﬃciently large A. We want to show that the maximum
solution to the problem cannot belong to S(A) for a suﬃciently large A. To
show this, we can choose a suﬃciently large value A′ so that S(A′ ) ⊂ S0 . Let us
denote as (n(A), m(A)) the maximum (m, n) associated with a given A. Then,
by construction of S0 and S(A), (n(A), m(A)) ∈
/ S(A) for any A > A′ because
if (n(A), m(A)) ∈ S(A), then (n(A), m(A)) ∈ S0 , and by slightly decreasing the
value of n(A) to n(A) − ϵ, the bank can raise its proﬁt due to the fact that
∂ΠL
∂n

< 0 for any (m, n) ∈ S0 . This, however, contradicts the assumption that

(n(A), m(A)) is a maximum. This proves that the capacity constraint m+n ≤ A
should be eventually slack as A becomes very large.
(iii) Since the objective function is continuous and the compact constraint set continuously expands as A grows, ΠL (A) is nondecreasing in A and continuous.
(iv) Proposition 4.3 (iii) yields that ΠL (mL ) > ΠH (mL ).
(v) If the capacity constraint (G.2) is not binding,

dΠL (A)
dA

= 0. If only the capacity

constraint (G.2) is binding so that there exists an interior solution, we must
have

∂ΠL
∂m

=

∂ΠL
∂n

and

dm
dA

+

dn
dA

= 1 at the optimum. Then,

dΠL (A)
∂ΠL dm ∂ΠL dn
∂ΠL
=
+
=
dA
∂m dA
∂n dA
∂m
= [γ0 − γ1 n − γ2 m − (1 + ρm )K] − γ2 m − ϕ2 n
= (r − ρm )K − γ2 m − ϕ2 n

If another constraint as well as the capacity constraint is binding, we then have:
dΠL (A)
≤ (r − ρm )K − γ2 m − ϕ2 n
dA
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Thus, for all cases, we obtain:
dΠL (A)
≤ (r − ρm )K − γ2 m − ϕ2 n
dA
= (ρc − ρm )K − (ρc − r)K − γ2 m − ϕ2 n

From the Bertrand constraint (3.20), r ≤ ρc , we have
dΠL (A)
< (ρc − ρm )K
dA
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[30] Duménil, G. and Lévy, D. (1993) The economics of the proﬁt rate. Aldershot:
Elgar.
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